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
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SUMMARY
OF THE
MAHRATTA AND PINDARREE
CAMPAIGN.

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No. 1870
M 199

SUMMARY

OF THE

MAHRATTA AND PINDARREE CAMPAIGN,

DURING 1817, 1818, AND 1819,

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE

MARQUIS OF HASTINGS :

CHIEFLY EMBRACING THE OPERATIONS OF THE

Army of the Deccan,

UNDER THE COMMAND OF HIS EXCELLENCY

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR T. HISLOP, BART. G.C.B.

WITH

SOME PARTICULARS AND REMARKS.

Nec sinas Medos equitare inultos
Te Duce.

LONDON :

PRINTED FOR E. WILLIAMS, 11, STRAND,


BOOKSELLER TO THE KING,

AND TO THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF YORK,

AND SOLD BY ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS.

1820.

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
SKETCH OF THE GENERAL POSITION
of the
BRITISH ARMY.

during the late Mahratta Campaign.

*Showing also the Divisions of the Bengal Army
under Gen. Marshall, Brown, B. Gen. Watson, &
Col. Adams, who cooperated more immediately with
the Southern Army against the Rajah of Berar
and in the War of Central India.*

The line marked Red denotes the route of Badjee Row's
flight as nearly as could be ascertained.

M 199
United Service Institution
of India.




SUMMARY

OF THE

MAHRATTA AND PINDARREE CAMPAIGN

DURING

1817, 1818, AND 1819.



Aurangabad, 15th April, 1819.

MY DEAR L.

In compliance with your earnest solicitations, I shall run over in detail for you, an account of our doings and operations in India within the last three years. I shall give you the ups and downs, the fair and dark sides, without affection or leaning towards this side or that. You will yourself, and your friends, make allowances for any deficiency of style, and the loose, or unconnected manner in which I may be possibly obliged to introduce scraps

throughout my detail : in short, being quite out of character as a scribbler, as you yourself would be, were you dressed in my red coat, and called upon to shew off at our new sword exercise, you must make every allowance for me, and endeavour to glean from these pages some little amusement or interest in the affairs of India, and of your numerous friends in that quarter; if they can impart either one or the other, my highest and only expectation will be fully gratified. I shall try as nearly as possible to embrace the causes, the features, and the incidents of the late campaign in India; and having been myself a partaker throughout of the toils, and personally borne a part in most of the principal occurrences and affairs in the army of the Deckan, you will have one satisfaction in perusing this account, that it comes from one on the spot, in the thick of the bustle, and whose only object is to speak to facts, and to point out to blemishes. Let us therefore proceed.

I visited Calcutta early in 1817, when a temporary lull from the horrors and devastations committed by the Pindarrees, afforded a moment for reflection on the growing power of these marauders, and forcibly reminded the Supreme Government of the necessity of measures of a different temper from those heretofore adopted, towards their suppression and extirpation. There was scarcely a day when some fresh rumour of barbarity or plunder by that banditti, on the Company's provinces, did not pervade and shock the public ear in Calcutta; and, during this season of general alarm and disgust, the local Governments of India seemed to consider the evil passed away like the monsoon, without any effort or plan suited to arrest its fast rising mischief. A few small detachments on the Narbudda, and the western frontier of Bengal, were the only check upon the advance of those hordes; but latterly, a summary mode of treatment to such Pindarrees as were taken prisoners pointed out to the whole body the serious game

that was in future to be dealt to them, as all quarter ceased to be given, and they were executed on the spot.

It was generally believed, that the want of the sanction of the home authorities, alone prevented the Earl of Moira from undertaking at an earlier period the plan which has been since so successfully pursued and followed up; but the season at length arrived when his Excellency, unfettered by any restrictions, was authorized to commence and prosecute his own policy and schemes, to the riddance of those enemies of all peace and order.

It may be proper here to glance for a moment at the general state of India, and the particular posture of affairs, when Lord Moira assumed charge of the Supreme Government in 1813.

Looking back to the middle of the last century, when the British power commenced giving some weight to the politics of India, Mr. Dow observes, "Hindostan is at present torn to pieces by factions. All laws divine and hu-

man are trampled under foot. . Instead of one tyrant, as in the times of the empire, the country now groans under thousands, and the voice of the oppressed multitude reaches heaven. It would, therefore, be promoting the cause of justice and humanity, to pull those petty tyrants from the height to which their villanies have raised them, and to give to so many millions of mankind, a government founded upon the principles of virtue and justice." India, thus over-run for ages past, and until the appearance of the British distracted by internal wars and commotions, could not attach any hope of durability to the conquest of the greatest or the best of their rulers: the people naturally looked for a change of masters in the constant succession of wars or invasion; and these ephemeral conquerors had scarce time to establish a form of government for their newly acquired provinces, before they themselves were compelled to look nearer home, and frequently to calculate upon an immediate surrender of their fleeting conquests. Amidst

these vicissitudes of government and succession of rulers, all property was precarious, and the people were naturally exposed to the severest laws and the most arbitrary exactions. A season of rapine past, they were possibly relieved for a short time from a second visit, and enjoyed during this wretched calm of poverty but a short repose, until either their industry or opulence bent again on them a second visit from their rapacious masters. In this manner, security to be found in no country or government of Hindostan, all confidence was banished the land, and no man's property could be considered his own; the unwarlike and timid Indian stooped or fled on the approach of danger, seldom daring to oppose force or strength to the most unlicensed plunderer, or demand.

In our first steps in India we were, as all wise nations should be, cautious in not despising our enemy; we proceeded with address and circumspection, and were only at first desirous to establish Factories where we had been hurried into Governments; I say hurried, because, whenever

we were compelled to try our hand, and applied with energy our resources or tactics against our enemies in India, we never failed to defeat them, and thus became sovereigns of countries before we ceased to be factors.

Possibly better had it been for England, had she had in the first instance a braver people to have contended with, which might have afforded us equal commercial advantages, and, in the character of a more serious government and people, have checked the precipitance and ambition of our early governments; but accident, and the nature of things in Asia, more than any desire on our part, has brought the load upon us: let us now see to carry it.

The home authorities, particularly the Court of Directors, had been anxious to place men of moderate ambition, and of moderate minds, at the head of the Supreme Government, ever since the close of the Marquis Wellesley's administration. Affrighted at the grandeur and magnitude of that nobleman's plans, and thunderstruck at the sudden pressure of his heavy

demands — without regard to the objects, the causes, and effects of his lordship's policy, they would have almost, in their own narrowness of calculation, revoked his deeds, and annulled that code of policy that was imperiously demanded at the moment, and which alone saved India from French influence, and consequently the British interest from inevitable destruction. It was, in short, a contest between the British and French power in India; the one or the other must have been triumphant: the eyes of all the Native powers were steadily fixed upon the contending parties, and whoever dealt the blow with most success on his adversary, was sure to have had the respect at least, if not the admiration, of the surrounding states.

The French government, on the subversion and overthrow of their power on the coast of India, and the fall of their favourite Tippoo Sultan, turned their attention to a bold design upon central India, and, still in possession of Pondicherry, looked to the port of Ballasore, in Cuttack, as a convenient key for the introduc-

tion of adventurers and military stores; and had this plan been as ably executed as it was devised, it would have been admirably calculated to have recovered their fallen fortunes in the South; but the activity of our fleet, and the alacrity with which our land forces were moved to the different points of attack, utterly defeated that project, and quickly terminated in the final dispersion of the French adventurers in those quarters. The British possessed the naval superiority in the Indian Seas throughout this contest, with a numerous and well organized army: the French had many officers of skill and talent entertained in the service of the Native states, and in command of corps; and they certainly seemed to be more the favourites than we were with the different Native chiefs and courts; the easy and happy versatility of that people adapting itself and assimilating more closely to the manners, languages, and dress of the Eastern sovereigns.

Such an aspect of affairs was sufficient to justify, on the part of the British government,

the utmost stretch of policy and means consistent with common forms of treaty; for there is no such condition as good faith with any Native power in Asia beyond its bare term, and the necessity of the moment.

In the accomplishment of the Marquis Wellesley's plans for the contest on our part, he very justly overlooked all minor considerations, and possibly, in his peremptory challenges and demands upon some of the Native governments, he might have overstepped the bounds of prudence and etiquette of European courts; but neither the season of the conflict, the character or order of things, and above all, the character of the enemy we had to cope with, rendered such a scrupulous attention to positive forms necessary. The field was far off and wide; it only remained for his lordship to ascertain the disposition of the Native powers, whether they were friendly or hostile to us, to collect his means, and push at once the decision of the crisis. The execution of the plan was as prompt as judicious, by first striking at the

fountain-head and rallying post of the French, in Tippoo; next at the dispersion of the French party at Hydrabad; and latterly, defeating and dispersing the several trained and disciplined corps in the service of Scindea, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. Nothing short of the comprehensive and vigorous mind of his lordship could have meditated these views, and nothing but the same energetic application of force could have ensured their complete execution. In the acquisition of territory and aggrandizement to our power that followed these measures, we certainly extended our wings farther than they could well cover. But this was a consequence—and not the object of the contest.

Other noblemen, similarly situated with the Marquis Wellesley, would possibly have rested satisfied with the bare protection of our own territory, would have turned pale to have dreamt of his lordship's plans, and would have remained indifferent to any and all connections that the Naive powers might wish to form, whether with European or Native powers. There is

scarcely a Native prince in India who might not to-morrow be rendered a handle by any foreign power to disturb and supplant, not merely the British government, but every other government, nay, every kind of established order or security. It became us then, and it becomes us as much now, to trust little to their treaties or their professions; whenever there is any danger or apprehension of intrigue or faction amongst them, we must step forward to aid and steady them by our advice and firmness: it will never be sufficient for us to confine our views or political relations to the bare preservation of our possessions in India; we must look farther from us, and possess, not a remote, but an immediate interest and cause in the condition and changes of our neighbours; whatever affects them must, in its operation, bear upon us in some shape or other.

The Marquis Wellesley had learned this by his insight, experience, and knowledge of the Native courts in India; his relations, therefore, were at once concise and absolute with these

powers; viz. "That under such weak hands the security of the British government and its allies is exposed to constant danger and encroachment; and that as you cannot govern your own subjects, nor protect your own dominions, we invite and enjoin you to a community of interest with us; you shall rule your own subjects as you please, but we must be guardians as well as you of the internal stability and peace of your kingdom."

Thus the Marquis Wellesley, when our armies in the former Mahratta war were opposed and impeded by the want of provisions and the aid of the Nizam's officers through his country, which he was bound by treaty to extend and observe towards us, caused it at once to be intimated in public Durbar to the Nizam, that if our troops, in violation of existing treaties, met with any further difficulty in his dominions, the British government should consider him in the light of a public enemy, and act accordingly. — This firm lecture quickly brought the vacillating and weak monarch to his senses. The British

minister announced to him the orders he had received, and requested a public Durbar for the occasion; and the communication very soon extended its good effects to our several divisions proceeding through that country, who met with no further molestation.

The Marquis Cornwallis succeeded the Marquis Wellesley as governor-general; and on his very arrival at Calcutta evinced, in his deportment to the Marquis Wellesley, the disposition and spirit of the home authorities, to husband the resources of the Company, and assume a less lofty tone of government. It is said that Marquis Cornwallis, on his landing, refused entering the carriage of the Marquis Wellesley until two or more of the horses were withdrawn; thus marking the proposed humility of his ensuing administration. The Marquis Cornwallis, in his advanced age, certainly came out the last time but the shadow of his former character, which, though never very resplendent or shining, possessed many of those sound and sober qualities which had endeared him so much to his country.

The fact was, the Marquis Cornwallis was too honest, too open, and too old, to have conducted the affairs of India in a critical moment. He brought out with him, both on the former occasion and the present, many traits of policy, wholesome and accordant enough to European tact, but altogether unsuited to the sphere of Asia. He would have stuck at stumbling-blocks where none existed; he would have been shackled by scruples and niceties, where nothing but treachery and evasion harboured on the opposite side; he would in vain have attempted to place the fair dealing and openness of the English character, in concert with the wily and deceitful potentate of India. The Marquis W. had been anxious, on the eve of his quitting the seat of Government, to have aided by subsidy or otherwise, the State of Jeypore, which we were bound to protect from encroachment or injury by treaty; but the line of conduct expressly professed by Marquis C. was so opposite to it, that he Marquis W. had little hopes of seeing that measure carried into effect. To

save for the Company, to recall confidence, and curtail as much as possible further acquisition of territory, were the only objects of Lord C's administration, all the other plans of the Marquis W. were either neglected, or but partially fulfilled. It was on the above occasion, the discussion of the Jeypore subject, that Marquis Wellesley, at a public dinner at which Sir G. B. was present, and the matter having been warmly debated, observed with considerable ardour, as if pointing his discourse to the supposed adviser of Marquis C., "Any man that shall dissuade the Marquis C. from the proposed measure will be a traitor to his country."

Lord Cornwallis's death upset all those ideal schemes of reformation, which had been contemplated, and Sir G. B. merely held the reins of government until the accession of Lord Minto, whose whole character of administration may be comprised in a few words, economy to the Company, lukewarmness to the internal politics of India, and the reduction of the French and Dutch Islands. The late Sir B.

Close recommended, on the advance of the Madras force towards Seronge in 1809, that measures might be then taken to provide those States who might be well disposed towards us, with small detachments of our troops, to guard against the increasing and turbulent hordes that were making such alarming advances in most of those unsettled countries. Sir B. C. had long observed the numerous bodies that were collecting around the armies of Ameer Khan, Scindeah, and Holkar, without occupation or employ; and he predicted in very forcible terms a general burst of those multitudes on all the surrounding countries, unless timely measures were taken to divert them to more settled and honest pursuits: he particularly recommended that the detachment then under his command might be left to the north of the Narbudda; this advice however was totally disregarded, and he was ordered to return to the Deckan. That want of protection to the frontier States, as has since been felt, has fully justified the correctness of Colonel Sir B. Close's conclusions; and in its

consequences adding to the insolence and pride of our enemy, now left to themselves, they naturally construed our supineness into fear, and shortly afterwards poured down upon us those hordes of Pindarrees.

In recurring to the unfinished fabric of Marquis Wellesley's government in India, and to the evils that have since occurred, we might compare it to the state of a new house left without a roof, and thus exposed to the inclemencies of the seasons and to every baffling wind, tottering and crumbling away in its surface, and gradually attacked in its more solid parts, until the eye of its proprietor had been attracted to the rot ; who at length perceives that, without remedy, the very foundation might become infected and give way, and, turning with alarm to the ablest artist he can find, is compelled to cover in his house with gold instead of stone, to remove and repair the imperfect parts, to unhinge and new knit together the half disjointed and rotten beams, and even then in its completion to apprehend, that this protracted

shelter to the building has yet left within it some corrosive seeds of decay, or of instability to the structure. Tippoo reduced, the French influence annihilated in India, and the Mahratta States severally defeated and brought to understanding, could have been shaped or new modelled at that time to our pleasure, but left unshackled by wholesome restraints, we dropped off suddenly from them, as if terrified at our own conduct, and thus impressed upon those States a reflection not very congenial to cordial or good faith: viz. that we had once chastised them, and that the very next step might be their total annihilation. It was natural for them, therefore, to brood over this theme in sullenness and displeasure, and in their own shallow schemes of independence, to practise every art or contrivance that might best restore their degraded sovereignties and connections. The able hand of Lord Moira has been happily applied to recover our former imprudence, and has infused an energy and spirit of administration throughout every branch of the Indian

system, that, if but preserved by the succession of such characters as his Lordship to the government of India, we shall have little to apprehend from any revolution or event within its own immediate sphere. Earl Moira succeeded Lord Minto as Governor General nearly at the commencement of the Pindarree system in 1813. His Lordship soon perceived, that not only the Pindarrees, but most of the Native powers were ready and willing to rise against us. He proceeded, however, dispassionately and coolly to the investigation of the subject; nor was there a single measure of coercion or interference adopted, until there no longer remained room to doubt the truth of the confederacy against us. Lord Moira very wisely, in his plan of destroying the Pindarrees, was resolved to apply the axe at once to the root of the evil, to give over the hunting and chasing down of these freebooters, who invariably gave our troops the slip, to drive them all to their earths, and then springing his mines upon them, thus to explode the whole banditti.

The wide and scattered pieces of dominion belonging to the several Mahratta States, demanded in the first instance a considerable portion of his Lordship's attention. Some territories belonging to these powers, although nominally under their government, were yet too distant, complicated and not exactly defined, to be regarded with that care and interest which would have secured the prosperity of these countries and added to that of their neighbours. These loose particles of territory it was necessary to dispose of, to Powers immediately in their own vicinity, and who had by experience rendered themselves worthy of the confidence of the British Government; giving in return for this interchange of territory, those lands and provinces which nominally belonged to the northern Mahratta States, lying to the southward of the Narbudda, thereby bringing the disjointed and remote fragments, claimed by these States, under a more compact and solid form, and preserving at the same time in this arrangement, as far as practicable, a due equi-

poise in the several powers. The whole were invited to look nearly to their own interest, to wrest from the domination of licentious freebooters and Pindarrees their newly acquired Provinces, and thus under their own eye, with the support of the British, to preserve a line of government, somewhat in harmony with security and order.

In this plan, considerable territories were to be added to the State of Bopaul, and others of the Ragpoot States; Holkar's possessions to be continued entire to him, to the west towards the River Chumbul; Ameer Khan's wings to be clipt; and Scindeah compelled to look nearer home, and to disband those hordes and rabble he entertained about him. These plans of his Lordship, with a few hard rubs by the several forces of the Deckan to the opposing armies, shewed to the powers of Hindostan, that we were as able as determined to eradicate the prevailing system of general pillage and spoliation throughout India.

In considering the character of the Pindar-

rees, we shall find this Banditti, as all others, growing from amongst the dregs of the people, the dissolute and the idle, and gaining strength from the inactivity and corruption of their local governments. The number of the Pindarrees was calculated by Sir J. Malcolm at twenty thousand; but so many had of late attached themselves in community of interest to that rabble, that we have little doubt a few years' further indifference to their aggressions would have converted the greater part of the Native soldiery of Hindostan into the same class and pursuits of life.

The salutary effects of our example and conduct at the better-disposed Native States, in the organization and pay of our troops, their discipline and efficiency, rendered a similar adoption of easy practicability amongst the armed bodies of our allies, resembling heretofore more a mob than an army, and better fitted for plunder, than any military achievement, living solely upon booty, extortion, or fraud;—these loose troops, being gradually disbanded, and in-

roduced in smaller and select numbers under our improved system, first paved the way for some stability and order of things amongst them. Again, the whole of Tippoo's army, the several French corps and others, being thrown out of employ, and having possibly only a horse and their arms to look to for support — these collecting together, betook themselves to the neighbouring sovereigns in Hindostan, who had seldom the means, had they even the wish, to refuse them admittance, and who, coupling themselves with the troops of their new employers, at length swelled out into those numerous masses of horse and foot, that shortly after hurled every government they had any connection with into aggression on their neighbours, whose subjects and property plundered, they rested merely until another opportunity of rapine presented itself. Thus every government not under the protection of the British, became the nest and scene of these iniquities; and thus this lawless multitude having sapped the substance of their own and the surrounding states, and

still restless for pillage, invited every one without employ to their side; and breaking off in small bodies under adventurous leaders, they at length turned their attention to the Company's provinces: hence was given a new stock, and life as it were, to the rapacity and boldness of the Pindarrees.

The alarming strength and strides of the Pindarrees, from 1814 to 1816, was, in its nature, that mode of warfare that would, of all others, have been best calculated to harass our government and impoverish the country; as it was of that description which, in the enemy who practised it, required little or no resources to conduct it; and rendered hopeless, at the same time, all effort and expectation of our government being enabled to bring them to action, or so to consolidate their mass or their strength as to deal with them like any other enemy. The extensive plains of Hindostan, and the impossibility of our small and scattered detachments being every where at the same time, with the dastardly spirit of the inhabitants who fled be-

fore them, invited and facilitated alike the ravages of this enemy; who at length, dragging into the vortex of this baneful association against us the neighbouring States and Powers, plunged every Power in India into the calamities of war.

The undisciplined and partly unarmed crowds of the Pindarrees, mounted on small but hardy horses, armed with a spear, a shield, a sword, and possibly one in twenty with an old pistol or matchlock, dashed across the Narbudda, and not meeting with the least opposition from regular troops, had only to shew themselves before the largest towns or villages, and to levy at pleasure their demands; these not complied with, they instantly fired the houses and plundered every particle of property, the miserable inhabitants flying in all quarters and abandoning their families. An intelligent officer, writing to Mr. Petrie at Panang on this subject, observed, that notwithstanding the great alarm prevalent throughout every part of the country from the incursions of the Pindarrees, he was sure, that

had the services of three companies of Seapoys been timely employed on their first appearance to the Northward, they would never have attempted a second invasion; but they were unfortunately permitted, by a series of successful irruptions, and the apparent inactivity of the local authorities, to acquire, in number and character, an aspect, that in the year 1815-16, seemed not only to threaten desolation to the Company's territories, but in like manner, striking terror into the neighbouring Native governments, compelled them, if not to aid directly, to allow them a free and uninterrupted passage through their several countries. Thus these hordes, by gradual steps, attained such a height of strength, and rapidity of movement to the most distant parts, that returning annually with the plunder and spoil of the Company's provinces, and of their unopposing victims, they not only enriched themselves and adherents, but holding out so tempting an allurements to the disaffected, proud, and turbulent characters in their range throughout India, they soon attached to

their cause many of otherwise fairer qualities and pretensions; but, generally speaking, the aggressions, resources and strength of the Pindarrees had been always overrated; and the want of a timely resistance and check to their incursions gained for them a degree of credit and fame of vigorous prosecution, which might have been at once crushed, even by a show of resistance. The territories subject to the Madras presidency during the seasons of 1814, 15, 16, suffered the most by the visits of this class; they seldom met with the least opposition throughout their desolating tour, and it not unfrequently happened, that the civil and military officers, at the distant and smaller stations, too quickly abandoned their occupations, and joined in the general flight and despair. Had an European army invaded India, the consternation could not have been greater; and this impression of danger and devastation at length reached the very walls of Madras itself. The governor of Madras is said to have reported to Lord Moira the serious apprehensions enter-

tained by his government for the safety of the Company's territories, on the descent of the Pindarrees towards the Guntoor district, and to have entreated his Lordship's advice as to the measures best to be adopted on the occasion. Lord Moira, on the receipt of that dispatch, is said to have observed, "Why, I believe, if the government house at Madras was on fire, Mr. E. would ask whether he should extinguish it or not." In the middle of 1816 the troops composing the garrison of Fort St. George were moved out, and encamped on the island outside Black Town wall. This imprudent step was taken, as was affirmed, to be in readiness to meet the Pindarrees, who were reported to be on their road to Madras, although it was well known that not half a dozen of them were at that time within 200 miles of the place. The Native inhabitants of all classes throughout Madras and its vicinity were in the utmost alarm, and looked for places of retreat and security for their property. It brought on Madras all the distresses, in imagination, of Hyder Ally's invasion. It was about

this period that an idle rumour reached Madras of the arrival of the Pindarrees at the Mount; all was uproar, flight, and despair, to the walls of Madras. This alarm originated in a few Dhobies and grass-cutters of the artillery having mounted their Tattoes, and, in mock imitation of the Pindarrees, gallopping about and playing with long bamboos in their hands in the vicinity of the Mount. The effect was such, however, that many of the civil servants and inhabitants on the Mount road packed up and moved to the Fort for protection. Troopers, messengers, &c. were seen gallopping to the government house, and thence to the different public authorities. Such was the alarm in the government house that on the afternoon of that day, an old officer, anxious to offer some advice to the governor, rode smartly up to the government gardens, and on reaching the entrance, observed the youngerson of the governor running with all possible speed into the house, who having got to a place of security ventured to look back, and then discovered in the old officer

a face which he had before seen, when turning back again, he exclaimed, "Upon my word, Sir, I was so frightened, I took you for a Pindarree." These trifles merely to shew the general sense of apprehension at that time from the Pindarrees.

A detachment was shortly after this formed under the command of General Brown, and ordered to proceed towards Naggree Nose, about fifty miles from Madras, as an advanced post; in the mean time the Madras detachment, under Colonel Walker, on the Narbudda, surprised several small bodies of this rabble enemy, and those that were not killed at the moment were handed over to the Seapoys, and quickly dispatched in the jungle. Amongst those taken were several men of inferior casts, Chucklers, Coolies, &c. who had formerly served at Madras, but had joined the Pindarrees on their approach to Guntoor. Colonel Walker had been, for a considerable time, expressly forbid by the Governor General from crossing the Narbudda in pursuit of the Pindarrees; and scarcely a day passed but parties from each side met at the

river, and either exchanged a few shots, or uttered the most abusive terms towards each other. This irregular kind of warfare continued until the end of 1816, with few incidents worth mentioning, beyond a smart chace and attack of the Pindarrees by Major Lushington, in which Captain Dark unfortunately fell; a handsome affair by Major Clark on the Bengal side; and the cowardly murder, a little prior to this, of Lieutenant Bolton, 16th M. N. I. who was surprised when returning from hunting, perfectly unarmed, and was speared to death in the most inhuman manner.

The Earl of Moira had had now sufficient insight and experience in the affairs of India to have formed the most accurate conclusions, as to the nature of the Pindarrees, their designs, their connections with the Native States, and the fittest measures to effect the ruin of this dangerous body; and furnished at length with the fullest powers from home, to proceed on the task as he should think proper; he lost no time in taking advantage of the favourable season of

the year, and of the advice and experience of those qualified to assist him. Sir John Malcolm, K. C. B., who arrived at Madras in April 1817, was invited round to Calcutta, and was put in possession of Lord Moira's plan of operations: he shared likewise in the most confidential communication and acquaintance with the secret advices from every British minister in India. Sir John Malcolm was heard to observe, that during his eight days' stay in Calcutta he derived a greater insight into the politics and schemes of the whole of the Native powers in India, than he had acquired during the whole course of his former political career. His detention was of short duration at Calcutta, whence he returned to Madras, and, of course, put the government of that presidency, and Sir Thomas Hislop, commander in chief, in nearer possession of the views of the Governor General, and of those measures that were to be put to immediate trial in furtherance of the proposed object. Sir Thomas was requested to take the field as commander in chief of the army of the

Deccan; this force was subsequently formed into five divisions: the first division under the personal command of Sir Thomas Hislop, the second under Brigadier-general Doveton, the third under Brigadier-general Malcolm, the fourth under Brigadier-general Smith, and the fifth under Lieutenant-colonel Adams, C. B. Many of the Madras corps were quickly moved in advance; and the briskest preparations were entered into by Sir Thomas Hislop, to enable him to take the field at the earliest period. In the mean time Sir John Malcolm started ahead for Hyderabad, where he arrived in the end of July, and announced his appointment at the British court of that capital, as political agent to the Governor General; Sir Thomas Hislop and himself being invested with the fullest powers by the Earl of Moira, totally independent of the residents at the Native courts. Sir J. Malcolm reviewed* some corps at Hyderabad during his stay there, and immediately afterwards quitted that place for Poonah, where he remained but a few days, and thence returning to Hyderabad, concluded his final arrangements with

his Excellency Sir T. Hislop, for assuming the command of his division (the 3rd) in the field. Sir J. M. now moved by rapid stages to Nagpore, the capital of Berar, where, as well as at Poonah, he had an opportunity of sounding and ascertaining the disposition of these two courts. It seems, however, that he did not altogether fathom the duplicity, the wily councils, and the prepared treachery of these states, as his reports of his visit to Poonah and Nagpore to the Earl of Moira justified at least a reliance upon their pacific views and intentions during the ensuing season of trial. He was aware of the ill-humour and sourness that possessed the mind of the Peishwah, from a recent disagreement with the British resident at Poonah, and more so from the annexation of a considerable territory to the Company, in reference to some unfulfilled article in the treaty of Bassein; but he had no doubt a little time, and a consideration of the Peishwah's own interest, would smooth over and reconcile those trifling difficulties. Under the existing temper, however, of

both those states, and where there appeared such just grounds of suspicion of their hostile views to the British government, in having secretly connived at the Pindarrees, by encouragement and shelter, and latterly becoming publicly identified with them, it would certainly have been more prudent to have strengthened the British force at both those places preparatory to advancing beyond them. At Nagpore there were only two weak battalions of M. N. I. (the 20th and 24th), the escort of the Resident, with a small detail of European Artillery, the whole not exceeding 1200 effective men. At Poonah there was the Bombay E. Rt. and two Native Bombay corps, with a small portion of artillery. At the former place the Arabs alone in the service of the Berar Rajah, exceeded 3000, and he afterwards turned out a very formidable train of artillery against General Doveton. The Peishwah's brigade at Poonah alone nearly equalled the British force at that place; and he had besides about 20,000 horse, and 10,000 irregular foot, in its vicinity: that

Prince also furnished not a contemptible artillery at the hour of trial. It was, therefore, hazarding too much to have left thus exposed, those important points in the campaign; for had either the one or the other been carried by the enemy's first onset, the result might have been ruinous to our whole scheme of action. The army in advance under Sir T. Hislop was scarcely proportioned to the services for which it was destined beyond the Narbudda. It would be therefore impossible to have divided that army with any effect; and to have retraced its steps would have been still more imprudent, without accomplishing, in some degree, the proposed object of our visit to Hindostan.

The attack at Nagpore on the 27th Nov. 1817; was more desperate and resolute than well concerted. The British Resident, Mr. Jenkins, on the first alarm, took post with his little band on the top of a small eminence close to the residency called Seetabuldee. It seems in that affair the Arabs did every thing unaided by any other class of the Rajah's troops, with the ex-

ception of a loose body of horse, who on this, as on all other occasions, seemed to place the summit of their skill and bravery in an ostentatious display of their agility in horsemanship. They seldom approached within fire of our troops; and on the near approach of danger invariably betook themselves to flight. There was another small hill contiguous to Seetabuldee, on which our troops planted a six-pounder with a party of Seapoys. The Arabs, in an irregular line, assaulted both hills at once, and at some points carried their ground nearly to the mouths of the British musquetry. They were repeatedly driven back with considerable loss from Seetabuldee; but were nevertheless determined to gain some advantage, and, after several repulses, at length charged with redoubled vigour, and carried the smaller eminence, the few of our men who escaped retreating on the main body. From this spot, and from the captured gun, the enemy now opened a most galling and thick fire upon Seetabuldee, in the course of which we lost several officers

and men. This firing continued for the greater part of the ensuing day, when a select detachment volunteered to retake the gun on the hill, but whose efforts, after a most determined stand on both sides, proved unsuccessful. The Arabs after this repulse, now observing our fire to be more languid, and our troops nearly exhausted, and recruited with fresh numbers to their side from the city, seemed bent upon carrying Seetabuldee itself. Our troops in this protracted contest became knocked up and dispirited; it was here the nerve and firmness of the European officers were put to the trial, when, after repeated charges and attacks, the troops, almost exhausted and in despair, would have resigned themselves to submission to the enemy. The Seapoys, apprehensive for the safety of their families, many of whom were outside the post, and about the Residency, and of course exposed to the fury of the enemy, became almost indifferent to their own existence, and had all but reconciled themselves to share the fate of their unhappy families. The Arabs still con-

tinued to push their attacks on the hill, and from the fatigue and dreadful havock amongst our troops, the event now seemed doubtful; and it was as much as the officers could do to rally and cheer their men to a stand. This gloomy posture of affairs was happily relieved by the gallant and vigorous charge of the cavalry escort, under Captain Fitzgerald, of the Bengal army, on the Arabs, who were soon put to flight from the small hill, the gun retaken, and their distant cavalry in like manner, and in equal style, dispersed along the plain. It was on that occasion that Captain Fitzgerald, observing a favourable moment to act with his little body, sent to Colonel Scott on the hill for his permission to charge. The Colonel disapproved of the proposal, and returned a positive refusal to Captain F. with a peremptory injunction not to attempt any thing of the kind at the hazard of his commission. Captain F. observed to the bearer of this message, "If it is only at the hazard of my commission, here goes;" and he accordingly gave the word to charge, and

thus secured the lingering and doubtful struggle. This fortunate event inspired fresh vigour and perseverance in the troops on the hill, who were now for the first moment after a conflict of nearly two days, allowed to take a short respite, and inquire after their missing and wretched families. These however, did not suffer much, as the Arabs were so hotly engaged themselves, in their successive attacks, as not to leave much time for a thought, as to plunder, or the perpetration of more cruel purposes on those defenceless creatures. The loss on our part was very heavy, nearly one half the detachment being killed or wounded. Amongst the former were Mr. Sotheby, assistant resident, Capt. Saddler, and Lieut. and Adjut. Grant, of 24th M. N. I. Lieut. Clarke of the 20th, and Mr. assistant surgeon Nevan. The Arabs must have also lost on their part great numbers; and the impression made upon them by the charge of cavalry under Capt. Fitzgerald compelled them to keep aloof and desist from any further attempt on Seetabuldee. But even

against the Arabs, and possessing as we did so advantageous a post, the day went hard with us at Nagpore; and it may be said, that to the intrepid example and conduct of the Resident Mr. J. and the other European gentlemen and officers, during that arduous struggle, the success of the contest must be mainly attributed.

The rapid advance of General Doveton's division (2nd) on Nagpore, early in December, with the measures adopted by the British Resident, and the consequent attack by Gen. D. on the enemy's lines of defence near Nagpore, on the 16th December, soon reduced the Rajah to submission, and left him without a single gun. The very judicious plan of attack by Gen. D. and the precision and alacrity with which each attacking column moved to its post, would have ensured success had the enemy even been perfectly on the alert or stood to their guns. The fact was, that on the evening preceding the assault and during the ensuing morning (16th), Mr. J. had been in negotiation with the Rajah for the surrender of his artillery and

other points. The troops had been told off for several hours to their different posts, and General D. was naturally anxious that matters should be decided one way or other, either to have quiet possession of the guns, and to allow the troops to break off, or to bring the matter at once to an issue. In this painful procrastination Gen. D. urged Mr. J. to a speedy decision, intimating at the same time his determination not to postpone his attack beyond a specified hour. Matters were shortly afterwards brought to a train of settlement by Mr. J.; and the Rajah had actually sent orders for the surrender of his guns. In the mean time a few matchlocks had been fired from a small post near a pagoda, occupied in some force by the enemy, upon some of our people; which Gen. D. observing, he quickly put the M. 12th L. I. in motion to dislodge the enemy from that spot. This corps, in moving towards the point of attack, had to pass some of the batteries, that lay partly concealed in the topes or groves; and they had not moved far when they received a

heavy discharge of cannon from one, and afterwards more of them. The whole line* was in-

* General Doveton's force at Nagpore on the 16th December, 1817: Six companies of the Royal Scots, 6th reg. of Bengal Cavalry, 22d reg. of Bengal N. I.—Madras troops: two brigades of horse artillery, 6th M. N. cavalry, two brigades of foot artillery, 12th light infantry, 11th, 13th, and 24th N. I., flank companies of the 2d and 25th N. I.

Extract from General Orders by His Excellency Sir T. Hislop.

The Brigadier-general reached Nagpore, with a division under his orders, on the 13th ultimo, after a rapid and fatiguing march, and formed a junction with the detachment of the 5th division already there. Having refreshed his troops during the 14th and 15th, he prepared to attack the enemy on the morning of the 16th, which was accordingly done; and the manner in which this important service has been achieved, reflects the highest credit upon the judgment and professional talent of the gallant officer who commanded, as well as upon the discipline and determined valour of the excellent troops, who so nobly carried into effect the able and well judged plans of their general.

The Commander in Chief cordially concurs in the expressions of approbation conveyed in the Brigadier-general's dispatch, of the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant-colonels M'Leod, Scott, Gahan, M'Keller, and Crosdill, commanding brigades; of Major Munt, and Captain Western, commanding corps of cavalry; and of Lieutenant-colonels Stewart and Fraser, and Majors Pereira, Pollok, M'Dowall, Weldon, M'Bean, and Garner, commanding corps of artillery and infantry, as well as to Lieutenants Poggenpohl and Hunter, of the horse artillery; and to those officers His

stantly put in motion in consequence, and the plan of attack that had been previously fixed upon by the General was carried into effect, with the utmost exactness and promptitude, by the brigadiers of divisions. The different columns of attack of course sustained the weight of the several batteries opposed to them; but the affair was quickly decided, and the whole of the guns taken easy possession of. Several of the guns had the bullocks already harnessed to them, others with the bullocks at hand, and the enemy were about to retire to the city, when the above circumstance luckily hurried on the event, which thus prevented the Rajah from withdrawing and concealing his numerous train for a future experiment. Gen. D. had attached to each of the Native corps (with the exception of the light corps) a company of the Royal Scots in this attack. The loss on our part was trifling, being under two hundred men of all casualties, no officers killed; and

Excellency desires to offer his thanks and praise, for their able and gallant exertions, as described by Brigadier-general Doveton.

much less than could have been expected, considering the extensive and well-equipped train opposed to us, of nearly eighty guns. The enemy suffered little or nothing in their batteries, as few of the guns were discharged but once, and they timely took themselves to the city. Their cavalry must have sustained a more considerable loss from the pursuit and activity of our cavalry and horse artillery. Several elephants and camels, with a quantity of plunder, fell into our hands on this occasion.

There still however remained another difficulty to be surmounted at Nagpore, and which ultimately cost us pretty smartly, nor did the execution of this service redound so happily to the credit of the troops employed. The Arabs, still numerous in the city, refused either to submit themselves to us, or obey the orders of the Rajah, until their demands and arrears of pay were fully adjusted: it was consequently deemed necessary to apply force for the reduction of the city; and for this purpose it was desirable in the first instance to get possession of one of the

gateways. This gateway was neither fortified nor protected in any particular manner, either by the strength of its own materials, its height, or any commanding post in its vicinity; there were however, several houses immediately within the gateway, running parallel on each side of the street. The Arabs with their matchlocks were posted in small bodies in these houses; and confident in their numbers and the security of those houses from any external attack of artillery, they viewed with perfect indifference the fire of our battery upon this gateway, by which it was quickly breached at one tower. The ensuing morning the superintending engineer, Lieut. Davies, having examined the breach, and finding it practicable, was anxious to establish a lodgement on the tower: the morning was particularly favourable for the attack, as it rained very heavily, and it does not answer to expose matchlocks in such weather; and Lieut. D. obtained the leave of the General, but not without repeated solicitation, to make the attempt, with the detail of Euro-

peans, and some Seapoys coming off duty that morning. The party was accordingly drawn out, with the miners and sappers, consisting of about thirty men from the M. E. R., in front. The Arabs during this time had retired, in consequence of the rain, from the gateway to the inner houses. Lieut. D. with his party passed, entirely unperceived, to the very breach on the gateway, and had ascended it with the advance, when the alarm was quickly given by the Arabs, who instantly started up, and opened a smart fire of matchlocks from the doors and windows of the houses on the head of the party. This checked our advance for a little; several of the sappers and miners having fallen, and the main body not making their appearance as might be expected, the Arabs, of course, gained ground, and increasing to such numbers that scarcely a man of those who ascended the breach escaped unhurt, they in their turn pushed the advantage, and compelled the whole party to fall back with considerable loss. Lieutenant Davies, and Ensign Nattes of the

Engineers, were both badly wounded. Lieutenant Bell of the Royals was killed, with three of his men; and five of the miners and sappers shared the same fate. The Arabs, shortly after this repulse, sent back the body of Lieutenant B., and generously intimated at the same time, that the other killed and wounded might be withdrawn. Two other attacks had been made at the same time on other parts of the city; but that at the gateway having failed, and General D. not wishing to expose his troops to further loss, ordered them to be recalled, and made up his mind to desist from further operations until his heavy guns arrived.—It became advisable shortly after to enter into terms with the Arabs for the surrender of Nagpore. This measure was adopted at the instance of Mr. J. the Resident, no doubt with a view of restoring order and tranquillity to the country; but it had neither the concurrence nor support of General Doveton, who was anxious to reduce the Arabs to unconditional surrender; particularly as his battering train, by which he could have quickly

effected it, was only a few marches from Nagpore at the time, and the whole of his troops were eager to retrieve the late failure at the gateway. The terms granted to the Arabs by Mr. J. were, the payment of arrears due to them by the Rajah (upwards of a lac of rupees), a safe escort for themselves and families to such places as they might wish to proceed to without the boundary of Berar, and the possession of their arms. A British officer, Lieut. Sherriff, was also attached to them, who of course, in his person, stood a sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of these conditions. Lord Moira is said to have expressed great dissatisfaction at this arrangement, and with some justice, as the evil effects of it were felt by us throughout the remainder of the campaign. About 1300 Arabs were moved off from Nagpore towards Khandeish; but there was scarce a day that ten or more of them did not separate themselves from the main body, and branch off to the different parts of the country; so that by the time the escort had reached their own capital, Mally-

gaum, not one third of the original number had remained together.

Nagpore, now deprived of its stubborn Arabs, was for a time restored to tranquillity and peace, and the Rajah Appa Sahib being again seated under certain limitations on his throne, seemed in better humour, and evinced in his outward demeanour a perfect reconciliation as to the past, and a seeming gratitude for our great moderation as his conquerors; but it will be hereafter perceived how perishing and fallacious these hopes and appearances were, and that the link of the Mahratta confederacy against us had not as yet been effectually broken at the Berar court.

The affair at Poonah is next to be noticed, though anterior a few days to that of Nagpore; and when we consider the Peishwah the head of the Mahratta states, the extent, riches, and population of his dominions, the reputation, and far-blazoned name of the Mahratta soldier for ages, the love and faith that seemed to pervade every subject of his country towards his title and his

family—finding himself, in his own apprehension, not only injured in his private feelings, but insulted in his dignity, and deprived of a valuable and ancient possession, he naturally enough under these impressions, feels disposed to support his consequence, and vindicate his right as a sovereign, and appealing to his subjects, and to his army, fancies himself secure in their affections and certain in his object; holding all these advantages, and in the calm and undisturbed enjoyment of his throne, and amidst the councils of his state, we observe this sovereign summon his chieftains and his army to tens of thousands of men, and we as quickly perceive the same sovereign with his whole strength, his whole army, and his skill, turn out and face a body of 800 Europeans and 1300 Natives, beaten and dispersed under the very walls of his own palace by this handful of men; we are as much surprised, as lost in our own long delusion of those invincible Mahrattas; and meeting but the shadows of men at this greatest trial and stake to the honour and call of a nation, their coun-

try's and their sovereign's independence, we are almost ashamed to boast of our victory over such a vaunting and pitiful mob.

It seems that a strong personal dislike had no small share in the origin of the misunderstanding between the Peishwah and the British Resident at his court: this want of mutual confidence became gradually aggravated through neglect and suspicion of each other; and daily acquiring strength and a severity of character through the agency of their several creatures and hirelings, it at length attained a pitch of the keenest personal hatred and abhorrence. In such an unhappy temper of things, there were not wanting those whose views, treachery, or private interest, quickly attached them to one side or the other; and it was said that there was scarce an observation made either at the Resident's table, or the Peishwah's zenana, that was not instantly and faithfully reported to the opposite party. The ambassador of the Guicowar Rajah, who was present at the court of Poonah in 1814, fell under this imputation in the opi-

nion of the Peishwah, as too closely concerned in these dealings, and sharing too much in the confidence of the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone; and under this suspicion he shortly afterwards fell a sacrifice to the vengeance of that court, having been put to death on quitting a place of worship by some of the Peishwah's agents. Trimble-jee Danglia, an adherent and minion of the Peishwah's, was the supposed murderer, but no doubt existed in the mind of the British Resident, as to the previous sanction and concurrence of the Peishwah to the assassination. Such an act of perfidy could not escape the notice of the British court, and the person of Trimblejee was in consequence demanded to be given up, and after a strenuous but fruitless endeavour to screen his creature, Badjee Row (the Peishwah) was compelled to surrender him. Trimblejee was accordingly conveyed to the fort of Tannah on the island of Salsette, where he was committed to close confinement: he however shortly afterwards contrived to escape from Tannah; and unwilling to trust himself a

second time at Poonah, he collected together a few horse, and continued a wanderer and a vagabond through the Mahratta territory, until the period of the open rupture between the Peishwah and the British government. These occurrences took place in 1814, 15. The escape of Trimbuckjee from Tannah was effected through the aid of a horse-keeper. On the night fixed on for the attempt, every thing being in readiness for his reception outside the fort, Trimbuckjee late in the evening quitted his apartment for the purpose of visiting an out-house: the European sentry was called to conduct him to that place, and Trimbuckjee passed in, leaving the sentry outside. There was a lamp burning in this room, and our prisoner, as if in want of water or something else, called out for the Tootee, who presently (no doubt by previous concert) passed also in, carrying with him a small basket and broom, which are commonly used for these places. Shortly after, the same person to all appearance passed out again, and left the fort. The sentry having waited a long

while outside, and thinking it was full time for Trim buckjee to turn out, approached the door, and soon found that his man was gone. There was a small window which looked out to the rear of this place, but so small as to leave scarcely a possibility of a person forcing himself out of it, or when on, of descending the high wall, unless aided by a rope and some person to assist also ; but it has never been fully ascertained whether Trim buckjee assumed the garb and implements of the Tootee, and thus escaped from the door, or whether assisted by the Tootee, he contrived to make his way through the window. He was, however, received outside by a party of Mahratta horse, who pushed off with all possible speed for the main land. The news of Trim buckjee's escape agitated not a little our government and the Peishwah's court. Badjee Row was called upon to seize and deliver him up again ; but that prince felt too near a sympathy and interest in the good fortune of his favourite, and possibly contemplating schemes of a more extensive and serious nature,

he, in reply, merely expressed his surprise and regret at the escape of the prisoner, urging at the same time his inability to overtake and arrest him. The escape of Trimbucketjee, as might be expected, only tended to widen the breach between the Peishwah and the British government, and certainly accelerated, more than any other event, the moment of actual hostilities between the two powers. The Peishwah henceforth thought himself bound to provide for his favourite; and, under various pretences of quelling disturbances, and other measures of a public nature, he placed a considerable force under Trimbucketjee, and made regular remittances to him for its support; whilst it was said that the leaders of the Pindarrees had been invited by Trimbucketjee himself to invade the Company's territories. They were promised the countenance and aid of the Peishwah's authority, and encouraged to renew their system of pillage on a more enlarged and extensive scale. These plots had been detected by the British Resident at Poonah, and it be-

came advisable to check their further progress. In the words of Lord Moira, "we were then constrained to anticipate this incorrigible plotter." We surrounded him in his capital, and obliged him to submit to terms which preserved the ancient appearances of connection, but deprived him of much strength, should he hazard any future machinations. The Peishwah's capital thus in 1815 surrounded by a commanding force, and an army of observation of about 12,000 men, being posted on the Tombudra river, under Sir Thomas Hislop, that prince was compelled to swallow the bitter draught of assigning over to us territory towards the support of a body of horse, which the Peishwah was bound by the treaty of Bassein to maintain, but which had not been enforced by us until this period. From this measure there was no receding for the Peishwah; and we may suppose he continued to brood over that necessity with unforgiving and keen revenge. Indeed if any part of Lord Moira's policy in the late war is questionable as to the rigid observance

of faith on our side, it is on this revived and compulsory demand on the Peishwah for the fulfilment of what he might have reasonably enough concluded to have been a remitted article in that treaty. The restoration of the Peishwah to his throne, and the consolidation of that empire by the Marquis Wellesley, was justly looked upon as the master-piece of that nobleman's administration. Why we should have so long omitted to enforce the full terms of the treaty of 1813, seems somewhat strange, and has a bad appearance, as it looks as if we searched out for that particular clause as a convenient clue of bickering and quarrelling with the Peishwah. The allotment of the country in question in the vicinity of Darwar quickly generated the most implacable hatred and spirit of revenge, on Badjee Row's part, against us.

The Peishwah, the acknowledged head of the Mahratta empire, lost no time, of course, in giving the alarm to the neighbouring states, calling on them to look at his degraded condition under the British Government; that they had

nothing better themselves to expect; and that the moment was now arrived when they should with one heart and hand rescue their remaining independence, and see to vindicate the sacred unsullied honour of the Mahratta compact. He called upon them, as their master, to follow his example, and strike against the British when he did. From this time, early in 1816 to Nov. 1817, every scheme was set on foot, and every power roused up to arms, against us; when finding our armies on the move in advance to Hindostan, and thinking to take us unawares, the two powers of Poonah and the Berar Rajah burst, at nearly the same moment, the whole weight of their impotency upon us.

Towards the middle of October, 1817, it was known to the Hon. Mr. E. that numerous bodies of horse, and troops of other descriptions, had already arrived at Poonah, and that others were daily crowding towards the capital; that active preparations were also making in the city for the arming of a considerable number of its inhabitants, and for putting the Peish-

wah's artillery in the most efficient order and readiness.

Matters being now matured, in the Peishwah's opinion, for action, he is said about this time (November 1817) to have intimated a desire to the Hon. Mr. E. that the European force at Poonah, on some idle plea or other, should be withdrawn.

The Resident received the proposal with respect, and returned for answer, that he had no authority to order a single European away from Poonah ; that the European regiment was placed there by the Governor General, and could not be removed by any other authority. On the afternoon of the 5th of November, 1817, the Hon. Mr. E. received information at the Residency, that large bodies of horse and armed men, with guns, &c. were moving out of the city, and advancing in the direction of the Residency and cantonments. On this news the Hon. Mr. E. very coolly intimated to the gentlemen and officers of his family, who were still at table after tiffin, that they had better

soon finish their wine, as they had no time to lose, the Peishwah's force being actually on the move towards them. The whole party therefore arose, and proceeded with the detachment at the Residency, and the escort, towards the cantonments. The troops, consisting of the B. E. R., the 2nd battalion of the 6th, and the 1st of the 7th, were immediately put under arms, and drawn up in one line at the Sungum, the ground of the old cantonments. Shortly after, several bodies of the enemy were seen drawing near, and, passing in a circuitous route in front of our line, seemed disposed to outflank our left. The B. E. R. was on the right, with a small detail of his Majesty's 65th regiment. The Hon. Mr. Elphinstone during these preparations evinced the greatest presence of mind; and aiding Colonel Bur with his advice on several points, he rode along the British front, cheering up the men by his presence and example, and addressing the different corps as he passed them. The enemy had now collected an immense force, and were seen advancing

their guns to the front ; which Colonel B. observing, and anxious to put part of his troops in motion and on the alert, he asked the Hon. Mr. E. if he should now consider himself authorized to act against the enemy. To this Mr. E. replied, " No, Colonel Bur, not yet ;—let us wait for the first blow." Shortly after the enemy opened a few guns on our line, and their cavalry commenced to move ; on which the Hon. Mr. E., addressing himself to Colonel Bur, said, " Now, Colonel, you may act as you please." The action, if it can be so called, now commenced, the enemy having opened all their guns, but with very little effect, and their infantry doing little better execution by a loose and irregular fire on our line. The enemy's cavalry seemed determined to break our line on the right ; but observing the Europeans posted there, they wheeled off, and passed on, receiving a few smart volleys from the European regiment ; and coming upon the 7th B. N. I. on the left, they made a partial, but bold dash at that corps, and for a moment put them in con-

fusion. The Hon. Mr. E. observing the attempt upon our left, rode with all possible speed to the European regiment, and requested the services of a couple of companies to the support of the left. The appearance of these, and the exertion and gallantry of the officers and men of the 7th, soon restored the left to order, compelling the masses of the cavalry to fall back; and the enemy finding themselves unequal to any serious impression upon the British line, gradually drew off for that evening, and continued the following day to hover about the line without a second attack, and without doing us any mischief. During the attack on the afternoon of the 5th, several small bodies of the enemy proceeded to the plunder of the Residency and cantonments, and demolished every house and trace of our little settlement, even to the very graves of the dead. The house of Captain F. alone escaped destruction; nor was there a single article of plate or furniture removed or injured in that officer's quarters. This officer, who was in command at the time

of the Peishwah's own brigade (every man of whom had been sworn some time before, agreeably to their several faiths, to be true and faithful to the Peishwah, and not one of whom kept this solemn oath of allegiance,) was considered a great favourite at court, and his tables were scarcely able to contain the rich presents of plate, in gold and silver, that had been made him by the Peishwah; and this prince was weak enough now to expect that Captain F. could not be forgetful of such marked kindnesses and bounty, and had accordingly given positive orders not only to spare Captain F.'s house from being plundered, but to place people over it for its security and protection. The attack commenced at three o'clock. Our loss was reported to be, 1 Havalдар, 1 Naick, 15 Seapoys, and 1 private of the European regiment, killed: 1 Lieutenant, 1 Jemadar, and 55 privates, wounded. The enemy left about 500 dead on the field.

The Peishwah's army now increased to numbers; and he endeavoured to organize its

undisciplined crowds into separate corps and bodies for the prosecution of the war. His army lay nearly upon the same ground as on 5th November, close to Kirkee, when Brig.-gen. Smith arrived in its vicinity with a very smart force under his command ; but after a seemingly unnecessary delay, and a number of pauses and doubts, that officer did not think proper to take the opportunity offered of trying the strength of the enemy. The chief doubt was as to the practicability of crossing our guns over a ford that intervened between the two armies. The General consulted with those about him ; some said the river was fordable for guns, others the contrary. The artillery officer is said to have given it as his opinion that the guns could pass. Parties, however, of our infantry had certainly passed over, and cleared the opposite bank of a few matchlock men who came down to annoy us. The attempt was not made ; and a bystander observed, during this painful suspension of active measures, the British Resident, who was present, labouring under the greatest dis-

appointment and distress of mind. At one moment it was supposed that the General would advance; the next he changed his mind; at length, somewhat perplexed, he is said to have moved quickly up to the Hon. Mr. E., and, striking his hat against his knee, to have exclaimed, "No, it is too much to risk on a single engagement; the hazard is too great: we must reserve ourselves for a surer occasion."

This opportunity lost of bringing the enemy to action, not only gave the Peishwah time to revolve in his mind on his condition, but must have added also not a little to the enemy's insolence and confidence; and before any other opportunity offered to engage that army, Badjee Row had put his whole army in motion, and led our several detachments in pursuit of him for some thousand miles. Thus commenced a march of many months, which cost the public more money, and a greater suspense, with more distress and suffering to the troops employed, than all the other operations of the campaign put together. The Peishwah had

now finally taken farewell of his capital, which had fallen into our hands with little opposition, and without any considerable loss*.

In the mean time the news of the insurrection, and of hostilities with the British power, spread through every part of the Peishwah's dominions; and all British subjects were ordered to be taken up, and prevented from passing through his territories. Several officers were accordingly intercepted, and either put to death or taken prisoners. Captain Vaughan, 15th M. N. I. and his brother, a young adventurer, were surprised by a body of horse on their route from Bombay, and both having been shot, were afterwards hanged from a tree. Lieut. Warre, of Madras Artillery, was also overtaken by a body, and most inhumanly put to death.

* The Hon. Mr. E. at the close of the insurrection at Poonah, was heard to observe, that during the whole progress of the conspiracy, and throughout all his secret researches, the result taught him, that he had not heard a single word of truth from any Mahratta employed by him, with the exception of one man whom he always suspected, and him he never believed.

Lieuts. Hunter and Morison, likewise of the Madras establishment, were taken prisoners after a very resolute and stout resistance; and having undergone a variety of adventures, severities, and condemnations, were at last spared their lives, and conveyed, blindfolded, to the top of the hill-fort of Wussita, whence they were afterwards released. But the mercy shewn to these officers arose, no doubt, from the immediate communication made to the Peishwah direct by the Hon. Mr. E. that the British government would hold his person responsible for any injury or undue cruelty inflicted upon these officers. These officers are indebted also, in a great measure, for the lenity shewn them to the good offices and intercession of Major Pinto, a Portuguese gentleman in the Peishwah's service.

It was at this period, January 1st, 1818, that a battalion of Bombay N. I. 2nd of the 1st, with a brigade of six-pounders and a detachment of irregular horse, had been ordered by Colonel Bur from Seroor to Poonah, and had come on

its first march suddenly upon the Peishwah's whole army, encamped close to the village of Corygawm. Captain Staunton, the senior officer, on observing the enemy's army, crossed the small river in front of the village, and threw his small detachment into it, very properly preferring the occupation of that village to any attempt of retracing his steps in the face of, or to a resistance on the plain against, such unequal numbers; but in doing this he omitted taking possession of the Gurrhee (or small fort) that lay within the village, and which, from its elevation, commanded every part of it. The reason assigned for this oversight was the total want of water in the Gurrhee, and the imprudence of dividing too much his little band. The appearance of the British detachment soon attracted Badjee Row's notice, and a large body of Arabs were detached accordingly to attack and drive them from the village. The Arabs advanced with the greatest gallantry and coolness to the very walls and gateway of the village, receiving the repeated volleys of our

lines from within the walls and houses. They quickly perceived the advantage of the Gurree; and after a persevering and vigorous attack at the gateway of the village, they forced their entrance, and gained possession of the little fort, whence they continued to annoy and distress our party more than from any other point during the conflict. The irregular cavalry on our side of course dismounted, and joined their companions for the defence of the village; and our two guns, after the greatest exertions, were at length posted so as to scour and protect the gateway. Nothing could be a fairer trial of bravery, discipline, and coolness, than the contest now became. The Arabs were slain in dozens by the steady and advantageous fire from the walls, and cut down in equal numbers by volleys of grape from the six-pounders whilst attempting the gateway. They frequently presented themselves at the gateway, and seemed bent to carry, or render useless, those destructive engines; and were as frequently mowed down and compelled to

retire. But many of the Europeans had fallen about the guns, and the few that remained were becoming more and more exhausted ; and the Arabs, observing the slackness of our fire, now redoubled their exertions, and at length charging the guns, they carried them, putting every man about them to the sword and dagger. The officer commanding the artillery, Lieut. Chisholm, Madras service, shared this fate ; and the exulting and furious Arabs, cutting off his head, carried it off as a trophy to Badjee Row. The loss of the guns, however, did not much dishearten the gallant band that still remained, who, collecting together in the most secure positions and cover behind the houses and walls, continued still to keep possession of the greater part of the Pettah, notwithstanding the desperate and fresh assaults of the Arabs. Badjee Row, observing the tough defence of the village, and many of the Arabs returning wounded, with the prolonged and doubtful state of the contest, is said to have remarked with some indignation to one of his

ministers, "Why, if my whole army is unable to destroy or to rout a single battalion of their own countrymen, what can they do against all the Faringees, and the other armies that will presently encompass us?" The minister in reply whispered, "True, Maharaj; but you had as well keep that sentiment to yourself." The Arabs, still pushing their ground, had now got possession of a house in which were two British officers badly wounded, Lieut. Swanston, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Wyngate: the Arabs did not seem disposed to put them to death, as they are commonly wont to do, but Mr. W. on the approach of the Arabs near him, seems to have provoked unintentionally, some way or other, their resentment, and he was quickly dispatched; but they offered no violence to Lieut. S. Lieut. Pattison, adjt. of the Native corps, and a man of prodigious strength, was shortly after this closed upon by the Arabs, and brought down no less than five of them by the butt of a musquet alone; but the brave fellow at length fell covered with wounds, and soon after expired.

The contest was thus obstinately continued to the afternoon of the day; and although our troops still held their posts, and repulsed every effort of the Arabs to dislodge them, the unceasing fatigue and want of water, with the fresh bodies of Arabs pouring in, and little hopes of relief to themselves—these hardships naturally pressed, and dispirited many of them; and observing their numerous comrades dropping about them, they would have almost resigned themselves to a similar fate. Every effort was made by the surviving European officers, by reminding the Seapoys of their duty, their families, and their colours; the drums beat to arms several times, and a fresh stimulus was thus infused into the troops to maintain their post, and the reputation they had already acquired. Towards the close of the day the fire slackened, and both sides seemed willing to rest a little. The contest was however resumed the next morning; but the Peishwah, seeing the issue still undecided, and his own troops thinned and brought back wounded and dismayed, and

apprehensive of the too near approach of Gen. Smith's army, ordered the attack to be discontinued; and the Arabs being recalled, he on that evening broke ground with his whole army*. Captain Staunton had early on the morning of the 2d of January, contrived to dispatch a messenger to Col. Bur, to inform him of his condition, and calling on him for aid: the messenger belonged to the irregular horse, and managed, with a great deal of dexterity and courage, to pass through several bodies of the enemy on his route to Poonah; he at one time unexpectedly came on their advanced piquet in a Nullah, and with singular presence of mind commenced ringing his horse, brandishing his spear, and proclaiming aloud the titles and valour of the Peishwah; the piquet, of course taking him for one of their own party, did not trouble themselves about him, when he suddenly dashed

* Our loss at Corygawm was not so heavy as might be expected: Lieuts. Chisholm and Pattison, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Wyngate, were killed, and about 100 killed and wounded of the privates and Seapoys.

across the Nullah, and left them in the greatest surprise and disappointment. Col. Bur, on receipt of the message, detached a body of troops to the relief of Corygawm under Lieut.-col. C.; but, singular as it may appear, with orders not to proceed nearer than ten miles of the place, as if merely to shew the enemy that reinforcements were advancing, but without much regard to the safety or lives of the remaining little band; and the above detachment proceeded accordingly to a fixed point, and without effecting any thing, turned right about again, thus leaving Capt. S. and his poor fellows to their fate. Luckily the Peishwah, as above stated, had recalled his troops from the attack, and moved off. Gen. Smith's force had now come close upon the Peishwah's army, and that force marched, for days and days together, completely surrounded by the numerous cavalry of the Peishwah, who kept at a civil distance from the British line, and only now and then made attacks upon the baggage and the rear; but whenever they came within musquet-shot of any

part of our line, they as quickly disappeared, seldom or ever leaving any of their killed or wounded behind them. The enemy's line had frequently received repeated and sudden rounds of grape and musquetry, and seemed instantly to take to flight, and in such a hurry as scarcely to leave time for a thought as to their casualties; nevertheless they seldom left a single man or horse behind them to shew the effect of our close and well-directed fire. The Mahrattas possess extraordinary skill in horsemanship, and so intimate an acquaintance with their horses, that they can make these animals almost do any thing, even in full speed, in halting, wheeling, &c.; they likewise use the spear with remarkable dexterity, sometimes in full gallop, grasping their spears short, and quickly sticking the point in the ground, still holding the handle, they turn their horse suddenly round it, thus performing on the point of a spear, as on a pivot, the same circle round and round again. Their horses likewise never leave the particular class or body to which they belong; so that, if the rider

should be knocked off, away gallops the animal after its fellows, never separating itself from the main body. The Mahrattas take to the field, without distinction, horses, mares, fillies, &c.; and you may see bodies of these rabble retreating or flying across the country, with nearly half the number of their horses unmounted in their retinue; every Mahratta brings his own horse and his own arms with him to the field, and possibly in the interest they possess in this private equipment we shall find their usual shyness to expose themselves, or ever to make a bold vigorous attack. But if armies or troops could be frightened by appearances, these hordes of Mahrattas would dishearten the bravest, actually darkening the plains with their numbers, and clouding the horizon with dust for miles and miles around. A little fighting, however, goes a great way with these as with most of the other Native powers in India; and after tasting a season or two of the bitterness and hardships of an active campaign, they are generally well

inclined to skulk off with their poor and worn-down animals to their villages. The Peishwah was now proclaimed throughout his dominions a traitor to the British government; and the Hon. Mr. E. proceeded to the quiet possession and settlement of his country, that wretched sovereign and his family being closely pursued and hemmed in by two or three different armies.

We had left Sir John Malcolm on his visit to the court of Berar, and shall now resume the operations under Sir T. Hislop. His Excellency arrived from Madras about the middle of August at Hyderabad, where he was received by the whole of the troops at that station, drawn out in a line of nearly two miles, and extending to the very entrance of the Residency. His Excellency arrived about one o'clock of the day, amidst a grand procession of the nobles, ministers, &c. of the Nizam's court, all mounted upon elephants caparisoned and decorated in the most costly and rich manner, and surrounded himself by the whole of his personal and the general staff.

Some days after, Sir Thomas had the honour of being introduced, with the whole of his suite and followers, to the Nizam, and on a subsequent day to the prime minister, Chundah Lall; on the latter occasion he was received by the corps of women under presented arms, who are kept for the protection of the Nizam's seraglio; on both these visits his Excellency was received most courteously, and presents were distributed to his suite to the amount of a lac and a half of rupees. The Nizam is said to have looked much dejected and in low spirits; he received the party in a small room with scarce any furniture or decoration; habited himself in a plain white muslin dress, seated upon a common carpet, and surrounded by his ministers and few nobles, he spoke little, nor did he seem altogether to understand the nature of the visit by the presence at his court of the commander-in-chief, and such an influx of red coats upon him: in fact he seemed to sit upon a throne of thorns during the whole visit, and was quite perplexed and confounded at this unusual levee.

Many of the Madras corps had now proceeded in advance on the Taptee river, and others more forward on the Narbudda; and his Excellency whilst at Hyderabad ordered a further contingent of Europeans in the head quarters of the Madras European Regiment to join a squadron of 22d dragoons, and two brigades of horse artillery, and the 3d light infantry, that were destined for his personal escort. This detachment started on the 27th of August, under the command of the Hon. Lieut.-col. Murray; but the rains having set-in a few days after, they became exposed to the most severe and inclement monsoon that had been known for years, and until the end of October underwent greater hardships and distresses than any other detachment on advance. The detachment had made but three marches when they were brought up by the sudden descent and overflowing of the Monzoora river, which continued impassable, circumstanced as they were, for upwards of 20 days. This river, within 30 miles of the Nizam's capital, was always regarded as one of the

most rapid and difficult streams in the country ; but, nevertheless, there was not even a basket-boat, or raft of any description, in readiness to expedite the transport of the guns and provisions, nor was there the least preparation made or thought of to meet the arrival of our troops and the existing exigency. It was in vain to seek for wood to form rafts ; none was to be had dry, and none of any description except the date-tree : the pioneers had completed some basket-boats, but no hides were to be had to cover them : every expedient was tried to pass the camels, by the purchase of village cots and chatties, and fastening them above their backs, these animals being unable to swim. The rain still descended in torrents for about 12 days without intermission ; and the detachment at length became perfectly insulated, and cut off from any further attempt at passing, until the 20th day, when the calmness of the weather enabled them to get huddled over, in basket-boats and rafts, a stream not exceeding eighty yards wide. His Excellency Sir T. Hislop had remained

behind at Hyderabad ; and it was very fortunate he had done so, as he experienced there an alarming attack of illness a few days after the march of his escort, and which had at one time assumed the most dangerous symptoms. The detachment, having crossed the Monzoora, now stepped out, weather permitting or not, but seldom marched above seven or eight miles in a day from the dreadful state of the country, men, officers, and all struggling knee-deep for days as well as they could through the mud, generally leaving a gun or two, and more than once the whole of the horse artillery guns buried up to the axles in the deep cotton-ground, and compelled to be left there until elephants, planks, &c. were sent out to disengage them. The detachment in their progress had been cut off, no less than three different times in the course of ten days, from their tents and baggage at different small streams, but which, from the torrents of rain, had swelled to the largest rivers, and to the depth of fifteen or twenty feet. On one occasion the force had not

crossed a small rivulet knee-deep above an hour, when the flood descended, and in two hours after it rose to such a height as barely to give footing to the largest elephants. None of the tents or baggage, with the exception of those of the messes, had come up; and the whole of the troops were exposed that day and night, and the succeeding day, without the least shelter, and scarcely any nourishment.

The detachment now became, as might be expected, sickly, fevers and dysentery spreading amongst them; and the scanty supply of medicines and regular dooley men, furnished on first quitting Hyderabad, was found lamentably deficient for the increasing sick. The wing of the M. E. R. alone amounted to four hundred and forty men; forty-four dooleys were the complement required, and forty-four were furnished, but only nine of them with regular bearers; the others were entirely composed of common coolies, or villagers, who were pressed at Hyderabad, and who, on reaching the Monzora, deserted by sixes and sevens, at length

leaving the detachment scarcely twenty dooleys, and half of these carried on the heads of those villagers, whence they repeatedly precipitated the wretched occupants headlong into a river or a bed of mud, some of whom actually perished in this manner before they reached the ground of encampment. Village carts were afterwards substituted for the want of dooleys; but the state and condition of four or five sick men thrown upon one of these carts may easily be imagined—without bedding, and exposed either to incessant rain, or to a killing and vertical sun, and frequently unable to hold on, or bear the motion of the cart—tumbling off, and obliged to remain so on the road, until possibly at the close of the day they are missed, and a dooley sent back for them.

Lieut.-col. Murray's detachment thus contrived to pull through the mud as far as the Godavary river at Nandere. At this place we were much gratified by a visit to the Seik College, where there are upwards of three hundred of that class instructed in matters of

their religion, and the whole establishment is seemingly conducted with great regularity and application. The sages who preside there deliver out their lectures from their respective stalls, occupying at a convenient distance from each other two sides of the hall of audience. These instructors appeared venerable, pious, and respectable old men, seated upon carpets, and having large and richly embroidered pillows before them, whence from their books they delivered out their discourses to their hearers. The Seik student always appears in public well dressed; and in stature, deportment, and habit, strikes the visitor at once with a prepossession in his favour. They are generally tall, of elegant symmetry, and in their countenances alone carry an expression of superiority and manliness far above any other tribe in India. They generally dress in dark clothes, with lofty blue turbans, and are on all occasions armed with a sword and shield, and many of them with an instrument of war, which they use with the greatest dexterity and effect.

This weapon resembles a common quoit, with this difference, that the plate of the former is perfectly flat on both sides, and not above the eighth of an inch in thickness. These are commonly carried in a dozen or two on the upper ball or crest of the turban, where they sit close together, and quite at hand for service. In using these missile weapons, the fore finger of the right hand is introduced into its cavity in the centre, and the inner edge brought to rest firmly on the ball of the same finger; the thumb is applied outside and over the edge (which is as sharp as a common knife), merely to direct the aim. The right leg is then drawn back, and the Seik, raising his arm above his head, and inclining his body downwards, discharges it in a horizontal direction, just as a boy skims a sheet of water with a slate. These weapons fly through the air faster than the eye can follow them, and the Seik makes as sure of hitting an object the size of a man at seventy or eighty yards, as the best marksman could with a rifle. These weapons are used with best effect

against bodies of cavalry, where, even at the distance of two hundred yards, one of them coming in contact with the horse's leg or body will be sure to break the former, or plunge right into the latter. The Seiks use also bows and arrows with great skill, and are elegant horsemen, on these occasions using the spear and matchlock, and on all public ceremonies displaying their beautifully embroidered black banners, with curious devices upon them. This class of people bear the most deadly antipathy to the Mahomedans.—At Nandere we had an opportunity of witnessing the effects and marks of the late inundation from the heavy rains which fell in September. Two-thirds of the houses had been entirely carried away; and the only place of refuge which remained for the wretched inhabitants was on the tops of the lofty towers and battlements of the fort. The water at one time attained an extent in breadth of twenty miles opposite Nandere, and had risen between forty-five and fifty feet above its usual level. The trees in the village bore

the most incontestable proofs of this fact, the whole of them still retaining the marks of the overflow by a thick line of leaves and rubbish along the branches of the loftiest trees in the village. Upwards of twenty villages had been entirely swept away between this place and the mouth of the river at Rajahmundry during that season. A Jogee, or Hindoo devotee, had at Nandere occupied a small shrine, or place of worship, on the most elevated part of the town, and projecting somewhat towards the river. He had resided in this cell for years together, never extending his commerce with man or the world beyond an occasional descent for a small supply of rice, or oil to trim his lamp with. He had been accustomed to expect the rise of the river as usual, and took no further notice of it this year than formerly. The waters, however, had risen unusually high, and in the course of a single night washed the walls of his abode, and the following morning overflowed the floor of the little temple. The inhabitants on the towers of Nandere observed the danger

of their holy man, and sent off a raft for him, but this he positively refused to ascend, and said he would never abandon his deity. It is in vain to endeavour to prevail upon people of this mind; and towards the evening he was seen sitting on the very pinnacle of the cell with a few of his favourite idols in his hands, the flood having risen; and on the following morning the deluded man was missing altogether, not a vestige of his abode to be seen.

The detachment had now crossed the Godavery. There are excellent boats at Nandere, and the natives of that place possess extraordinary skill and ease in swimming that broad and rapid river. They will pass over at the same time three or four horses: having a piece of light wood, or a dried pumpkin-shell, fastened loosely under their armpits, and holding the single cords by which the horses are held (from the under jaw) in one hand, or by the teeth, these fellows kick out, and beating the stream with the other arm, they lead the horses, with the greatest safety, across the

river. They will singly manage the most stubborn or restive horse, closing upon him whilst he plunges and paws at the swimmer, and, if necessary, mounting on his back, or holding him by the neck, and sometimes by the tail, flogging him at the same time with a rope's-end. The bullocks swim over of their own accord, provided one leads the way; but should this leader, which frequently happens, suddenly turn about in the water, the whole, as if by word of command, right-about also, and thus present an amusing scene, where there may be two or three hundred in his retinue at a time, the bullock-drivers abusing the leader in the strangest terms for this detention; but the moment the leader turns again, so do the whole body, imitating exactly his motions. The docility of these animals, and their discipline amongst themselves, may be observed with a great deal of entertainment at the Company's bullock-farm near Seringapatam, where there are frequently from ten to fifteen thousand bullocks kept for public purposes. Amidst this vast herd the keepers

select a bullock of particular cast or breed from amongst their own droves, each drove having from three to six hundred belonging to it. This favourite bullock is immediately decorated with a tawdry covering of particoloured stuff, hung all over with small bells and beads of cowries, or of ivory, with old buttons, and not unfrequently with small bits of looking-glass stuck in damur or wax. His horns in like manner are surrounded with neatly worked brass rings, and frequently tipped with the same. Thus ornamented by the keeper, its authority soon becomes acknowledged by the whole herd; and the keeper now, through his new deputy alone, directs all the movements and government of his charge. The whole of the bullocks at the farm are turned out promiscuously to feed along the extensive grounds, where they graze without any interruption for weeks together. But when it becomes necessary to select bullocks of a certain breed, either for gun-carriage or grain (the same bullock not answering for both), the keepers are directed to furnish so

many : on this they have only to summon their leaders, who instantly obey the call, when every bullock of that particular herd turns out, and follows his master without failure. The required number is then taken away, and the chief and remainder return to their pasture.

His Excellency Sir T. Hislop with his staff overtook the detachment at Nandere, and starting a-head with the squadron of the 22d dragoons, the command of the detachment devolved upon Major Andrews, M. E. R. the Hon. Lieut.-col. Murray having accompanied his Excellency. Our detachment now stepped out, and marched for 24 days in succession, halting but one day, the 26th of October, at Bassein, averaging 14 miles a day. During this march the horse artillery guns broke down twice; and although they were separated, with a view of accelerating their junction with the army on the Narbudda, they were nevertheless passed by the infantry, and left some miles in the rear of Mulkapour, the H. A. officers fairly acknowledging that the horses were knocked up and

could proceed no faster. We had now gained the Taptee river, and the following day passing to the eastward of Asseerghur, we entered the Charwah Jungle, and quickly after reached his Excellency's camp, Sir T. Hislop's, at Hurdah, where we arrived on the 13th of November. In our march through the Charwah Jungle we lost several followers by tigers; these animals are very numerous in that tract, and more than commonly bold and greedy. A Seapoy with the advanced guard was knocked down and carried some distance, on our second march through it. The man was afterwards found, but the tiger had left such deep marks behind him, having penetrated the skull in the hind part of the head, that he died. These animals generally stun their victim by a dreadful blow in the first instance, and then proceed to suck out the blood; and a horse or buffalo will have nearly as poor a chance of escaping, being knocked over by a single stroke, as a man or less animal.

On our arrival at Hurdah, the encampment

of the army, we found assembled there the following force, including our own detachment: viz. four brigades of horse artillery; the rocket corps; one squadron of H. M. 22d dragoons; 3d, 4th and 8th M. Native cavalry; three brigades of six-pounders, including the Russel brigade guns; the flank companies of H. M. Royal Scots; the M. E. regiment; the rifle corps; the 3d light infantry; a battalion of the 6th Native infantry; ditto of the 7th N. I.; both battalions 14th Native infantry; the 16th and the 17th light infantry; the Russel brigade, and about 3000 of the Mysore irregular horse; and the 1st battalion of the Madras pioneers.

Sir John Malcolm was also in camp with his political assistants and staff. The army remained at Hurdah to the end of November, without any thing particular occurring beyond the news of the treaty with Scindeah, and the execution of a trooper of the 8th M. N. cavalry for the murder of Major O'Donnel of that corps. It was on this ground that the news of the insurrection at Poonah reached his Excellency

Sir T. Hislop, who shortly after in consequence detached Lieut.-col. Deacon with the 17th light infantry, the gallopper guns of the 8th N. cavalry, and a party of Mysore horse to cover the borders of Khandeish, and to remain at command in the vicinity of Dowlutabad, in the event of need. Sir John Malcolm had been thrown across the Narbudda, towards the end of November, with the rifle corps, the 6th M. N. I., the Russel brigade, and the greater part of the Mysore horse; but he had not made above one or two marches, when he hastily returned to his Excellency's camp (leaving his small detachment beyond the river), and it was now resolved to retrograde with the army to the south again. The force was accordingly put in motion, and had made three marches, when a council of war was called, and it was there decided that the army should retrace its steps to its old position on the Narbudda. That measure of falling back we may suppose was taken with a view of opposing Badjee Row's army on its march towards Khandeish, and of

preventing a junction between that and the Berar Rajah's forces; but the ill-advised step was happily arrested without any material detriment to the object of the campaign. The Earl Moira disapproved in very strong terms of the retirement of the army from Hurdah; and with great reason, as such a step at so critical a moment was certainly but too well calculated to inspire confidence into our enemies north of the Narbudda, and to postpone the accomplishment of the grand scale of action that was in contemplation by his Lordship.

Sir John Malcolm now joined his own detachment again across the river, and proceeded nearly in a northerly direction by Seronge, thereby, in co-operation with some of the Bengal divisions, hemming in and closing up to the westward the followers and adherents of Holkar; whilst the army under Sir T. Hislop, and Lieut.-col. Deacon's detachment, more to the south and west of the Narbudda, prevented any party from proceeding to the aid of the Peishwah. The fort of Hindia, on the left bank

of the Narbudda, which commands the only ford in that quarter, and the passage-boats of the river, was now taken possession of, agreeably to an article in the late treaty with Scindeah, by his Excellency, who threw in for its garrison a brigade of guns, a company of M. E. R. and the 7th Native infantry under Major Heath; and these arrangements being effected, the army commenced crossing the Narbudda on the 30th of November, and had completely passed it on the 3d of the ensuing month. Hindia was formerly a town of considerable note, but now only bears the ruinous and decayed vestiges of its ancient extent and splendour. The Narbudda presents here a new and grand sight to the visitor, in its deep, rugged, and extensive bed, running east and west open to the eye for several miles. Its waters had now subsided from the effects of the late monsoon; but its variegated bed of islands covered with the thickest herbage, of naked and bold rocks, its lakes at different points, and the smooth and deep green stream that washed the off bank, fur-

nished the soldier of southern India with a just and interesting idea of a great river. Its width at Hindia is upwards of 1200 yards, and its banks little under one hundred feet above the level of its bed. From Hindia the eye is immediately attracted to a beautiful pagoda on the opposite side of the river; to the right of which lies the Durrah, or tributary estate, of Cheetoo, a celebrated leader of Pindarrees. It was at this spot, that the Emperor Aurungzebe in former days passed on his expedition to the Deckan; and the people of the place point out to the visitor the marks of that proud enemy on every part of the above pagoda. The whole of the figures below, and many parts of its rich and highly sculptured works, certainly bear the marks of having been broken off and defaced; and the pilgrims at the pagoda affirm, that the Deity was so much offended at the insult thus offered to his temple, as to cause it to turn away its face in shame from the sun, and to look to the west, to which, however the tale may be, it

certainly at present points, and contrary to the general order of all Hindoo places of worship.

The army under his Excellency had now reached, by slow marches, close to Ougein, the capital of Scindeah, without any kind of interruption; and Sir J. Malcolm inclining with his detachment to the west, was instructed so to shape his route as to meet his Excellency's army at the above place. Sir John visited his Excellency on the 11th of December, within one march of Ougein; and the two armies the following morning broke ground together, and encamped on the left bank of the Sepra river, which washes the walls of that capital. The combined army remained on this ground for some days. The bazars in the town during our stay were all closed, the inhabitants cold and uncivil in their communications with us, scarce a dozen people to be seen in the streets at a time. They seemed to have entertained a high opinion of the Bhye's army, which had been assembled for some days in its vicinity, and

looked on our six-pounders as they passed their gates with contempt and disdain ; but, the moment they heard the news of the victory at Mahidpore, and the total discomfiture of Holkar's army, they with true Oriental fickleness at once changed their conduct, exposed their most valuable articles for sale, and even advanced a large loan in money to our army. The army of Holkar had been assembled at Mahidpore, about 24 miles from Ougein, with the Regent Queen Toolsie Bhye and the court of Holkar ; and that princess, in nominal charge of the government during the minority of Mulhar Row Holkar, had some days previous to the arrival of our army at Ougein, sent out Vakeels in terms of good faith and confidence to the camp of Sir John Malcolm. She professed the greatest regard and admiration for the British government, and expressed a hope that the same pacific views which led Sir John to her court on a former occasion, would be attended with equal success at the present unwelcome and alarming crisis. Sir John of course returned a polite acknow-

ledgment for this civility, and recommended the Bhye to send her Vakeels to the camp of his Excellency Sir T. Hislop on its arrival at Ougein. The Vakeels from Holkar's court accordingly arrived in camp, and negociations on the first day seemed to wear the most promising features of accommodation and peace. His Excellency Sir Thomas held a numerous levee on the occasion, and the Vakeels were received at his tent with all due parade and attention. The kindest professions and good offices were interchanged, and presents of Pawn, and other trifling forms of Eastern custom, passed between the head Vakeel and his Excellency. Sir John in his usual good humour preserved mirth and merriment amongst them; but he no doubt knew too well that all these professions, and this dissimulation on the part of Holkar's court, at least was mere nonsense, and that we must have a fight for it. The two armies were too near each other, and the plots and designs on both sides too materially at stake, to be decided in any other way than by strength of arm.

There is every reason to suppose that the Bhye herself had no wish to proceed to hostilities with us; but her single voice had little or no controul over her haughty and factious Sirdars. Amongst these military leaders, Ram Dien and Roshun Khan were the most turbulent, and seemed confident in their numbers, and their artillery; and possibly the recollection of the disastrous retreat* of the British detachment before this army, at a former period, might have not a little spurred on their pride, and given a keenness for a second experiment. Negotiations were however repeated, and carried on with seeming frankness and sincerity, until the news of the affair at Poonah had reached Holkar's court, when the Bhye again changed her mind, and refused to enter into any positive engagement or treaty with us, which did not embrace the fortune of Scindeah, and guarantee the solidity and preservation of the Mahratta compact; and she is said to have ex-

* The Hon. Col. M.

pressed her fixed determination to support and replace Badjee Row on his throne again, as far as her ability and aid could effect it. Whether these were the sentiments of the Bhye herself, or of her military council, is of little importance: such language was sufficient to damp and efface the heretofore favourable appearance of the negotiation. Amongst the articles proposed by us in the treaty with the Bhye, was the *sine qua non* of the establishment of a Resident at her court, and the cession of Gaulnah as a depôt; to neither of which, however, the court of Holkar would consent.

The Vakeels were desired to oppose the former firmly, but that they might wave to a subsequent period the consideration of the latter. The Bhye is even said of her own free will to have made a solemn oath, in the presence of her chiefs, that as long as she lived, or had power, she would never admit a British Resident at her court; that she considered them as merely placed at Native courts to undermine and sup-

plant the established order of things, and to seduce the subjects from allegiance to their lawful sovereigns.

Ameer Khan was urgent for peace, and had instructed Guffoor Khan to declare publicly in the Bhye's durbar, "That war with the English would be the ruin of the state, and that his troops should not engage in it." Toolsie Bhye, in consequence of this intimation, and from the advice of some more sober people about her, again relaxed from her hostile disposition, and expressed an anxiety that young Holkar should be placed under the protection, and at the disposal, of the British government; that they, her Sirdars, all knew, by sad experience, how hopeless any contest must prove to them, or to any other Native power, against a British army; and that, hard as were the conditions of the British government, they were preferable to absolute ruin and degradation. These sentiments, but too just and true, cost the unfortunate woman dear; a murderous gang having on

the night of the 20th of December dragged her from her tent, and, after beheading her, thrown her body into the river.

She had been seized by Ram Dien and Roshun Khan, together with her supposed paramour Gunput Rao, and having been charged by them that she was too amicable with the Faringees, or Europeans, and disgraced the Raje by her connection with Gunput Rao, she was put to death. Gunput Rao was tied up and severely beaten with slippers, and would probably have been put to death also, but the battle took place the following day, and he escaped to Holkar.

Matters now not wearing such a favourable aspect, Sir T. Hislop began to calculate on the probability of hostilities, and accordingly issued preparatory orders to the several divisions, nominating Sir John Malcolm to command the line. And his Excellency, about the same time, reviewed the whole army in person.

The number of effective men (not including the Russel brigade and Mysore cavalry)

on parade that morning, amounted to about 5500.

The army moved from Ougein by slow marches, and arrived within eight miles of Mahidpore on the morning of the 19th of December. Negotiations were still carrying on, but with so many difficulties, and such apparent insincerity, that little was to be expected from them to the point. The ground that our army now lay upon was most difficult, the whole force being broken up into small detachments and patches, from the number of ravines and nullahs running in every direction through it; and had the enemy posted themselves on this ground with their numerous artillery and infantry, they would have cost us much more severely than we afterwards experienced. Their masses of cavalry might have thrown themselves between Ougein and these hills, and again between Mahidpore and the same position; and they would at all events have thus harassed our rear, and cut off all supplies.

Even here the Vakeels again visited Sir

John as a last effort to accommodate matters; but the conference was suddenly broken off by Sir John turning them out of his tent, on his hearing of an attack upon our foraging parties by the enemy's cavalry. These were some of the Pindarrees who had taken shelter under Holkar's army, and observing our cattle at too great a distance from the camp, were induced to make a dash, and had carried off several camels and bullocks with them. On the alarm being given, the whole camp was in an uproar. The piquets were ordered out in pursuit, and the line put under arms. We could see the Pindarrees flying like the wind, at a considerable distance off, our cavalry having no chance with these fellows, even on an open plain. The Pindarree, unincumbered with accoutrements, heavy saddle, &c. will gallop round and round the most active of our troopers; and his very horse seems to partake of the master's cunning and dexterity, and to know exactly the moment for a quick and timely retreat.

Early on the 21st December the army broke

ground; the order to prepare for action being previously given, a strong detachment having been also told off for the cover of the baggage. The road towards Mahidpore was narrow and intricate, winding through several hills, and so covered with large round stones as to render the footing particularly difficult both for horses and men. The army had not proceeded above four miles, when several volleys of musquetry announced the baggage to have been attacked, and quickly after the fire of the six-pounders was heard in the same quarter. Sir John had passed a-head of the army with the 16th L. I. a couple of gallopper guns, and some cavalry, and had taken possession of a small village on the right bank of the Sepra, and to the left hand of the ford, which village now became open to the view of the army at the extremity of an extensive and flat plain; the pagoda of that village, and the towers of the fort of Mahidpore, being the only objects that attracted the eye. On advancing, however, we soon got command of a nearer and greater view; the baggage

drawing up under the cover of a small eminence to our left, and a few straggling horse of the enemy appearing behind the topos, and along the summit of a low range of hills on our right. The army now halted, and rested for about an hour, the enemy's lines, with their streamers and flags, to be seen distinctly with a glass at about the distance of two miles. The horse artillery and rifle corps were now ordered a short distance a-head of our line, which was soon after put in motion also, the left in front, covered by the cavalry formed in close column of squadrons on the right and left, and moving in a line on the centre of the infantry. A few companies of the 16th N. I. had been thrown across the river in the early part of the day by Sir John, and passing the ford to the right of the village, got over and lodged themselves under the deep banks and ravines of the opposite side of the river, compelling some matchlock-men who shewed themselves in that quarter, to fall back. We could now discern with the naked eye the enemy's artillery posted

beyond the Sepra, and running in an irregular crescent on both sides of a small hill, having their left on the Sepra, and their right extending in a curve beyond the ford, and inclining on the river in that quarter also. Their infantry were drawn up in a line behind the hill; and behind these again were to be observed their masses of cavalry, and their encampment.

The horse artillery had now reached an avenue which runs along the right bank of the river to the fort of Mahidpore; and opening a few guns on the right, whilst the other guns descended the ford, the enemy in their turn opened several of their guns on those points, as well as on the line advancing at a distance.

The rifle corps under Major Snow was employed at first in keeping back the enemy's small fire from the off bank of the river, but was soon withdrawn from the avenue, and pushed across the ford with the 3rd light infantry, when, entering a deep ravine, that ran with its head towards the right of the enemy's guns, they proceeded to the very extremity of

it, thus becoming exposed to a galling and coolly-directed fire from the enemy's right and centre guns, every one of which took effect from the shallowness of the ravine in that quarter; and these corps, with the 16th L. I. sustained in that injudiciously chosen position their heaviest and greatest loss during the day, having been seated there without any one object or view for at least an hour, and exposed to the steadily-delivered rounds of the enemy's line. The light corps having passed the ford, and our horse artillery and some gallopper-guns following, these were formed into a battery on the left side of the Nullah, on the upper bank, and quickly opened a smart fire on the enemy's line, the enemy immediately pouring a most furious cannonade on these guns, and blowing up one of our tumbrils and a limber, and in the course of a few rounds disabling several of our guns. The rocket corps had from this point tried their hand by discharging a few rockets, but strange as it may appear, instead of having any effect, or of even proceeding in the proper

direction, the greater part of them burst or expended themselves amongst our own men, thereby causing as much confusion as we had suffered from the enemy's fire in that quarter. The enemy's cavalry were now put in motion, the back ground of the camp being entirely enveloped in one vast cloud of dust. The light corps and the horse-artillery now brought to a stand, the whole of the latter being silenced, and the head of the British line having reached the ford, the leading corps were eased off to the left, giving room to the European brigade to pass, some plan of action at length having been fixed upon. The enemy had by this time opened all their guns on the different parts of our line and ford, the fire on the latter becoming particularly severe and galling, and several men falling under it. The European brigade, under Lieut.-col. Scott, had now crossed the ford, the other corps following in succession, and the whole obtaining shelter for a while under the opposite bank of the river, where his Excellency Sir T. Hislop with the greater part of the staff,

were also, they formed themselves into line along the rugged bed of the river as well as they could. Lieut.-cols. Conway and Blacker (the adjutant and quarter-master generals) were in the mean time actively employed with their own staff, in disposing and telling off the corps for their several destinations; and Sir John Malcolm now coming up, gave the order for the European brigade to move up, and form themselves on the top of the bank; instructions having been previously sent to the foot artillery, posted on the right bank of the Sepra, to open their fire on the enemy's guns during the formation and advance of our line. The flank companies of the Royal Scots, and the wing of the M. E. R. with the 2nd battalion of the 14th N. I. quickly ascended the bank, and were formed into line, the same movement being taken up under the personal direction of Col. Conway by the several corps to the centre and left, and the right, at the example and under the eye of Sir J. Malcolm, giving three cheers, advanced double quick in a direct line on

the enemy's guns to the left; Lieut.-col. Scott, with the Hon. Lieut.-col. Murray (as a volunteer) taking the lead, Sir John himself putting the central corps in a similar movement. The enemy now dealt their round and chain-shot in quick succession. In the mean time the three light corps had emerged from the Nullah; those on the left also quickly forming themselves into line. The whole line may now be considered as moving in an oblique direction on the enemy's guns, which, as we approached, seemed somewhat to slacken their fire; and allowing us to come within grape-shot distance, the whole British front received, as if by signal, a most destructive and furious discharge of grape, chain, and round together, which, by its weight alone, staggered for a moment the advance of our line. The cheering, however, instantly set our steps in advance again; and regardless of the fury and quickly-repeated volleys, we closed on them, and giving a volley of musquetry, announced that we were at hand; when the enemy's left, throwing down their

sponge-staffs, and taking to the river, sought safety in Mahidpore. The enemy's right, cut off from retreat to the town, stood longer to their guns; but at length, overpowered by the advance of our left, they either threw down their arms, or stood the charge; nearly six hundred of the enemy towards the right, and to the rear of it, having fallen. Not a man was spared in this quarter. The cavalry had now passed the ford, and joined in the pursuit, as also the Mysore horse under Captain Grant; and these continued to follow up the enemy till late that evening. The guns being now taken, the line of infantry advanced through the enemy's camp, which was left standing; whilst the light corps and 6th N. I. stepped out, and took possession of a few guns posted at a ford in the rear of their camp, and which the enemy, now too late, endeavoured to carry off with them. The enemy were now no longer to be seen or heard; and the few who escaped the sword sought shelter in the neighbouring Nullahs, and along the banks of the river. The

enemy's infantry at Mahidpore amounted to about 1600, being the broken remains of eleven regular battalions; their artillery to upwards of 2000; and about 1200 matchlock men from Ougein. Holkar's cavalry amounted to upwards of 15,000, with 8,000 of Ameer Khan's under Guffoor Khan, and 4000 Pindarrees and Loottees of different descriptions. The action commenced at half-past eleven, and ended at half-past one, to the entire discomfiture of Holkar's army. The afternoon of the 21st December had set in with heavy rain, which continued until the evening of the 22nd, the whole army, but particularly the wounded, suffering much from the bitterness and cold of the night, scarce a tent standing in the camp. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded amounted to about 2500, and that on our side to upwards of 800, of whom thirty-eight were officers. Our killed amounted to 174, of whom three were officers: Lieuts. Colman, M. E. R.; M'Leod, R. S.; and Lieut. Glen, 3rd L. I. Many of the wounded officers died shortly afterwards

in the field hospital. Amongst these were Lieuts. Hancome, M. E. R. ; Shanahan, R. C. ; J. Gibbings, Quarter-master-general's department ; Germ, R. C. ; and Capt. Norton, attached to the rifle corps also ; and of the wounded men at least two hundred suffered the same fate. The number of guns taken from the enemy was seventy-six ; of these nearly sixty were brass, many of them well cast and beautiful guns ; a few of them of French and Portuguese manufacture, and furnished with every necessary in equal perfection with our own. Their grape-shot was entirely European ; and, however it happened, many of their portfires bore the stamp of St. Thomas's Mount upon them. Their double-headed shot was in like manner European, their round and chain shot being of beaten iron, which tore the mouths of the guns to pieces ; but their elevating screws, their buckets, and small furniture, were precisely of a pattern with our own. Had the enemy's cavalry, which were estimated, including Ameer Khan's contingent under Guffoor Khan, at

upwards of 30,000, stood to their ground, and supported the artillery by a charge on our left and to the rear, when we had advanced far on the plain, they would have sold the day dearly to us, if not gained it altogether. There was no corps in reserve, and although our cavalry, not exceeding 1200 regular, might have broken the enemy at the point of contact, still those had not crossed until the infantry was half advanced on the plain with their rear to the left entirely open, and the moment of that possible contingency had passed*. The distance of the guns

* Had the light corps, instead of being seated in the Nul-lah, been directed to the right and left under the bank of the river, particularly to the right, where an open pathway, sufficient for three abreast, ran to the very flank of the enemy's left guns on the Sepra, they would in this point at least have completely taken the enemy unawares, and might have of themselves carried the principal battery there, before the enemy could have had time to wheel round their guns on them. The other light corps should have been put in motion in open distance to the left of the horse artillery, and might have gradually outflanked the enemy's right as long as our artillery continued to play. But, placed as they were, they could be neither useful as light or heavy corps; and there they stuck until the advance of the right of our line enabled them, in drawing off

from the bank of the river was about 760 yards, and it may be easily supposed, that the line was pretty well knocked up by the time they closed upon them, and could not have very quickly formed up, or recruited their breath so as to make an effectual stand against a fresh attack on their rear. But luckily for us, the enemy's cavalry moved off without firing a shot; and such was the indignation of Holkar's artillery on this sudden defection of their comrades from them, that they actually at the commencement of the battle, turned round some of their guns

the enemy's fire, in a great measure to put themselves in motion, and co-operate in the charge. The horse artillery in like manner should have dashed across the plain to the enemy's right flank, instead of being placed in battery, where they were in the course of a few rounds from the enemy's line of guns entirely dismantled. Major Noble had, we understand, recommended this. In that position of the artillery, we lost nearly 50 of their horses, 33 of them running over to the enemy, and the remainder killed or disabled. The fire seemed to be too much for the gallopper guns of the N. cavalry to have done much in this position, and we understand they were not quite so steady, under the fire as might have been expected. This branch of the service has since been very properly transferred to the artillery line altogether.

and gave them a few smart volleys as they departed. These fugitives however did not altogether escape the calamities of that day, as the Mysore horse pursued and overtook many of them, who were quickly dispatched, and their horses and property plundered; and it was afterwards perceived that the direction of the flying enemy was marked for miles around from the scene of action by dozens of their dead bodies exposed along the plains. Young Holkar had moved off with his ministers in the early part of the action; but the Mysore horse nevertheless contrived by the celerity of their pursuit to overtake and capture the most valuable part of the escort, the regalia and jewels of the court, amounting, as was affirmed by the agents of Holkar, to between 70 and 80 lacs of rupees. There is no doubt as to the seizure of the above property by the Mysore horse, but not to such an amount; and the circumstance afterwards excited not a little discussion throughout the regular army. A committee had been appointed by his Excellency to investigate the business,

but the pressure of more important duties was unfavourable to the inquiry at the time, independent of the obstacles that had been thrown in their way under a thousand unmeaning and idle pretences. Some officers of consequence in the camp seemed to support the title of the Mysore cavalry to the property captured; these maintained, that had not that body seized the valuables, the enemy would of course have now possessed them; that it was our interest to harass the enemy by every means as much as possible, and to this effect it was advisable to hold out as much encouragement, if not an exclusive right by the captors to all property taken under such circumstances. The inquiry fell to the ground at that time, owing to the want of assistance on the part of those who could afford it, and not a little to the evasive tone of correspondence which was then assumed by some, through motives of a prudent or partial tendency. It seems, however, that Lord Moira has taken the business into his consideration, and that already, through the activity

of the Hon. Mr. Cole at Mysore, a considerable amount of that property has been discovered, and claimed from the Mysore government. This has been the second instance of the Mysore cavalry having made themselves masters of the lawful prize of the army, during the late services; the former seizure from a detachment of Madras troops under Major R. M'Dowall, on surprising some Pindarrees, and who permitted the above cavalry in his presence to claim and carry off the whole of the enemy's plunder. Lord Moira commended Major M'D.'s forbearance, but lost no time in compelling the Mysore government to return every rupee of the property for the use of the army.

Any man at all acquainted with the nature of the troops in India, will at once draw the distinction between the regular army and the auxiliary and irregular troops of our allies. The one performs its various duties on fixed and determined principles of discipline and subordination; the other in its very nature professes and displays the very contrary qualities: the one

on all occasions acts in concert and at command, the other, let loose, sets all restraint at defiance and contempt ; and particularly, troops of such character as the Mysore horse are in fact nothing more or less, on these occasions, than so many Loottees or Pindarrees, every man his own master, and every man for himself as to what he can take or get. Our regular cavalry at Mahidpore had been recalled from the pursuit, and, on grounds superior to all private consideration, reserved for future call or emergency. The whole camp of a regular army is restored to as perfect order and harmony in an hour after an action as it was an hour before ; even on the field of battle on the 21st, when the British line had passed the guns, and stood in readiness for a second assault, the above irregular cavalry were solely busy in plundering and packing up on their horses the enemy's tents and property. Whilst therefore such invaluable benefits from a regular army are preserved to a state, and enforced through the exertions and at the general consent of the whole body, it is not to be sup-

posed that government will be unmindful of their just and fair pretensions, or acquiesce for a moment in the position that the fruits of their valour or achievements should be transferred to a body of men, who had as much to say to the action at Mahidpore as their friends in Mysore had. At the same time, it would not be generous to exclude altogether from some participation those who may have been instrumental, through their activity and bravery, in discomfiting the enemy. There requires to be some rule laid down for such cases where regular and irregular troops are employed together ; but that will be no easy plan to devise, so long as the latter body are maintained and employed under their present loose and defective system. These bodies are entertained by our allies for limited periods, or at will, and are severally paid according to the goodness of their horses, the efficiency of the man himself, and the completeness of his arms and equipments. Some receive monthly 40 rupees, others 35, and 30. Each man provides forage, grain, &c. for his horse,

and must be ready at all times for service. These bodies generally bring up the rear of our armies, are useful in conveying expresses, furnishing bazar-guards, escorting supplies, and in short save the regular cavalry from numberless detached and harrassing little duties; they always pitch on the flanks, or to the rear of the camp, and do not in any way fall within the rules or discipline of the army, such as mounting guard, piquets, courts martial, or otherwise. They frequently flank the army on the line of march, and during the march they never neglect securing at pleasure whatever may be useful to themselves or horses; and they may be constantly observed on coming to the ground with bundles of straw, choolum, &c. or bags of grain suspended by the saddle, for which they seldom or ever pay, and whenever they do pay, it is by throwing the villagers a mere apology. Should they not meet with these articles on the march, they start from their encampment in the course of the day, by tens or so, and, as distance is nothing to them, they will move off 10 or

15 miles, and are sure to return loaded in the evening with the richest produce of the country. I myself was on one occasion an eye-witness to the rapacity of a party of the Mysore horse, close to Mundessoor, when, being on piquet about three miles off camp, my attention was called by the cries of the inhabitants from the tops of the houses and walls of a village close at hand. I instantly proceeded with a few Seapoys to the gate of the village, which had been already broken open ; and on entering I found a body of the above horse dismounted inside the village, pulling down the houses for the sake of fire-wood alone, which they threw over the walls to their mounted comrades outside ; filling likewise their bags, chatties, &c. with grain and oil, and in short devoting the village to downright plunder : most of the inhabitants having fled and concealed themselves, they had already demolished five or six small houses, and such was the alarm in the village, that the families had all collected in a small house on one of the turrets, probably expecting a worse fate. I of

course put an immediate stop to this scene, by clearing the village of these Loottees, and reported the circumstance in the usual channel; but it never went farther. In this manner these bodies of irregular horse act through the country, whenever they are removed from the observation of their superiors. Nor is it pretended to confine this remark to the Mysore horse only: it will apply generally to all Asiatics in our service; who, were it not for the restraint and vigilance imposed upon them, would turn their hand precisely in the same way over their timid and weak countrymen. Thus this pusillanimous people become the dupes and objects of every one who wishes to peck at them, flying in despair, and abandoning, on the most trifling appearance of danger, their families, houses, and their property; and thus at the hour of trial, or of danger to our possessions in India, to whatever perfection or attachment we may attain amongst the Natives, this dastardly and imbecile spirit would but too well encourage and invigorate the first advances of our enemy, who

might, at the very sound of their name alone, find themselves already masters of the richest towns and provinces. Hence we can but at best compare our dominions in the East to a vast expanse of waters, on which may be met detached and distinct bodies of opposition, but these encountered or avoided, the easy and yielding element will be alike open to all, and in its very nature alone will for ever set at defiance all human ingenuity or skill towards rendering it either stable or permanent.

On our crossing the Taptee and Narbudda rivers in advance, and getting into our enemy's country, we had all supplies of beef, mutton, and grain of all kinds, much cheaper than in our own—even the cattle, &c. consumed by us in the field being seldom paid for, the wretched inhabitants fleeing, on the very report of our army, from their villages; and the numerous hordes of camp-followers with our armies spreading far and wide over the country, and devastating every field or village they came on. We require a check upon this system of

depredation on the part of our camp-followers, who are generally eight to one fighting man; and we may take it for granted, that four of these cannot come by their support honestly. These rascals, arming themselves with spears, old musquets, swords, &c. form into bodies of ten or twenty, and released from all restraint, dash away from our camp from ten to twenty miles, and seizing horses, cows, goats, &c. they drive them along the rear of the line of march until they have escaped all suspicion, when they there send in their booty to the bazars; and procuring the cattle themselves at so cheap a rate, they dispose of them at a corresponding reduction to our bazar-men, who also of course find too near an interest in collusion to bring the offenders to justice; and consequently these vagabonds continue with impunity in such practices, frequently adding murder to them when they are at all opposed; and whenever the fruits of the country are not sufficiently inviting to their hands, they commonly recoil upon our camp, and form themselves into so

many gangs of nightly robbers. Hence the disgrace that frequently follows our armies in passing through the territories of our allies or enemies ; and to the same cause we may attribute the scarcity and dearness our troops have constantly experienced in provisions, from the consumption of the above idle and licentious rabble. Our military police should apply a better corrective, if not root out, this system attaching to our field armies. Every man or woman without employ, and without some kind of pass from the police or their master, found in the camp, should be whipped out and turned back. This commenced on at the first starting of a force, could be easily continued and kept on : it would be some remedy, at all events, of an evil, the weight of which we may at one day feel in such description of people consuming three times as much as our fighting numbers. I am sure the number of followers accompanying our armies under his Excellency Sir T. H. and Sir J. Malcolm at this juncture at Ougein, fell little short of 200,000 people,

when our number of troops was not upwards of 8000 altogether. The mass of followers, with cattle, baggage, &c. cover the plains as far as the eye can reach; demolishing every field of peas and grain they come across. They are infinitely worse than swarms of locusts, for they carry off roots and all with them; and after passing through a field of peas, you can descry for miles a moving field of peas, each of these creatures with a bundle on the head or the turban. This of course more generally happens in an enemy's country; but an Indian army, in its very nature at present, cannot pass through any country without heavy and material injury being done to it.

We had left the Mysore horse in the supposed possession of the regalia of Holkar's court; and shall now proceed to the subsequent operations of the army under his Excellency Sir T. Hislop. The whole of the sick and wounded of the army, as also the latter of the enemy, were thrown into Mahidpore, where a field-hospital being established, and the 6th N. I. placed there

as a garrison, his Excellency broke ground with the army again, in a northerly direction, towards the Chumbul river. Sir J. Malcolm had marched with a light detachment on the 28th December in pursuit of the enemy, and had just closed on their heels in the vicinity of Mundessoor when he was recalled by Sir Thomas Hislop. On the army reaching the Chumbul, we fell in with Sir W. Kier's detachment from Bombay, consisting of the 47th foot, 17th light dragoons, and two battalions of B. N. I. with some artillery; and after an interchange of civilities between the commanders of the two armies, Sir W. Kier proceeded with his force in a north-westerly direction; and the Madras army, a few marches afterwards, took up its ground at Mundessoor. Negotiations were shortly afterwards entered into with the ministers of young Holkar; and it was at length agreed to, that we should have our own way, and a day was accordingly appointed for the reception of young Holkar in his Excellency's camp, and for his being placed under the pro-

tection of Major Agnew, Sir John Malcolm's political assistant. The detachment of the Bengal army under Gen. T. Brown was now also closing to the westward; and that officer, a few days after our arrival at Mundessoor, made himself master of the fort of Rampoor, after a smart, but short resistance. The news of the victory at Mahidpore following so quickly the late discomfiture of the Peishwah and the Rajah of Berar, seemed now to paralyze all further effort or opposition with the remaining Mah-ratta powers (Scindeah and Ameer Khan) against the British government. And they themselves being closely watched by the several Bengal divisions, and cut off from all communication with each other, or with the Southern Mah-ratta states, now assumed a tone of the utmost humility and submission to the Earl Moira. Ameer Khan consented to the surrender of his artillery (which, however, were far from being in an efficient state, as we were obliged to send out carts to bring them in); and Scindeah proceeded to the dismissal of the rabble about

him, chiefly consisting of loose and predatory troops.

The Pindarrees, by these repeated blows on their masters and protectors, being now driven from their nests, took in small bodies to different parts of the country; and finding every door and every hope of relief shut against them, they quickly fell an easy prey to our surrounding light detachments; or, reduced to the lowest plight, they abandoned their horses and arms, some taking to the jungles, and others seeking refuge in the villages, heartily sickened of their late occupations. Amongst these bodies, Cheetoo, a celebrated Pindarree leader, having collected a small body of his gang, was resolved to push across the Narbudda, and try his fortune in the South; and had with this view arrived within twenty miles of Hindia, when Major Heath, commanding at that place, having received the information, he instantly detached the company of the M. E. R. with a wing of the 7th M. N. I. to surprise him. Cheetoo lay encamped close under a village, and our party

came up to the spot undiscovered at midnight. The detachment then separated for the attack, with the view of surrounding the enemy if possible ; but the darkness of the night, added to our ignorance of the difficulties that opposed this movement, from the nature of the ground and the thickness of the jungle, defeated in a great measure the complete success of this service. The troops, however, moved on as well as they could; but some of them firing before the others had reached their ground, the enemy took the alarm, and fled in all directions, leaving their whole camp and property behind them ; and this seasonable blow checked every future attempt by that banditti at crossing the Narbudda.

Lord Moira, from the important consequences of the battle at Mahidpore, and the successes attending our armies south of the Narbudda, was now enabled to calculate upon a quicker termination to the campaign than he was at first led to apprehend ; and his Excellency Sir T. H. was authorized to recross the Narbudda with

his army, and be there guided as matters should turn up. The 1st division accordingly broke ground about the end of January, 1818*, and taking a route *via* Indore (the capital of Holkar), we passed for some days in succession through plains of the richest and most beautiful cultivation possible to be imagined. Here wheat, peas, poppies, and grain, grow in separate fields in the greatest luxuriance, and over a sheet of country, between Mundessoor and Indore, of nearly one hundred miles, and scarce a hillock to be seen the whole way. There was scarcely a path-way even left for travellers; and we were on several occasions compelled to march through cultivated fields, and not unfrequently to pitch our encampment in the midst of them. The villages are small in this part of the country, and the population very

* Leaving Sir J. Malcolm there with a brigade of horse artillery, the 3rd L. C., the 1st battalion 14th N. I., and the Russel brigade; and that officer shortly afterwards took up his ground at Mhow, not far from Indore, and was employed from this period in the settlement of that country, and the establishment of a court for young Holkar.

scanty: we must therefore suppose that the produce of this extensive cultivation is consumed chiefly between the capitals of Ougein and Indore.

At both these capitals the tombs of the Scindeah and Holkar families are the only objects well worthy of the attention of the visitor. The tombs of the Holkar family at Indore are certainly grand and beautiful; situated on the bank of a clear and broad river, surrounded and interspersed with mango and other trees, their effect is pleasing and striking from the southside. But even these tombs are now much neglected, and chiefly occupied by Jogees, Fakeers, and impostors, who, on the presence of any person of rank or consequence, and for a small donation, will gratify the curiosity and passions of their visitors at the same time, by inviting thither bands of dancing girls from Indore, and thus prostituting those sacred abodes of the dead to the most sensual and depraved gratifications.

It seems apprehensions were entertained about this time of an intended insurrection at Hydra-

bad, in the general confederacy against us. Numerous bodies of horse and foot had been pouring into the city for several days; but the timely and vigilant measures adopted by Mr. Russel, the Resident, with an augmented and commanding force under Brig.-gen. S. A. Floyer, stilled and defeated the attempts that were no doubt ripening against us at that capital.

The army under Sir T. Hislop left Indore on 2nd February, 1818; and on its first march descended the Indore Ghaut, a winding and terrific descent amongst hills to the low country on the Narbudda. At Mundessoor we had the thermometer, during the month of January, frequently as low as 34° and 36° , and commonly every morning and evening at 40° and a little upwards, whilst the range varied from these degrees in the course of the day from eleven a. m. to four p. m. to 86° , and 92° - 93° ; but descending the ghaut, which must be some thousands of feet above the low country, the transition from heat to cold was much more perceptible, and quicker, and attacked almost every man and animal in camp with violent

colds and rheumatisms. Above the ghauts the troops were remarkably healthy; but in the low country, the sun becoming powerful, and the ground covered with thick and luxuriant grass and herbage, these acted upon by a vertical heat in their effects quickly generated fevers, bowel complaints, &c. amongst the men. The direction of the descent of the troops was entrusted by his Excellency to Lieut.-col. Conway. The length of the ghaut was about eight miles to the bottom, the road narrow and difficult, and almost impassable for carriage of any description. We had not proceeded above half way when we were attacked by numerous bodies of the Bheels, or hill robbers, who infest that mountainous and wild tract that runs immediately north of the Narbudda, some hundred miles east and west of it. These robbers are generally armed with bows and arrows, and sometimes with matchlocks, and exact at all the different ghauts a certain toll from all bodies of merchants and others who pass these narrow ways. But individuals proceeding alone,

or even in small parties, are commonly robbed altogether, and if they make the least opposition are murdered also. The Bheels shewed themselves in considerable numbers on the tops and sides of the hills as we descended, and discharged a few matchlocks and arrows at our line; some of them even ventured to come nearer down the hill; but a few of them being knocked over by our light infantry, and finding that we were too numerous for them, they retired, and allowed us to pass unmolested. These Bheels in like manner occupy all the passes or ghauts along the Taptee river, in the Deckan, and along the extensive range of the western ghauts of India; and so troublesome had they become of late to our communications and tappals, or posts, that it was found expedient to pay them an annual tribute for a free and unmolested passage to our several runners and agents. Some of these bodies receive annually from us three or four thousand rupees, others two, and so on; and ever since this contract has been formed with these fellows, our messengers and people

have never suffered the least hindrance or injury. The Bheels reside entirely amongst the hills, seldom visiting the low country, except for the purposes of procuring arms, cloth, &c. They have their small villages in the retired and distant recesses of the mountains, and generally cultivate sufficient rice and sugar-cane to answer their own consumption. Of this class of people there are certainly not less than 10,000 immediately north of the Narbudda, and between that and the Deckan, in a line from Dowlutabad to Ellichpoor. The army had now reached the Narbudda, and passed at a ford about 60 miles west of Hindia; and thence bending our course southward, we reached the fort of Sendwah on the top, and commanding a ghaut of that name. This fort was agreed to be surrendered to us by the late treaty with Holkar; and the Killedar being duly summoned, the garrison turned out with their arms, and the British union was hoisted on the ensuing day. The 2d battalion of the 14th N. I. with a brigade of guns, was thrown into it as a gar-

risson; but that place, completely surrounded with jungle, proved in the course of six months a grave to nearly half that detachment. His Excellency now descended with the remainder of the force the Sendwah Ghaut, and had made but the second or third march from that place when we were drawn up suddenly by the fort of Talnair, on the river Taptee, on the 28th of February. It was intended to have passed the Taptee on that morning, and to have encamped on the left bank of it, but the garrison of that place having fired upon some of our people who were going in advance, the line was of course halted; and a smart firing having ensued between the piquets and the enemy, the ground of encampment for the day was taken up to the north-west of the fort, and at the distance of about a mile. His Excellency Sir T. Hislop on the first report of the business had gone a-head, and is said to have sent a written message to the Killedar, intimating that unless he immediately opened the gates and surrendered the place, he would hang him: it does not seem to

have been clearly ascertained whether this message ever got to the Killedar, or was even received or delivered into the fort; but threats of that kind are frequently made use of to induce the enemy to surrender, and to frighten him into submission, without any real intention of carrying them into execution. We had heard nothing of Talnair until we came upon it, nor does it appear to have been expressly ceded to us in the treaty with Holkar; and in fact no person in the camp seemed to know any thing whatever of such a place being before us. Hostilities however having commenced, the foot artillery, and some of the horse artillery guns with the howitzers, were brought up and placed on the most advantageous situation for cannonading the gateway. The fort itself is situated upon one of those abrupt mounds of earth that had been formed from the main land through the overflowing of the Taptee, its own bed being unequal to its waters in the rainy seasons, the loose and rich mould giving way in masses, and presenting at these particular places preci-

pices of from 80 to 100 feet in height. The west face of the fort is washed by the Taptee, and a deep nullah or ravine runs completely round the fort, thus rendering the place, independent of its masonry, a hold of considerable strength. The inner fort itself is an irregular square; and, standing inside, the walls do not exceed 16 feet or so in height, whilst outside they are carried down to the very bottom of the face of the mound, which on the side nearest the Taptee is upwards of 70 feet high. The fort slopes gradually towards the land side to the east, where the principal entrance is; and between the square of the fort itself and the outer gate there are four other gates, each of these being situated somewhat lower than its neighbour as you descend outwards. There is a ford on each side of Talnair across the Taptee, both of them commanded by the fort; and the approach on the northern side being cut off by one of those rugged and deep nullahs, formed also by the waters of the river, renders the situation of Talnair capable

of great resistance. There are, however, many good approaches to it, in the windings of the smaller cavities and ravines, whence our musquetry during that day kept up an ineffectual fire at the enemy, who, screened behind their battlements, and firing from loop-holes, caused a much smarter loss on our side, having wounded a great number of our men, with four officers, and killed two or three Seapoys. Our six-pounders were posted on a rising ground nearly opposite the outer gate, at which they fired for the greater part of the day with scarce any effect, the shots either passing through the gate, or burying themselves in the mud of the walls on its flanks. The enemy on their part continued to serve their only gun on the south turret of the fort without doing us much injury; but the Arabs, with their matchlocks, had made some excellent shots, and towards mid-day amongst others had brought down a quartermaster serjeant of the H. A. not far from the place where Sir T. Hislop was standing. His Excellency was quite indignant at this presump-

tion of a handful of men opposing his army, and he became exceedingly angry when he saw the above serjeant killed; and turning round, he addressed his Persian interpreter Capt. B. near him, and said, "Now what does this fellow deserve to be done with?" to which that officer replied, "He should be hanged, Sir." The firing on both sides was now continued towards the close of the day. In the mean time the flank companies of the R. S. and M. E. R. had been ordered down in the early part of the day, under command of Major Gordon of the former corps, to stand by as a storming-party. There was, however, no opening or breach effected, nor was there much hope of one being made with the six-pounders, as, independent of their unfitness for such purposes, there were not twenty more shot in the camp. Towards the evening the enemy seemed to have reflected more seriously upon their condition, and had accordingly at about five p. m. hoisted a white flag from the fort for cowl, or a parley.

This signal was observed and attended to by

us; and some of the pioneers under its protection emerged from the ravines, and proceeded directly up to the outward gate; the enemy, even on this hasty approach, not offering the least violence or firing at them: and the pioneers immediately set to work at opening the gate, but finding that strongly barred, they effected a small opening to its right, and introducing a few men, the gate itself was shortly after thrown open to the whole body, the flag of truce still flying, and some of the Arabs shewing themselves on the walls. The party under Major Gordon was now moved up, we may suppose with a view of taking possession of the fort; and was halted outside the third gate. The head of the pioneers, with a number of idlers, and people who had no business there, had now reached the inner gate of all; the wicket of which having been opened, the Killedar with ten or eleven attendants came out, and delivered himself a prisoner to one of the pioneer officers, and shortly after meeting with the Adj.-general, he spoke to him, saying, "Whatever fault may

ave been committed, I am the guilty person, but let the garrison understand what terms they are to have:" and he was thence conveyed to his Excellency. Major Gordon with the head of his party, with the Hon. Lieut.-col. Murray, now moved on, and six or seven of them entered the wicket, without the least opposition; a few Arabs standing in front of the gate, others on the wall, and in other parts of the fort, moving about in a careless manner. Lieut.-col. M. and Major G. and Capt. M'Gregor of the R. S. being inside, a word of command from a staff officer of distinction, outside the gate, was given to disarm the Arabs; and the same expression being repeated once or twice in a vehement manner, the Hon. Col. M. held out his hand to an Arab, signifying that he demanded his arms; and which the Arab observing, he drew off, beckoning that he would not deliver up his matchlock: on this Lieut.-col. M. put his hand to the hilt of his sword, as if to alarm the Arab, when others of the R. S. behind forcibly seizing the matchlocks of some of the Arabs, these with

one voice exclaimed aloud in their own language 'their honour and their faith,' and drawing their daggers, instantly set upon as many of those inside as they could get at, of whom five were killed; and Lieut.-col. M., dreadfully wounded, was just saved, having been dragged away from without the gateway. The head of the party outside now fell back in some confusion; but the wicket still remaining open, and all opposition having ceased, they again advanced, and entering the fort, commenced a general slaughter of every one they met with, only two out of about 180 people having escaped. Amongst our killed were, Major Gordon, and Capt. M'Gregor of the Royal Scots, with three men of that corps. Some of the Arabs, observing this attack, collected together on one of the towers, and made a short but feeble resistance, whilst a few in despair threw themselves into the river, by which they were dashed to pieces. These particulars being reported to his Excellency, he now ordered the Killedar to be taken inside and hanged; which

was instantly put into execution, the unfortunate man having been dispatched by a musquet out of humanity by an officer present ; and his body was afterwards suspended from the battlements of Talnair. We have no doubt the above lamentable catastrophe occurred entirely through want of regularity and arrangement in conducting it, and in particular in neglecting to send some person a-head of the party, who could have spoken to the Arabs, and brought matters to a clear understanding. No Arab will allow himself, or has ever stooped to the indignity and disgrace of having his arms wrested by force from him : he will ground his arms of his own accord, according to the custom of war ; but he will rather suffer death than permit force to be used in depriving him of them. Neither the Hon. Lieut.-col. M. nor Major G. was capable of speaking a word to them : the Commander-in-chief had his established interpreters by himself ; there were also many of the Company's officers who might have been employed, and would have thus prevented

one of the most needless, butchering, and disgraceful scenes that has ever occurred in India. Nor can the fate that awaited, and was afterwards in cool blood dealt out to the unfortunate Killedar redound a whit more to our justice or our humanity. The natives of India have their prejudices in war as well as in every thing else; they have certain forms and ideas of honour in defending a place and in giving it up, nor will they recede from them until scrupulously observed. They, for instance, look upon it as a disgrace to give up a place without some kind of defence, and they generally fire a gun or so before they will surrender, and sometimes a gun without a shot, even where they possessed the means of a stout opposition. The garrison of Talnair composed chiefly of Arabs, perceiving on our arrival that we had no large guns to breach their walls, grew bold in their security and defence until evening, when, possibly calculating upon an escalade by night, they proposed fair terms of surrender, and hoisted a flag of truce: this was virtually accepted by us, and

acting under its cover we proceeded with rashness, and without any plan, to seize on the garrison, who, inspired with a natural and becoming resolution, would not stoop to dishonour, and in resisting the attempts had thus involved themselves and their families in a merciless destruction. Their leader for nearly the same reasons defended his post for his master, and when he had surrendered himself to our faith, is handed over to the executioner, and in cool form dispatched. The general impression through the British camp was, that we had acted treacherously on this occasion; but the execution of the Killedar, a Bramin and nearly related to some of the first families in the country, and his having been exposed naked from the walls, branded our name with an idea of barbarity and injustice, that in that quarter of India will not be easily effaced or forgotten. Sir T. Hislop supposed, or more probably was led to think so by some of those about him, that the garrison acted treacherously upon the head of our party, in first admitting them through

the wicket, and then setting upon them; but, however Sir T. Hislop's well-known humanity and moderation may acquit him (and we have good reason to know, that he was not the most morally culpable in that transaction) of a wanton or premeditated shedding of blood, still, in the affair of Talnair, his name as the chief commander must remain attached to it, and surely not under the most flattering colours.

The army left Talnair a few days after having thrown into it a detachment of the 16th light infantry. We shall now turn our eyes to the South. Badjee Row's army, on its first starting from the vicinity of Poonah, took its route by Gungtorry, and thence in an easterly direction towards the river Wurdah, not far from Nagpore, with a view of co-operating with the still disaffected troops of the Rajah of Berar; whilst the armies under Brigadier-gen. Doveton and Smith pursued him by different tracks and directions, but without ever coming upon him; and the Peishwah, finding that matters were not favourable to him at Nagpore,

struck South towards the Godavery river, and betaking his steps to his own country again, he shortly after, in February 1818, gave Briggens. Smith an opportunity of a brush with his cavalry near the village of Ashtee. On the first appearance of the enemy under Gocklah, our cavalry, consisting of two squadrons of H. M. 22d dragoons, the 2d and 7th M. N. C. formed up in open column of half squadrons; the 7th in front, the dragoons in the centre, and the 2d Native cavalry in the rear; and moved on towards the enemy, who, prepared in a solid mass, were seen advancing on our left flank, and seemingly with an intention of charging the centre; but on nearer approach perceiving the centre to be occupied by the Europeans, they quickly brought their right shoulders forward, and dealt a most furious blow with their whole weight on the 7th cavalry, who were broken and put into some confusion by it. The 22d dragoons, however, in their turn charged to the off flank in support of that corps, and penetrating the centre and rear of

the enemy, soon checked their impetuosity: the 2d cavalry at the same time advancing, and in good order, to the support of both, the enemy were driven back, and soon took to flight in every direction. Our cavalry followed up the pursuit, and suddenly coming upon a deep nullah crowded with elephants, &c. they got possession of the whole of the Satara family:—these are legitimate sovereigns of the Mahratta empire. In this affair Gocklah fell with several of his men.* General Smith† after this re-

* List of casualties in the cavalry brigade in the affair with the enemy, commanded by Brigadier-general Smith, C. B. —Camp Gopall, Ashtee, 20th February, 1818.

His Majesty's 22d dragoons:—killed, 3 regimental horses: wounded, 1 lieutenant, 1 trumpeter, 13 privates, total 15; 1 officer's horse, 13 regimental horses: missing, 1 officer's horse, 7 regimental horses.

2d Light Cavalry:—killed, 2 regimental horses: wounded, 1 trumpeter, 1 private, total 2; 4 regimental horses: missing, 7 regimental horses.

7th Light Cavalry:—killed, 1 private; total 1: wounded, 2 privates, total 2; 5 regimental horses: missing, 7 regimental horses.

Officer wounded, Lieut. Warand, 22d dragoons, slightly.

† Brigadier-general Smith, during his pursuit of Badjee Row, formed one of the Bombay N. Corps into a Light Corps,

sumed the pursuit of the Peishwah, who again struck off to the north-east ; and Brig.-gen. D. was in the mean time invited off his track to meet his Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop on his arrival at the Godavery. His Excellency's force had now reached Parola, a little to the south of the Taptee, when an express from Viziapour announced that Badjee Row's army was in that neighbourhood. The army accordingly stepped out, and marched on that day twenty-seven miles, and in the three succeeding days fifty-two, when coming to the bottom of the Casabary Ghaut, we there learned that Badjee Row had left the vicinity of Viziapour about three weeks before. The army now ascended the ghaut, and marching nearly south on the Godavery, we reached Pultumba on that river on the 15th of March, where his Excellency intimated his intention of retiring ; and Gen. D.'s force

and mounting them on tattees, or small horses, thus managed to keep always at hand with the cavalry a body of infantry, in event of overtaking the enemy. This system might in India be much improved upon, particularly in desultory kinds of warfare, such as with the Pindarrees, &c.

having arrived at the same place a day after, Sir Thomas Hislop detached that officer again with a smart detachment in pursuit of Badjee Row, placing at the same time a force under Lieut.-col. A. M'Dowell for the reduction of the Peishwah's posts in Gungtorry and Khan-deish. This detachment consisted of two weak companies of the Royal Scots; three ditto of the M. E. R.; a battalion of 2d N. I. and 13th N. I.; with a battering train of two 18 and two 12-pounders, and a few mortars howitzers, with some engineer officers, and a detachment of pioneers. This force was shortly after reinforced by a body of about three hundred of the Poonah irregular horse; and moving on Dowlutabad, we remained close to it a few days for further instructions from his Excellency Sir T. Hislop, who had gone a-head on a visit to the caves of Ellora. During our stay at Serisgaun we had likewise an opportunity of being gratified by a sight of these wonderful excavations. On approaching these caves from the westward, and when you arrive near the bottom of the

range of hills in which they are formed, the entrances of these caves have much the appearance of so many gloomy prison windows or cells along the bottom of the hill. The approach on the N. W. side is over broken and tedious ground, intersected by a number of ravines and nullahs, through which it is necessary for the visitor to have a conductor. At a small and beautiful pagoda not far from the caves, and on the bank of a deep nullah, built of red granite, and in my opinion, in point of art and design, far excelling the best of the caves, the visitor may always find people willing to conduct him to the caves for a small present. Out of about twenty caves, there are four or five only worth looking at; having seen these, you in fact see them all, none of the others offering any greater variety of sculpture or of figures. The first, and we believe the largest, cave, or rather hall, cut from the base of the mountain, is about 170 yards in length, 17 broad, and about 26 feet in height, with a row of 16 pillars left from the rock, running from one end to the other. In

front of this hall there is a small and beautiful pagoda, cut in like manner from the solid rock ; its portico, vestibule, and different doors being all from one piece, and supported by elephants, tigers, &c. cut also from the rock. Many of these figures, and the exterior work of the pagoda, display a most exquisite and finished use of the chissel ; nor is admiration less on visiting the interior of the hall and pagoda, which in their various figures and sculpture, particularly in the former (although on minute examination somewhat obscene), in like manner pourtray a rare excellence in that art. But notwithstanding the supernatural agency attached to these caves, we think we can trace their execution to more plain and simple causes. The first of these works must have commenced from the upper surface of the hill. You may fancy to yourself three sides of a square being marked on the side of a hill ; and the upper line of course being the deepest in substance to the bottom of the hill, was probably commenced on in the first instance. The work in this manner

entered upon, there was nothing but perseverance and common labour required in clearing away and removing as fast as possible the broken stones and rubbish, until reaching an assumed point for the very summit of the pagoda; the workmen proceeded, shaping accordingly the dome and ornaments at their leisure, and thus gradually clearing and working down to the very bottom of the pagoda; in the mean time keeping the perpendicular line of the three sides as straight as possible, so as to form a convenient area, or square, round the pagoda, which lies in its centre. The external part of the pagoda being now finished, the artist of course set to, and formed from the mass of the solid body the entrance, portico, and interior; and these all finished, they next set to the rear side of the square, or the side nearest the centre of the hill, and commencing at the proposed height, they endeavoured first to remove one shelf of the stratum of which these hills are formed, and then working lower down, and leaving the rock untouched for the line of pillars, in this man-

ner, by indefatigable labour and perseverance, they must have accomplished its perfection. The whole of the hills running from Dowlutabad, as well as those to the north of it, and in the neighbourhood of Mulcapore, are formed of a stratum of the above kind, running in a straight line for miles along the hills, and some from three to six feet in thickness and less, and separated from its neighbour by a thin layer of a loose and brittle stone ; so that to work a cave in the sides of any of these hills, the work is already half done, and it only remains for the workmen to penetrate the surface, and cut the sides and back, the layer or stratum itself above and below, to any length and depth the artist may choose, being easily removed. Next to the above cave the Carpenter's Hall, as it is called, is worth visiting, from its roof alone ; the hall itself being scooped out of the solid rock, and the ceiling of it precisely resembling the inverted hull of a small vessel, the keel and ribs being cut to the most exact distance and nicety to it.

Lieutenant-colonel M'Dowell had now received his final instructions from the Commander-in-chief; and Capt. Briggs, one of the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone's assistants, having joined the detachment as Civil Commissioner for the settlement of the countries that might be reduced, the detachment quitted Serisgaun, and after a few marches took up its ground before the fort of Unkie-Tunkie on the 5th April, 1818. Negotiations had been opened on the preceding day with the Killedar of that fort, whose master, a Rajah in the vicinity, had been summoned a short time before to attend on Badjee Row in his flight, and who now, finding that matters were going against the Peishwah, had sent orders to the Killedar to deliver up the place to the British government, as the only hope of retaining his country. On arriving therefore at Unkie, and matters not being fully settled, Col. M'Dowell ordered a couple of six-pounders to the gate of the Pettah Gate, which was instantly opened, and the surrender effected; and a party from the detach-

ment ascending the lofty and beautiful battlements of Unkie, the British flag was thus easily hoisted on the very summit. The whole of the guns on the top had been loaded, and the matches lighted ; nor was it without the greatest difficulty, and a handsome gratuity, that the Killedar prevailed upon the garrison to retire, without giving our camp the benefit of a volley. The garrison amounted to about 300 men, with about 40 guns of different descriptions ; and on examining the works, the well-furnished magazines and stores of that beautiful and strong fortress, we had every reason to be gratified at its easy and bloodless conquest. The shape of the hill is nearly square, being a solid rock rising from another hill, whose sides gradually decline towards the low country and the Pettah. The rock itself is scarped on its four sides to a perpendicular fall of from 150 to 200 feet and upwards, thus presenting on its four quarters an inaccessible and bluff rock, and so smooth in some parts, that you would take it to be a work of art. The upper circumference of the hill is

as nearly as possible an English mile, and perfectly flat, with the exception of the eastern quarter, whence rises another small hill of about 150 feet above its own base; the summit of this little cone, which is called Tunkie, being exactly 900 feet above the level of the low country. The ascent to Unkie is very difficult, being guarded on the right by a chain of works which unites another hill to the east of it, called Palca, with Unkie itself; and the ascent to the latter place being directly under fire of several pieces of cannon, and over a steep and craggy way, about a mile from the Pettah to its lower gate, would render an approach in this quarter as desperate as difficult. The lower gateway is exceedingly well built, and with its curtains, towers, &c. presents an independent work of itself by no means contemptible. Passing this gateway, the farther ascent is through a number of difficult and intricate windings, and by flights of steps cut out of the solid rock, and affording but a low and small parapet to the left hand as you ascend, to protect you

from the giddy and dangerous precipice beneath. Coming at length to the last flight of steps, the entrance is protected by a strong gateway and works; passing through which you mount by narrow and winding stairs still more shallow, and to the edge of the rock, and protected by similar gate and works on its top; so that half a dozen men, standing on the top of this latter gateway, would be able, with stones alone, to keep back any body, however numerous; and this being the only way to the top, so long as it should be protected, would set all further effort of approach at defiance. The latter flight of steps is just broad enough to admit a single man at a time, being in number between 60 and 70: with a large quantity of dry wood on both the gates, to fire the gateways if necessary. This measure, if had recourse to, would in a few minutes bury both gateways and the passage in a heap of ruins and fire, and stop all possible access a step higher. On reaching the summit of the hill, the eye is extremely gratified by the extensive

view of the Khandeish and Gungtorry countries; nor is the gratification less in visiting the numerous and different magazines, granaries, and armouries, &c. all hewn from the rock, and in their depth and various recesses setting defiance to the ordinary effects of bombardment, or any other practice in the use of war. Some of these cells are from 20 to 50 feet under the surface of the rock; and the approach to them is by narrow and winding flights of steps, with wells of the purest spring-water from the rock at the different turnings and chambers. There are likewise on the surface of the rock two large tanks or ponds of water, cut from the rock; and at the western extremity the remains of an extensive and beautiful palace. The guns are disposed in different parts and angles on the hill, with two or three extensive batteries cut also from the rock to the east face half way down the scarp, and commanding the approach and entrance to the gateway. Here, as also at the base of Palca facing the Pettah (which is embraced in the angle of the two hills, Unkie

and Palca), may be seen the same use of the chissel and art as before described at Ellora; and the whole of the forts in Gungtorry and Khandeish bear with little variety the marks and traces of that persevering and wonderful class of artificers. Unkie-Tunkie is considerably the strongest and best-furnished hill fort in that quarter, or perhaps in India; and the curiosity of the visitor may be satisfied to its full by a few days' minute examination and attention to every part of it. The detachment got about 12,000 rupees in cash, and realized about 20,000 more from prize sale; but all this, with the other handsome prize property subsequently taken by this detachment, went to the general fund of the army.

The force now proceeded in three marches to Chandore; and two days after, passing thence over a difficult ghaut, they took up their ground on the 9th April, opposite the hill-fort of Raj-deir, distant about 10 miles from Chandore, to the N. W. behind a range of hills. The civil commissioner had gone a-head the preceding day, and summoned the place to sur-

render; but the enemy refused to pay any attention to him, and fired a few matchlocks at the party. Lieut.-col. M'Dowell took up his ground at about two miles distance from the fort; and Lieut. Davies, the engineer, proceeded to reconnoitre. Rajdeir stands upon the back of a chain of small hills, rising from their rear about 400 feet above their tops: its shape somewhat resembles a lion crouching, and its sides are scarped in the same manner as those of Unkie-Tunkie, with but one entrance to the N. E. front. The base of Rajdeir runs to the N. W. in a projecting neck of land, which is naturally strong, and fortified by a wall of dry stones, and a well-built gateway to the eastward of it. The next step is to the second hill, and further down a third; these three points thus presenting a chain of posts capable of great defence, and being in fact so many outposts to Rajdeir itself. In the valley between these posts and Rajdeir lies the Pettah, with Indrie, another hill-fort overhanging it to the right, and the left of all being cut off from the western hills by a deep ravine, with a

Bheel village at the lower angle of it. The enemy in the course of the day shewed themselves in great numbers on the tops of the range of hills, and on the principal out-post; and some of them descending the hills drove back our followers and people from collecting grass, &c. Lieut. Davies had now fixed upon the plan of attack; which was, to get possession of the upper out-post in the first instance, and then to be guided as circumstances might turn up; and the following morning being fixed upon for the attack, a party of 180 Europeans of R. S. and M. E. R. with 300 Seapoys under the command of Major Andrews of M. E. R. ascended the heights at about three o'clock a. m.; gained the first and second hills unperceived by day-break, the enemy having drawn off from these points during the night; and took shelter on the off side of the second hill from the fire of Rajdeir, and the remaining principal out-post. Our guns in the mean time having been placed in battery at the foot of the hill opposite the Bheel village, opened a few

guns and howitzers at break of day on the outpost, which it was our object to carry, but without much effect, from its great elevation and distance, being upwards of 700 feet above the plain, and retiring itself back considerably amongst the hills. Some shells did nevertheless handsome execution; and it was decided by Lieut.-col. M'Dowell, that the whole party should start from their cover at nine o'clock (10th April), and proceed to the attack at a signal of three salvoes from the battery. Preparations having been accordingly made, and the parties told off for their several destinations, at the signal given, the troops as above under Major A., with Ensign Nattes of the engineers, moved on in the most regular and gallant style, and ascending the hill, which was exceedingly difficult of footing and steep, and little short of a mile, under a furious discharge of guns, Gingall's rockets, &c. from the upper forts, and a few volleys of matchlocks from the lower work, they carried the latter without the necessity of escalade, the enemy abandoning it, and retreating on Rajdeir.

In this affair we had but one officer and a few men wounded, and none killed. The enemy, still secure in their main hold, now endeavoured to render our new post as disagreeable as possible, by a constant and thick fire from a couple of guns, and hundreds of matchlocks, during the remainder of the day. Lieut. Davies immediately set to work with his men, in the face of the whole of this fire, and marked out his line for further operations: in this his efforts were well supported by the sappers and miners and pioneers, who run out their gabions, and plied with the most praiseworthy zeal to effect his wishes; the enemy firing repeated volleys upon them. Towards the evening, the enemy perceiving a new work nearly constructed, and judging from our zeal and intrepidity alone of our determination to carry the place, hoisted a flag of truce towards sunset, and entered into terms for its surrender. On the flag being first hoisted, a Native officer was sent by Major Andrews to ascertain what they desired; and on his reaching the bottom of the rock, they hailed

him as loud as they could; amongst other questions, asking him what was the object of the work we were constructing (the appearance of the gabions and sand-bags being quite new to them): the Native officer replied with a good deal of readiness, that we were working a large hole behind it, and that we should be under the rock itself in the course of the night, and blow them all to the d——l. These simple people actually believed it, although our trenches were upwards of 300 yards from them, and on the surface of a hard and solid rock; and they begged the Native officer to go back and do the best he could for them. Shortly after, two Jemidars came down and treated with Major A. for the surrender in two hours; the garrison to be permitted to retire with their private property and arms. But these could scarcely have returned, when a sudden explosion took place on the hill, and in a short time extended in a general conflagration to the whole of the buildings on it. The night was calm, the moon very bright, and the size and grandeur of the rock,

with the stillness of every thing below, and the furious blaze, and shrieks and yells of the people, on the hill, gave to the whole scene a picture of the most extravagant romance. It seems, some misunderstanding had taken place between the Killedar and the head Jemidar with regard to the payment of arrears; but whether the latter meditated mischief by the explosion, or the former set fire to the magazine himself, in order to hurry the garrison out of the place, and thus save what he could, is uncertain; the greater probability is, however, that the fire was accidental, and caused by some of the garrison going in quest of money or property at this moment of disorder, and thus falling suddenly upon some loose powder, it exploded in the above manner. The wretched families, horses, cows, &c. now came crowding down headlong the narrow passage; and some on fire, others dead, presented altogether a scene of misery and suffering the most distressing. Many of the garrison had descended and got off by a Bheel track on the off side of the hill; but the greater

part came down by the regular gateway, endeavouring to save their families, and many of them in vain searching and calling out for those that were no more. A few companies of Seapoys had been moved to the gateway for the purpose of taking possession of the fort when it might be vacated by the enemy. The officer who made the terms with the garrison, was actuated as well by feelings and principles of humanity as those of duty. The surrender of such a place on the terms granted to the garrison was most advantageous to us, and exceeded the expectations of the most sanguine; but what will be the astonishment of those who hear it, that the evacuation of Rajdeir, and the mercy shewn to the miserable enemy amidst the flames, was actually reported to Madras, and circulated to the reproach of the officer so humanely performing his duty, for having allowed so excellent an opportunity of distinguishing himself to have passed bloodless through his fingers? but, thank God! the spirit and general practice of the British government is far above the profession or encourage-

ment of such crimes, which can only be resorted to, or perpetrated, through the rapacity or insolence of those unused to conquer or to govern. The public approval of the affair at Talnair by Marquis Hastings, which had now been promulgated through the Madras army, filled certain gentlemen with a glee and exultation of spirits unknown to them in the ordinary gladness of the heart, and gave, we are sorry to say, a public stamp and sanction for similar outrages on like occasions; but we must suppose that the Marquis himself judged merely on the abstract report of that lamentable business, and on the grounds of the perfidy and treachery attached to the Arabs.

Amongst the ruins of the buildings of Raj-deir we collected about 50,000 rupees; and the detachment leaving there a small party, returned to Chandore, and thence proceeded for the reduction of Trimbuck beyond Nasuck. The country from Chandore to Nasuck equals perhaps any like space of country in India, in beauty and fertility, being a rich flat, well

watered, and interspersed the whole way about 80 miles with gentle rising grounds, populous villages, and the most extensive topes of mango trees. We passed through this country in marches of from 14 to 16 miles daily, and arrived at Nassuck on the 19th of April. Lieut.-col. M'Dowell, ignorant of the strength of the town, or the disposition of the inhabitants, took up his ground of encampment at a civil distance from it; but it was afterwards ascertained that the whole of the armed part of the population had retired a few days before to Trimbuck, and that those who remained were to all appearance friendly disposed to us. It was here ascertained by the Prize Committee, that considerable treasure in jewels, the property of Badjee Row, was concealed in Nassuck. The President therefore sought permission from Capt. B. to search such parts of the palaces, or the town, as might be likely to contain valuables. But the Commissioner refused compliance with the request, on the grounds of the town being unfortified, and the place having quietly surrendered to us.


The detachment halted a few days at Nassuck; and moving towards Trimbuck, took up its ground in front of that tremendous and wonderful hill-fort, on the 23d of April. Trimbuck, like all the other forts in Gungtorry, is in its high and inaccessible scarp, impregnable to any army or artillery, however numerous or well served. It lies about 20 miles west of Nassuck, and distant about 80 miles nearly in a direct line from Damaon on the Western Coast. It is ten miles round its base, and about four round its upper surface. Its entrance to the south-west side is by a large and well-built gateway, with recesses one within the other for the distance of about 300 yards, and inclining in its principal and last gateway to a nook or angle, formed of two projecting precipices of the hill, completely securing this gateway from any effect of artillery, and from the tops and battlements of the gateway all approach to it would be rendered impossible and hopeless. Lieut. Davies, having reconnoitred that side, was resolved to commence his operations on the

off-side, or north-east, the ground of which was more favourable for the construction of our batteries, but the only access to which was by narrow and winding stairs cut from the rock, and barely sufficient for one man to ascend at a time. This passage may be best compared to three sides of a chimney with nearly 200 steps, each furnished with a groove or nich by which to hold on as you ascend; and by the time the visitor gets half-way up, it would be at the hazard of his life for him to look back, so appalling and frightful is the steep giddy precipice beneath of from 6 to 700 feet. The passage is cut into the rock from four to six feet deep, thus affording support on each side, with grooves also on the side by which to sustain yourself; but the flight of stairs in some places is so straight and dangerous, that for fear of giddiness and the apprehension of slipping no person would from common curiosity only attempt it. The top of this passage is surmounted by a building, the ascent through which is by winding stairs cut through the body of the

rock to a depth of not less than 20 feet, and about 6 feet in width, protected at its mouth by a double gateway, from which the further ascent is through a hatchway. These winding stairs are covered over by the above building, the beams of which cross the stairs overhead, and which, if knocked down, would only add strength to the place, by its ruins tumbling in, and burying the passage, gateway, and all in its destruction. We made this mistake: as the building in question presented a very imposing appearance, having in front and over the passage a large window, which we took for the principal door or entrance; and our guns being placed in battery, on the second day after our arrival, a little in front of the village of Trimbeck, we accordingly battered at that building for a whole day, doing, as we thought, vast execution; but on getting possession of the place, we were soon undeceived, and observed that every shot that hit it was only calculated to obstruct the passage, and consequently to defeat our object. On taking up our ground the first morning,

the enemy refused to attend to the summons of the Commissioner, and returned an abusive answer. They shortly after opened a few guns, compelling the Engineers to fall back, killing three Seapoys, and wounding some others. That evening the village of Trim-buck (which is commanded by the hill) was taken quiet possession of; and the same night two heavy pieces of ordnance, with a few howitzers, being placed in battery, we opened on the hill early the following morning, and kept it up during the whole day, but, as above described, with little effect. A party of Seapoys, with two six-pounders, had been sent in the mean time to the off-side of the hill, to overlook the gateway, and to amuse the enemy in that quarter.

Towards mid-day on the third day of our operations, the enemy's fire had ceased altogether, and not a man of them was to be seen for hours together on the hill, or along the works. This general silence, and the disappearance of the enemy for the time, seemed to justify a supposition that they were withdrawing, or at least



that they were in a humour to give up; and Lieut.-col. M'Dowell, anxious during this pause to take possession of a garden and loose work that lay in a curve at the base of the hill, ordered a small party of Europeans (R. S.) and Seapoys to ascend the slope of the hill above the town, and, proceeding to the right, to gain possession of it. There was in this no immediate hazard or danger, had the orders given been attended to; but the officer commanding, Major M'B., instead of leading the party to the point desired, moved straight forward with his whole body to the foot of the precipice itself, and directly to the entrance of the passage up the hill; which the enemy observing, they on a sudden opened such a discharge of gingalls, matchlocks, rockets, &c. with a shower of stones, that, bounding and cracking to pieces along the abrupt sides of Trimbuck, nearly demolished the whole detachment before they could withdraw. Seven or eight men were killed, some of them crushed to atoms by the stones, and about thirty severely wounded. Amongst these Major M'B. himself, and a little

after Ensign Lake, of the Engineers, whilst making for the garden, which those who remained at length got possession of, finding in it tolerably good cover amongst the ruins of some houses and behind the trees—the enemy still peppering at them till the close of the day. Towards the afternoon, however, the enemy, either fancying, from our desperate and rash enterprise of the morning, that we really had intended an attempt by the narrow passage, and that no difficulties, heights, or crevices could resist our ingenuity or skill, or suspecting that we were doing no good in the garden, one of them was lowered by a rope down the side of the hill, so as to come within hail of our party; and this fellow called out, that the Killedar was willing to treat with Colonel M'D. The usual demands of payment of arrears were made, but of course rejected; and a Jemidar of the garrison coming down the following morning, terms were entered into for the surrender of the place, *viz.* that the enemy should retire with their arms and private property: and in the course of the day the garrison turned out be-

tween 4 and 500 of the finest men we had yet seen—a mixture of Rajpoots, Mahrattas, and a few Seedees or Abyssinians. On examining their guns, we found their artillery not to have been quite so scientific as their practice at first led us to suppose. There were several shells that had been brought in the time of the Mogul government from Damaon, lying carelessly about the place; and some of these being filled with loose powder, without a fuze or any other stopper, were run down with the usual charge of powder, and fired at us. This gun gave of course a double report, the shell bursting the very moment it left the gun; nor could we below fancy what was the cause of it, never being able to see where the shot struck, or what became of it; but on getting on the hill, we soon discovered the reason, and the mouth of that gun was torn to pieces by this foolish practice.

The sacred river of the Gunga, or Godavery, takes its rise on the top of Trimbuck, whence it issues in single drops from the rock, and at

its fountain-head is guarded with a small pagoda, with a number of Hindoo idols about it. This stream runs down the side of Trimbuck, and is received at the bottom by a similar group of figures, and with the same veneration. It thence takes its course through the town of Trimbuck to Nassuck, its bed from the foot of the hill to the latter place being paved or flagged completely across, and in the middle decorated with pagodas, baths, and small cascades nearly the whole way. The river at Nassuck discovers a larger body of water, having some of the most beautiful and chaste pagodas on its banks and in the bed of the river; and the town, being principally inhabited by Bra- mins, strongly reminds the visitor of similar scenes at Madura, Seringham, and Conjaveram. The town of Nassuck is also very considerable, and possesses, with the two palaces of Badjee Row, some handsome and spacious buildings; these, with the gardens and vineyards in its vicinity, rendering Nassuck a pleasing spot of residence. The palaces possess nothing par-

ticular to be mentioned beyond the novelty in the style and mode of building of an eastern palace. The rooms of the new palace are all low, and contracted in size, without design or taste, with the exception of the hall for Nautches or dancing-girls, which is alone remarkable for its beautiful carved work in wood. All the other apartments are small, retiring one within the other, and communicating one floor above the other by dark and narrow passages, and in all the intricacy and mazes of chambers, cells, &c. conveying a pretty good idea of the cramped and narrow contrivances and minds of the people themselves.

There was no prize or property of any description taken at Trim buck ; and a small party being thrown in for its garrison, the detachment retraced its steps to the vicinity of Nasuck, where it remained a few days, Capt. B. intimating to Col. M'D. that he had business of importance to transact that would detain them there for a short time. It seems that the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone had sent notice to Capt.

B. of treasure being concealed in Nassuck, and with every particular regarding its place of concealment so exact, that the very house where it was buried was found out, and entered into before the occupants had any suspicion of it themselves. This secret was not, however, made known to Col. M'D. by the Civil Commissioner until Capt. B. thought it prudent to call on that officer for his assistance, and a party of the troops to secure the property. We give Col. M'D.'s account of the transaction in his own words*. It will be sufficient here merely to mention, that the whole detachment had been detained for days at Nassuck evidently with the sole object of securing that property, and in prejudice of other important services; that it was dug up by the pioneers of the detachment, and the house surrounded and guarded at the time by a company of Seapoys from it. The treasure in jewels was estimated by Badjee Row's agents at 76 lacs of rupees; but we understand they have not realized as yet above

* See Appendix.

half that sum. It seems the Marquis of Hastings sticks at the decision of that property as belonging to the army, and the matter remains as yet undecided.

The detachment now marched for Chandore again, where it was intended to have taken up our monsoon ground ; but the season still continuing favourable for active operations, we moved into the Khandeish, and took up our ground before the fortress of Malligawm on the 15th May. Malligawm is the capital of Khandeish, and distant about 50 miles from Chandore. It has always been considered a place of great strength and importance, being the chief seat of the Arab settlers in India ; and has a proverbial saying attached to it in that country :—"Get but possession of Malligawm, and you have Khandeish by the nose." The day before the arrival of the force before Malligawm, the Killedar Gopal Row Raj Bahawdar paid a visit of ceremony to the Civil Commissioner and Lieut.-col. M'D., welcomed the arrival of the British, and in the course of

the conference said that there would be no difficulty in entering at once into possession of the place, that the garrison were composed of a handful of Arabs not exceeding 100 in the fort, that there were a few more in the Pettah, but that they were all so divided amongst themselves, that they would make no opposition to us. And in reply to some question that had been put to him regarding the strength of the place, its ditches, &c. he described it as a contemptible hole, with a ditch not above the depth of his knee running round it; and this wily and deceitful old Bramin, as if to add sincerity to his statement, offered to remain himself in our camp, but which was declined, and he returned. We could see distinctly, 12 miles off, the lofty and beautiful battlements of Malligawm; and soon found to our cost the want of information, and the deception practised on us by the old Kille-dar; and that, instead of attempting that fortress with four heavy guns, a few mortars and howitzers, and little above 900 men (the total strength of musquets with us), it would have been no dis-

credit to any of our first armies to have taken up its ground before it. This fort is situated nearly in the centre of a rich and extensive plain, without a rising ground of any description for miles around it, and is built on the left bank of the Moosum river, which joins the Guirna, about two miles to the south below the fort. It consists of an inner castle or fort of about an hundred yards square, the walls of which are above 45 feet high and ten broad, with a battlement rising from the top of about six feet high, and four in thickness, thereby giving a platform for guns all round; square ports, resembling the ports of a ship, being let through the battlements, and the battlement itself furnished with loop-holes in every direction. Independent of this there are eight towers, four corner and four centre, on which were planted guns of larger dimensions; the whole wall built of a blueish granite and of the very best masonry. Without this castle is a corresponding inclosure, at the distance of about 50 feet from its wall, and its sides being parallel to those of

the castle, carried completely round. The height of this second wall is about twelve feet, and three in thickness, in front of which was built, all round the inclosure, a line of stabling; thus furnishing a convenient covering for horses or other purposes, this wall being in like manner furnished with loop-holes, and looking into every part of the ditch, which is immediately outside it, and sunk from it, to a depth of 25 feet, and 25 feet broad, extremely well built and finished. Beyond the ditch, running level with the edge of the counter-scarp, was a second enclosure or garden about 70 feet from the ditch, and terminating the whole work by a strong and thick-built wall carried completely round, and from 18 to 20 feet in height from the inside, but not above 12 outside, having in like manner at its different angles and curtains, towers, on which were planted smaller pieces of artillery. These several works communicated with each other by gateways, and a bridge for the two outward enclosures, and by six gates from the second enclosure to the castle. All

these gateways are built in the strongest manner, and of the height of the castle wall itself, the gates leading to the castle being in fact entrances to three distinct squares, and these squares, presenting of themselves so many independent works as you enter, could be defended as well backwards as forwards one after the other. It would have been madness to have attempted these gateways. The town, or Pettah, lies to the east side of the fort, and is only separated from it by a narrow street. On the approach of the detachment to Malligawm, Capt. B. resting upon the information derived from the Killedar, recommended Col. M'Dowell to march the detachment through the town at once; but Col. M'Dowell of course did not accede to the suggestion, which would have involved the whole detachment in confusion. Taking therefore a route at a convenient distance, we took up our ground for that day about a mile in front of the Pettah, many of the Arabs shewing themselves along the hedges and houses all armed and ready, but offering no

violence or injury whatever to any of our people, who were merely beckoned to keep off. The place was summoned on that day, but no attention was paid to it, and the force shifted its ground on the 16th to the west side of the fort, it being determined to carry on operations from that quarter. The pioneers were now set to work in a tope on the right bank of the Moosum, and opposite the fort, when a few of the Arabs crossed over and compelled them to abandon it, killing one of them. The Arabs were, however, obliged to fall back in their turn on the arrival of a covering party; and the pioneers resumed their work. On the 18th of May, arrangements were made for commencing operations in this tope; and Lieut. Davies with the other engineer officers, having already marked out the ground for two enfilading batteries on the right and left of the tope, so as to knock off the defences of the curtains on the south-west angle or tower of the fort, they towards the afternoon set to, in like manner, in the tope itself, in marking out the parallels

and the approaches towards the bank of the river, on which it was resolved to place our breaching battery. The plan laid down by Lieut. Davies for the reduction of Malligawm was breaching in the first instance the outer wall, opposite to the left curtain of the southwest tower of the castle. On the outward breach being effected, it was proposed to have made a lodgment on it; and ascertaining the exact situation of the ditch, of which Lieut. Davies was fully apprised, to have carried on our farther operations as might be deemed advisable. Towards sunset on the 18th, the different working parties were at their posts, and the whole had set to work about half an hour after. The evening was perfectly calm, and the moon having just got up, threw its still feeble light through the deep mango trees on those working below, and rendered the whole scene as interesting as it was solemn. The advanced sentries were thrown out on the bank of the river, and the work went on briskly till about seven o'clock, when the fire and alarm was quickly given by

the Seapoys on a body of Arabs who appeared along the hedges to the left, and were crossing the river. The firing increased; and the Arabs shewing themselves on the advanced part of the tope, a general confusion ensued amongst those working there, the dooley bearers, &c. throwing down their loads and flying in every direction. The advanced sentries had now fallen back upon the main body of the covering party; and the Arabs in the mean time gaining ground from tree to tree, and keeping at a stand the covering party of 170 Seapoys under a subaltern, they at length made themselves masters of the tope, the work becoming entirely abandoned. Luckily the quickest news of this check was intimated to Major Andrews of the M. E. R. by an officer of that corps who had been looking on, when the Major instantly put himself with the same officer at the head of 60 men, who were parading for duty at the moment, and proceeding towards the tope, they were there joined by Lieut. Davies. Being now on the edge of the tope, this party drew up, the Arabs to be seen

distinctly behind the trees from the burning of their matches; and the word of command being given, they dashed right at them, and in the course of twenty minutes drove the Arabs completely out of the tope; but, unable to restrain their own impetuosity, they followed them into the river, and close under the walls of the fort, which now, crowded with Arabs, opened a most furious fire of matchlocks upon them, (opening at the same time all their heavy guns upon the camp). Major A. with several of the men having been wounded and withdrawn, Col. M'Dowell now arriving in the tope ordered the party to be recalled. It was at this moment when the order was given to fall back, that Lieut. Davies received his mortal wound by a chance shot from the walls of the fort. He was in the act of turning round to return, when the fatal ball passing through his neck laid that brave fellow low. He was still heard to exclaim, "At them, my boys, at them;" and being lifted by some of the men, he breathed his last on reaching the tope. Thus terminated his

career this gallant and distinguished officer : zealously devoted to his profession and to the service, bold, enterprising, and active, he seemed only to require the maturity of manhood and of experience to have rendered him the most solid ornament and value to the service. His remains were attended to the grave by every officer off duty in the camp ; and it may be truly said that there was scarce a dry eye on the occasion.

Bless'd youth, regardful of thy doom,

Aerial bands shall build thy tomb,

With shadowy trophies crown'd :

Whilst Honour bathed in tears shall rove

To sigh thy name thro' every grove,

And call his heroes round.

COLLINS.

There was but one man of the M. E. R. killed and 17 wounded ; the most of these received their wounds from the walls, the Arabs below retiring as our party pushed on ; some of them however closed with the Europeans, and left the deep marks of their daggers behind them. The Arabs left three of their dead bodies in the river, but contrived to carry off with them the

dead European; this they generally make a point of doing if they can. By ten o'clock on that night all was dead silence again in the fort, scarce a shot was fired; the Arabs seemed to be not a little mortified at this repulse; and our parties had now resumed their work again. Their fire, however, on the camp caused some loss, and the greatest consternation, some people and cattle being killed and wounded; and they continued the two following days to gratify us by a few dozen of rounds or so, the Colonel being fool-hardy enough to keep his ground, nor would he strike a single tent in the camp until several serious accidents had occurred, and compelled him to shift his ground on the fourth morning after our arrival; the Arabs giving us as we struck our tents a few smart volleys. By the following morning the two enfilading batteries being finished, and the guns placed in them, two 18-pounders in one, and two 12-pounders in the other, these opened together on the curtains of the south-west angle, dismounting in a few rounds a large brass gun from that

tower, but without any material effect on the curtains or battlements, from the goodness and strength of their materials. The trenches in the tope being now finished, and the breaching battery prepared, the above guns were moved into it by the 23d, the places of these being substituted by mortars and howitzers. The duties and conduct of the siege had from this time devolved on Ensign Nattes of the Engineers, and the breaching battery had now opened upon the outer work, and had brought down a considerable part of it the following day. The enemy had in the mean time made an attack upon our left post in the day-time, and flanking it from some old houses on the left, put our party with two six-pounders, and a detachment of Seapoys, into a little confusion; but this was quickly redeemed by a supporting party of Seapoys charging, and driving them at once out of these houses. We had now moved that post higher up the river to the left, and commanding the gateway of the outer fort and part of the Pettah. The enemy were very jealous of this

spot, and kept a numerous body of matchlock men constantly on the look-out against it. The breach on the outer wall being now effected, it was expected that we should have attempted a lodgment there, as had been originally designed; but this plan was abandoned from the difficulty of the ground, which was found to be rocky; and Lieut.-col. Crosdill of the artillery set to, breaching the inner wall of all of the castle, clearing with the shot the surface of the outer breach, the shot afterwards taking the main wall behind as low as possible. All the shot, however, passed clear of the intermediate or stable wall on the off-side of the ditch. We had no certain information where the ditch was situated, it was generally supposed to have been immediately within the outer wall; nor was any attempt to reconnoitre or ascertain the fact made, until the night preceding the unsuccessful assault; and that then obtained through hurry was found to be uncertain and could not be relied on. The main wall by the 27th of May had been well shaken, and it now com-

menced mouldering and giving way to the shot in large pieces. The guns were now nearly destroyed, the vents having melted away to a size to receive the hand of a man, and it being unsafe to fire them otherwise than by attaching the match to a long bamboo and standing aloof from them, half the force of the powder discharging itself by the vent alone. Our shot was also entirely expended, and that which we were now using was partly of beaten iron, brought from Unkie Tunkie. Fortunately, however, the shortness of the distance from our battery to the main wall of the castle, not exceeding 250 yards, and the effects of our former home shot, with the rooting and shaking fire from the damaged guns, at length on the afternoon of the 28th of May brought down the centre of the inner curtain, and presented to the eye a most complete breach, its rubbish with that of the outer breach seemingly mixed together, and offering the most inviting appearance for an attack. Nothing more at all events could now be done by the artillery until they had

other guns and ammunition ; and Ensign Nattes, with the concurrence of the officer commanding the artillery, reported the breach to be practicable, and recommended that an immediate assault should be made. Lieut.-col. M'Dowell, still doubtful in his own mind as to the ditch, was against making the attack until some certain information was obtained regarding it; but Ensign Nattes still urging the necessity of an attack, and having addressed a public letter to Lieut.-col. M'Dowell on the subject, the latter officer at length acceded to it, and it was accordingly decided to assault the Pettah and the breach together on the following morning (the 29th.) The 17th or Chicacole L. I. had now arrived in camp; and Major Greenhill, 17th L.I. was appointed to command the attack on the breach, and Lieut.-col. Stewart, 13th N. I. that on the Pettah. The storming party consisted of 100 Europeans from R. S. and M. E. R. with three subaltern officers, 300 of 17th L. I. and the light companies of the 2d and 13th N. I. ; and that for the Pettah, of a small complement of Eu-

ropeans, and the remainder of the 2d and 13th N. I. The hour fixed for the attack was 5 a. m. On the evening of the 28th, Lieut. Egan, 13th N. I. an active and zealous officer, was brought down by a matchlock in the left post, and expired shortly afterwards.

The several parties having been told off for their destinations, that under Lieut.-col. S. started from its ground above our left post at the appointed hour, and crossing the river, got quiet possession of the Pettah, the Arabs having previously withdrawn to the fort, with the exception of a few who still occupied one or two houses in it, and who, through our own negligence, were allowed to escape; and a few shells being thrown from the tope or grove on and about the breach, Major Greenhill's party in like manner, with Ensign Nattes, the miners and sappers with ladders, &c. and each man furnished with a small bundle of hay, pushed across the river, the Arabs until this time not firing a single shot; and our party gaining the off side of the river, and closing under the wall

to the left, quickly ascended the outer breach, Ensign Nattes being a little a-head, when that officer looking over the breach, he had just time to turn round and say, "Totally impracticable,"—receiving at that instant no less than five bullets, and dropping lifeless. Major Greenhill, with the head of the party, however, shoved over the ladders, but these were seized by the Arabs inside, which gave our people, from the darkness of the morning, reason to suppose that the ditch must be there, and that of course further progress was impossible; the Arabs at this time having crowded to the walls and battlements, and opening a thick and furious fire on those about the breach as well as on our trenches, whence we endeavoured to keep them under as well as we could. Major G. had now formed his party under cover of the wall, and being badly wounded himself in the leg, returned to report the failure of the attack to Lieut.-col. M'D., who of course decided upon the recall of the troops; and the assistant quarter-master-general passing over in a very hand-

some manner under a smart fire, intimated the Colonel's orders to the party, the whole of whom fell back to the trenches, leaving about the breach and in the bed of the river about 20 killed and wounded. Amongst the former, Capt. Kennedy of 17th N. I. and Lieut. Wilkinson, 13th N. I. and about 70 more wounded of those who returned. Possibly with the difficulties that would have opposed their further advance, it was as well the party had not got in, as even inside the outer breach they would have been as far as ever from success, and must have lost a considerable number of men before they got any kind of shelter, and which only existed for them in the ruins of an old mud fort at the eastern extremity of the garden. We now hoisted a flag of truce, in order to withdraw the killed and wounded, which the Arabs instantly paid attention to; and all firing having ceased (although it briskened on the Pettah side), we withdrew our killed and wounded, nor did the Arabs either strip the dead or wounded, but merely compelling the

dooley men to hand up the musquets, and set fire to the bundles of hay which we had carried over, they desired them to retire. The flag of truce being withdrawn, the firing was again resumed on both sides; and Lieut.-col. M'D. finding that nothing more could be done on that side of the river, moved the detachment a few days after to the east side of the fort again, resolving to blockade it until the arrival of a fresh battering train. A detachment of the Poonah horse had now arrived under Capt. Swanston, from near Poonah, to act under Col. M'D., and these were posted to the N. W. of the fort, the Russel brigade being to their right. A stockade was however constructed to the right of the old breaching-battery, to overlook the enemy in that quarter; and in this spot Ensign Purton, who had succeeded Ensign Nattes as superintending engineer, was a few days after disabled for immediate duty by a matchlock-wound in the head. The Arabs on the day following our change of position, on the 1st June, sent out to propose terms of

surrender; and the only conditions they demanded were, that they might be permitted to retire with their arms and private property wherever they wished; but Col. M'D. would listen to nothing but unconditional surrender, and the conference broke off. The Nuggur train, with a battalion of 4th B. N. I. and a proportion of artillery, having been put in motion by the Hon. Mr. E. some days prior to the date of the assault, they were now close at hand, and arriving early in June, the whole of the mortars and howitzers, eleven in number, being placed in battery, opened on the 10th of that month, and about 11 o'clock on the following day two or three of the shells falling on nearly the same spot, communicated with the enemy's magazine, which blowing up in a most tremendous and grand explosion, buried the whole fort for some minutes in a thick smoke, and which, on clearing off, presented the curtain to the left of the N. E. tower completely carried away, leaving a chasm of nearly from the corner to the centre tower. The

enemy nevertheless shewed the greatest bravery and presence of mind, by rushing down to the outer walls and gates with pikes, swords, &c. prepared for a stand; and this certainly would have been the moment for attack had sufficient troops been at hand; but the camp was about two miles off, and the day closing in, we were obliged to rest satisfied with the injury we had already done them, still continuing to serve them a few shells during the day. Towards the evening two Jemidars again came out; and after a tedious and obstinate stand on both sides, it was agreed that the garrison should march out and surrender their arms. But previous to admitting Lieut.-col. M'D. to hoist our colours in the fort, they demanded from him a written paper to the above purport, that they should have protection for themselves and families to their destination. The paper was written in the Mahratta language, and it was afterwards discovered that that paper implied a meaning whence could be construed that the Arabs might go where they pleased, or to their

own place of destination, and which, after numberless discussions and references between the Bombay government, the Hon. Mr. E., and the Chief at Surat, was decided in their favour; the words in the terms on which the doubt rested were "Mukamkà Mûrad," which literally mean "the intention of the place of abode or destination." Now the question was, whether by these terms was meant that their place of residence or destination was to be fixed by us or by the Arabs; for it will be as good in one sense as the other. The Arabs, in demanding that paper, were entirely guided by a regard for their own safety and that of their families, if not through an apprehension of treachery; and Col. M'Dowell in his public report intimated as much, *viz.* that he had been induced to grant them that paper to remove a serious alarm that the Arabs were in for their lives, in reference to a recent transaction in that neighbourhood (evidently alluding to Talnair). This report reached the Marquis Hastings, and his Lordship called upon Col. M'D. to explain

more fully the tendency and meaning of his allusion. The truth is, the report was prevalent throughout every part of the country, that the gates of Talnair had been fairly and in faith opened to us, and that we destroyed man, woman, and child in it; nor did the disposition and menaces on the part of *certain* gentlemen in other parts of their immediate vicinity, seem much calculated to undeceive the people, or remove that foul stigma from our character. On the morning of the 13th June several companies from the detachment paraded on the bank of the Moosum river opposite the fort gate; and Lieut. Sherriff, a zealous and useful officer, with a member of the Prize Committee, were sent in by Lieut.-col. M'D. for the purpose of arranging matters with the garrison to turn out. The Arabs inside, notwithstanding the repeated assurances of Lieut. S. that their persons would be respected, and that their lives were in no danger, evinced the greatest distrust and alarm, and could not for a considerable time be prevailed upon to move out, nor until

Lieut. Sherriff staked his own life for our faith, by placing himself between two of the Arabs, and telling them, "Now if a man of you is touched, you may deprive me of my existence—I am in your power." They on this turned out to the number of 310, of these about 40 Hindostanees; and grounding their arms, daggers, &c. they were marched off to the Pettah by a strong guard; and a street having been prepared for their reception, the whole were confined to it as prisoners for the present. Col. M'Dowell most generously returned the small daggers to many of them, these weapons being generally handed down from father to son, and considered almost sacred amongst them. Thus after nearly a month's hard work, and the loss of 5 officers killed, and 8 wounded, with upwards of 300 men killed and wounded, fell the strong and tough hold of Malligawm into our possession. The Killedar, Raj Bahawdar, now made his appearance from the castle, and contrived for a time to impose upon the Civil Commissioner, and to palliate his former falsehood and du-

plicity on the ground of compulsion by the Arab garrison; and Capt. B., being fully impressed with his innocence, and commiserating the distresses that had been undergone by the Killedar and his family during the siege, thought proper to interpose his authority, and prevent the Prize Committee from taking any inventory of the goods of the Killedar. Capt. B. was, however, shortly after more fully persuaded of the real merits of this impostor, and at length ascertained that the Killedar had not only encouraged the Arabs to the defence of Malligawm, but that he also, on the evening preceding the surrender, paid them up their arrears with a handsome gratuity. A considerable time after the Killedar's property had been withdrawn, and no doubt secured, he (Capt. B.), as if in mockery, intimated to the Prize Committee that he had ordered the Killedar's horses, &c. to be given over to any person that might be appointed to receive them; but to this the Prize Committee paid no attention, as they had been prevented in the first instance

from taking an inventory. Col. M'Dowell had now reported the termination of the siege to Capt. Briggs, and the terms that had been granted to the garrison, *viz.* personal security and subsistence to their place of destination; and requested him to appoint some people to provision the prisoners; but to which that officer replied, that he had nothing whatever to do with the garrison, or the conditions granted them. The Colonel, therefore, was obliged to order the Commissariat Officer to furnish the wants of the Arabs. Capt. B. in fact was displeased that any terms had been granted the Arabs, and was heard to say, that he had at least expected that the whole of them should be put in irons, and employed on the public roads. In the mean time Capt. B. forwarded a copy of the terms to the Hon. Mr. E., saying, that as he was ignorant of the exact meaning of them himself, he begged to be informed how he was to act upon the occasion. The Arabs were still in confinement, nor had they to this time once attached a quibble or

indirect meaning to the paper they had received; and that was the moment for Capt. B. and Col. M'D. to have come to a precise understanding with them as to what they expected. The matter being still left in doubt, the Arabs were moved from Malligawm to Surat, where, as above stated, after a tedious correspondence they were dismissed, and permitted to go their way.

The Malligawm Arabs, on their arrival at Surat as prisoners, had been urged by the advice of some people to an insolent demand of pay, &c. from the British authorities there; and these, both civil and military, seemed to view the Arabs in so desperate a light, as to have almost lost all confidence in themselves and the troops at that station. They wrote to the Bombay government, begging to be informed how they were to act with the Arabs—whether to discharge their demands, or deny them. If the latter, that the government had better send up some European troops to keep them in order, as the Arabs had sent word to the Factory, that

unless their demands were complied with, they would proceed to the attack of the castle itself. The officer commanding at Surat added in his letter on the subject, that the Arabs seemed to despise altogether the Native troops; that when told we should compel them to obedience by force of arms, they replied, "We care little for you, or about your Seapoys; we see, it is true, you have a number of Morghees, or fowls, but we can't perceive any cocks, or the true fighting-breed, amongst you." Now the discontented Arabs amounted to about 200 (for many had deserted on the road from Khan-deish), and the British garrison to upwards of 800 Seapoys and some artillery. A Lieutenant in the command of a small post in the vicinity of the place where the Arabs were, wrote to the Lieutenant-colonel commanding at Surat, that he was apprehensive of an attack by the Arabs, who were in very bad humour; that he had but little ammunition left, and begging a farther supply of it; adding, "But let it be sent in to me in the most private manner, lest

the Arabs perceive it, and be thence hurried on to attack me." If the stability of the British government, its rank, and authority, are to be shaken and interrupted through the audacious menaces of a handful of vagabonds, and this through the want of a becoming energy and conduct in the existing authorities on the spot, in the face of a population of some hundreds of thousands—in the face too of an armed body quadruple the number of those to be opposed, and at one of our oldest and most respectable settlements in India—what are we to expect, at a serious and trying hour, from our firmest authority, or the talents and conduct of those charged by government with such trusts? The Hon. Mr. E., on seeing the above correspondence, shut up all further discussion about the Arabs, and recommended that they should be discharged at their pleasure*.

* Surat is the port, in fact the depôt, whence the Arabs disperse themselves throughout the country. There are at Surat several respectable and opulent Arab merchants, whose interest it has been heretofore to encourage the emigration of their countrymen to the coasts of India, and who, on their

Lieut.-colonel M'Dowell's detachment now moved from Malligawm, and took up its ground for the monsoon about half way between Malligawm and the Casabary Ghaut; and in a few days after their arrival there, they were visited by the *cholera morbus*, which carried off between 30 and 40 Europeans and as many Natives in the course of a few days; the M. E. R. alone, from the end of June to the end of September, having lost from that disease and fevers upwards of 160 men. The detachment of the Royal Scots had fortunately retired to Jaulnah before it appeared in the camp. The *cholera morbus*, in most of the cases, set at defiance all human skill and aid. The men were frequently taken ill at parade, and generally

arrival at Surat or Bombay, were detached at the pleasure of those merchants, who had in a manner been furnished with the requisite authority for these troops from the Native powers of Berar, Poonah, and the Deckan. These conscripts were furnished with a small outfit and arms by the above merchants; and as they afterwards advanced in favour or rank at their particular destinations, they were enabled to repay, with handsome interest, the first advances of their friends.

early in the morning, at first by a slight vomiting and purging, succeeded by an attack of ague, with a cold moist skin; and were in fact past remedy in many cases before they even reached the surgeon. Their eyes became sunken and hollow, the pulse ceased, and a quick and sudden purging of white matter ensued—the lancet applied in several cases had no effect, the veins and even arteries not giving above a drop or two of black blood. The patient was next seized with a numbness, and cramps about his legs and knees, which quickly changing to spasms and ascending to the stomach, released him in a few minutes from further suffering. The ground on which the detachment lay was elevated and dry, with a clear and beautiful stream in the rear, and the country about it more free from jungle than perhaps any other spot in Khandeish: yet all the corps along that position suffered nearly alike from the above disease. But what is very remarkable, the 17th L. I. situated on the right, and between two hills through which a constant and

strong current of air blew, escaped altogether, nor had they a single instance of *cholera* amongst them for two months; but the moment they quitted that ground on their march to join General Doveton, the complaint started up amongst them, and caused several casualties. Many medical men are divided in their opinions as to that disease, "improperly called the *cholera*," being contagious or not; but, although not of that profession, from the many striking instances I have witnessed amongst the troops, I should think there is good reason for concluding it to be contagious; however, only in a peculiar character, and in such a way as we perceive a flash of lightning take a particular spot of ground from the previous sympathy and property of it to the lightning; thus ten men may visit a man taken with the *cholera*, and not a single man be affected by it, and two may visit him the following day, and one of these be taken with it. We witnessed in the hospital on the Punjawn several cases that seemed to have been contracted by contagion

in a peculiar way as above : for instance, one man extremely ill was conveyed to the warm bath by a friend, who a few hours after was seized with the complaint, and died ; others in the hospital employed bathing him and others suffered no injury, nor was there any case where the sick in hospitals contracted the distemper from those lying near them ; whilst again we observed three camp-colour-men follow one after the other into the grave, after burying men who died of that disease. But as strong an instance as any, I myself witnessed in the Concan near Malligawm ; through which place an officer of the Bombay army had passed while I was there, and two or three of his bearers having been taken with the *cholera*, one of these, a high-cast man, was introduced amongst a party of Seebundies or irregular Seapoys, and the following day died there. The ensuing morning a Seapoy, whose berth was on the other side of the hall where the above bearer lay, was seized with the same disease, and died that evening also. I was present myself at the first attack, and adminis-

tered some powders that I had by me, but to no purpose. He was also bled, but only a few black drops issued from his arm.

We had not been above a week on our monsoon ground, when a private report reached Col. M'Dowell from Captain B. stating that having obtained information of Trimluckjee Danglia being in the neighbourhood of Oone, in Gungtorry, he Captain B. had sent Capt. Swanston with his party of irregular horse to take him prisoner, and that he was glad to say Capt. Swanston had fully succeeded, adding that the little property that was by Trimluckjee was divided on the spot, and that the prisoner was then secured in Chandore. Not a word more had been reported on the subject, and the whole transaction was hushed up and buried in silence for nearly two months after, when certain reports reaching the Prize Committee, demanded their inquiry and attention to the affair in question. It seemed that Trimluckjee on the rout and dispersion of Badjee Row's army by Gen. Doveton and Col. Adams near Nag-

pore, in April 1818, deserted his master, and was willing to accept the general terms of the proclamation by the Honourable Mr. E., and had accordingly reached the village where his father-in-law resided, and having purchased some bullocks, carts, and ploughs, with a view of abandoning his public life, he proposed living out the remainder of his days in peace and obscurity. Trimbeckjee had not been many days in the village, when the resentment of a woman for some former injury done to her husband by Trimbeckjee, prompted her to take this opportunity of revenge, by informing the British authority of his residence amongst them; and she accordingly left her village, and having made a long march, put the secret in a train of quickly reaching Captain B's ears at Chandore. Captain B. on receiving this news, wrote off to Capt. Swanston to push off for Trimbeckjee; and Capt. Swanston with his irregular horse starting from Malligawm, reached the above village, after a march of 40 miles, early on the following morning; and at day-break having

surrounded the village, he entered the gate with a few of his men, and observing a man running quick past him, he halted him, and desired him to point out the house where Trimbucketjee's father-in-law resided. The fellow refused at first, but, terrified at last, he turned round and pointed out the house, when several of the horsemen dismounting entered and searched the house, but could not for some time find Trimbucketjee, although they came upon his women and property; but at length having rummaged under some hay in an upper loft, he was there found concealed under it. He was shortly after mounted on a horse with his family in hackeries; and all his property being secured, the whole moved off to Chandore, where Capt. Swanston gave over his charge to Captain B. who immediately authorised that officer to take and divide the whole of the prisoner's property. The amount, according to Trimbucketjee's own statement at Tannah in March last, exceeded somewhat two lacs of rupees, or about 24,000/. From these

particulars, and the circumstance of there not having been a shot fired or the least opposition made, and adverting also to the cause of Trim-buckjee's return to that part of the country, viz. the dispersion of Badjee Row's force by the regular army under General Doveton and Col. Adams: the Prize Committee addressed a letter to Col. M'Dowell, with one to the Civil Commissioner, claiming the above property, "if it could be justly forfeited by the owner," as belonging to the regular army; the post where it was taken being within Col. M'Dowell's command, and the detachment employed to all intents and purposes of a military and organized nature. Captain B. returned a very short answer, saying, that he did not look to the Prize Committee for their approbation of his measures. He added, however, that the amount was overrated, as it only amounted to 60,000 rupees, but that he should now refer the business to the Hon. Mr. E. for his decision; and we find in a letter under date the 5th of October, being an interval of nearly four months

from the seizure, that the appropriation of the property was confirmed by the Marquis of Hastings to Capt. Swanston's irregular horse.

The detachment, however, looked upon this disposal of Trimluckjee's property by Capt. B. as a partial act, and one not altogether unconnected with feelings of private regard; nor could they draw the distinction, agreeably to Capt. B.'s own reasoning, between the present case and that of Nassuck: the treasures of the latter being surrendered without opposition to the same class of troops, and carried to the side of government, and Trimluckjee's capture having been effected with a like facility, but his property made over to an individual officer and his horsemen. Independent of this, there were detachments of 2d M. N. I. and 4th B. N. I. not half the distance from Trimluckjee's residence that Malligawm was, and Lieut. Rind's detachment of the same horse (the very party who had before taken possession of Nassuck) at a nearer distance than the detachment under Capt. S. It was therefore a matter of surprise

to Lieut.-col. M'D. and his detachment that none of the above parties more convenient at command had not been ordered on that duty. It seems that Captain B. did not even think it expedient to have given all the particulars to the Hon. Mr. E. himself; for until the letter from the Prize Committee reached Captain B. there was no public acknowledgment of the capture beyond "the little property;" but Captain B. then discovered it to have amounted to 60,000 rupees, and the Prize Committee to upwards of two lacs; and Captain B's act after a considerable lapse of time is, as a matter of form, confirmed by the Supreme authority*. Whilst Lieut.-col. M'Dowell's detachment was employed in Khandeish, other forces were in like manner busy and successful in reducing the strong-holds in the southern Mahratta country and the Concan; those in particular under Brig-

* The Marquis Hastings, however, has since paid a nearer attention to the subject, on the report of the Prize Committee; and we are sure his Lordship's decision, whatever it shall be, will at least be consistent with the principles of public equity.

generals Munro, and Pritzler, Colonels Prother, Deacon, Kennedy, Boles, Imlach, and Elridge*.

* Of these the principal, and indeed the only smart affair was that at Sholapore under Gen. Munro, at which not having been present ourselves, we give an account of it in the words of a correspondent.

"Camp near Hutteed, 23d May, 1818.

"Bajee Rao had long looked upon Shūlapore as his last refuge, and his infantry and guns having been for some time moving about in that neighbourhood, there was ground for supposing that he intended to pass the monsoon there; Gen. Munro, therefore, as soon as he was joined by Gen. Pritzler's detachment, moved to the eastward, and encamped before the place on the morning of the 9th. The infantry and guns had taken up a position under the walls of the fort, and covered by the bank of a large tank which embraces part of the wall and Pettah. A strong reconnoitring party was sent round the Pettah by the left, and in the afternoon another to the right, to examine their position. The enemy were very bold, and advanced to attack both reconnoitring parties, but these having accomplished their purpose, avoided coming to an engagement. It was now determined to adopt the left attack, and having first of all stormed the Pettah, to suit the ulterior operations to the movements of the enemy. A strong detachment was therefore moved at 3 o'clock in the morning (on the 10th), and as it approached the Pettah wall on the far side the N. E. was divided into three columns; two of them to assault under Col. Hewitt, C. B., and the third under Gen. Pritzler, to remain on the outside, to rub up the enemy whenever he should make a movement. Gen. Munro remained with this third division, to superintend the whole.

Badjee Row had contrived in the mean time, by the skill and celerity of his movements, to evade

The Pettah was carried in very fine style, the enemy having only their usual guards upon the rampart, and intimidated, I suspect, by three cheers, which our lads gave when they got upon the top of the wall. When in complete possession of the Pettah, it was broad day-light, and the enemy's whole force was observed moving round to our rear by the S. E. wall. Gen. Pritzler, being apprized of this, was on the alert, and waited (under cover of an angle of the Pettah) until they should come within a reasonable distance; but the enemy having discovered him, drew up in line, and commenced a cannonade. Our artillery were also run out, and kept it up till a tumbril blew up among the enemy; and our column advancing about the same time, they fled in the utmost confusion. They now attempted to take up their old berth in the tank, but our parties from the walls of the Pettah drove them from that, and obliged them to run into the covertway of the fort. They left three guns in our possession, and threw others into the ditch to prevent their falling into our hands.

Our loss in these affairs was not considerable, but our advanced parties were frequently sallied out upon during the day, and many of our brave fellows were wounded. The flank companies of the 69th and of the 4th N. I. were the principal sufferers; they rendered the enemy's situation in the covertway however so uncomfortable, that the whole body of them moved off (without their guns) about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. This gave occasion to another brilliant affair, which I would give you all the particulars of, but am afraid have already trespassed on your patience. Suf-

all our pursuits, leaving Brig.-gen. Smith frequently in the rear, and throwing him now and

once it to say, that General Pritzler with two squadrons, and the gallopers of the 22d dragoons, aided by Capt. Munro's and Doola Khan's irregular horse, got among them at half past five, at the distance of six miles from camp, and left 8 or 900 of them dead on the field. The party returned about 11 o'clock at night quite exhausted; with few casualties; but several have since taken place (from wounds and fever), and among the rest, that of the lamented Capt. Chadwick, from a complaint brought on by excessive fatigue.

The force was employed from the 11th till the 14th in preparations against the fort, and our batteries, consisting of 8 guns and five mortars, having opened upon a weak part of the rampart, a breach was effected in a few hours. The enemy however did not wait until an assault was practicable but sent out to say that they had surrendered; they were permitted to remain in the fort until next morning (the 15th), when they marched off with arms and private property. They were about five or six hundred strong; and the field army (under Gunput Rao) about six thousand. We found about fifty guns in the place, some of them, which had been carried in from the outside, very excellent ones of brass. We expect now, as there is nothing else to do, to go into monsoon quarters at Darwar."

Return of killed and wounded in the field division of the army before Sholapoor, from the 10th to the 15th May, 1818.

His Majesty's 22d light dragoons: wounded, 1 captain, 1 rank and file, 3 officers' horses, 16 regimental horses; 4 horses missing. Detachment artillery: wounded, 1 gun

then off the scent altogether*. General Doveton, however, kept close on his heels, and at length pressed him so hard, in April, to the eastward of Nagpore, that Col. Adams was enabled with his force to surprise his camp, and setting smartly upon them effected the dispersion of several thousands of Badjee Row's adherents, killing some and taking considerable quantity

lascar. His Majesty's flank battalion: killed, 3 rank and file; wounded, 1 havildar, and 33 rank and file. Rifle detachment: killed, 1 havildar; wounded, 8 rank and file. 2d battalion 4th regiment M. N. I.: killed, 1 havildar, and 3 rank and file; wounded, 9 rank and file. 1st battalion 7th regiment Bombay N. I.: killed, 1 rank and file; wounded, 1 rank and file. 2d battalion 9th regiment M. N. I.; killed, 1 havildar, 4 rank and file; wounded, 2 lieutenants, and 15 rank and file. Engineer's department: wounded, 1 lieutenant.—Total, killed, 3 havildars, and 11 rank and file; wounded, 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 havildar, 77 rank and file, 1 gun lascar, 3 officers' horses, 16 regimental horses; 4 horses missing.—Names of wounded officers; Captain Middleton, His Majesty's 22d dragoons; Lieutenants Maxtone and Robertson, 2d and 9th regiment; Lieut. Wahab, acting in the engineer's department, slightly.

* Badjee Row was heard to say to his minister, "As for Gen. S. I don't care about him, I can turn him and drop him whenever I please; but for that little fellow Gen. D, he keeps so close on me, that I can scarce call a halt my own."

of property. The Peishwah, now on his last legs, struck off to the S. W. and might have been again intercepted, had Gen. Smith taken the direction recommended by Gen. Doveton; but unfortunately the former officer went, on his own intelligence, to the directly opposite quarter, and Badjee Row, wheeling up again to the northward, bent his steps to the river Taptee, and shortly after moved to the vicinity of Asserghur. Gen. Doveton was still close upon him, and Sir John Malcolm having now arrived with his force from the Narbudda, had already entered upon negotiations with Badjee Row for his surrender, when Gen. Doveton arriving in that neighbourhood also, and not in possession of the actual state of affairs at the time, pushed on his cavalry towards Asserghur with a view of cutting off a body of Badjee Row's troops; but our cavalry moving somewhat too close to Asserghur, they were instantly descried by the Killedar Jeswunt Row Lar, who immediately opened several of his large guns on them, carrying 60 and 70lb shot, and compelled them to

fall back; and Badjee Row at this time thinking by the report of the guns that the action had already commenced between his own troops and Gen. Doveton's army, quickly moved off with a few attendants, and threw himself into the hands of Sir J. Malcolm. Sir J. Malcolm, however, on the particulars of the fire having become known, with his wonted generosity and candour, told the Peishwah if he did not wish to accept the terms then proposed to him, he might nevertheless return to his camp again and try his fortune; but Badjee Row was already too much knocked up, and his fortunes depressed, to seek shelter or success again in the field, and he finally acceded to the terms proposed by Sir J. Malcolm,—of placing himself in the hands of the British, but with a pension of eight lacs of rupees a year. These terms having been agreed on, Gen. Doveton fell back, and took up his monsoon ground at Jaulnah, the *cholera morbus* in a short time after making dreadful havock amongst his troops there also.

Sir J. Malcolm had now Badjee Row in his

possession ; and the Peishwah's detachment and property being moved towards Sir J.'s camp, arrangements were entered into for disbanding them to their homes. The Arabs were the most difficult to be settled with, and these fellows demanded the full payment of their arrears before they would separate, and some delay ensuing, they sent word to Sir J. Malcolm, that unless they were paid what was due to them, they would attack and seize both Badjee Row himself and his property. Sir John replied, that "if they did not alter their tone, he would draw out his line on them, and compel them to a milder strain;" but the Arabs answered that they were not to be frightened by menaces, or by his line, and that they should proceed forthwith to carry their first threat into execution, unless the money was forthcoming ; and Sir John was at last obliged to pay them down from his own treasury upwards of half a lac of rupees, when the Arabs moved quietly off and dispersed themselves. There were nearly 1200 Arabs with the Peish-

wah, and possibly Sir John did the wisest thing in not trying his hand with the detachment he had with him at the time, which could not have much exceeded that number, and were, with the exception of a few artillery-men, entirely Native troops.

General Doveton's army at Jaulnah were not allowed a long respite, even during the rains, as disturbances again arose in the Nagpore country, owing to the designs and plots still forming at the Berar court against the British interests. It soon appeared that Appa Sahib, though replaced on his throne in December 1817, was by no means sincere, or to be relied on, in his late recantation: towards the middle of 1818 it again became necessary to arrest him in his palace, whence, it was understood, he was preparing with his ministers to take the field at no distant period. The consequence of these designs at the Berar court was a general ferment and rebellion throughout the Nagpore territory; but these commotions (Chandah and Mundelah having already been reduced) were

soon put down by the activity of the several detachments employed under Colonels Adams, Scott, Bowen, Major Munt, and others; and quickly closed all further serious stands against our arms in that quarter. Captain Brown, 22d Bengal N. I. was the officer deputed by Mr. J. to arrest Appa Sahib; and Capt. B. having secured the entrances to the palace, he went up and found the Rajah in his Zenana, or amongst his women, when, communicating his mission, he was instantly set upon by the whole of the women, who surrounded him with shrieks and lamentations, and had nearly pulled the whole of his clothes from off him; nor was it until further aid was rendered from below that he was able to withdraw himself and his prisoner. The Rajah for the present was kept in close confinement; in the mean time several smart affairs had occurred between some small detachments of our troops and the enemy in different quarters; but few of these deserve any particular attention beyond the gallant, but unfortunate attack made by Captain Sparkes with a

detachment of 120 Seapoys (Bengal N. I.) on a numerous body of Arabs, who at length outnumbering them, and many of our men having fallen killed or wounded, the Arabs pushed on their advantage, and surrounding the party, cut every single man of it to pieces. This act on the part of the enemy met with a like return on all future operations, and all quarter ceased to be given: the enemy were shot or hanged as they were defeated or brought in, and scarce a day occurred when some fresh instances or news of this barbarous practice on one side or the other did not attract the general ear.

Appa Sahib, however, soon managed to give his escort the slip, a few marches from Nagpore on his way to Bengal. Captain B. and a detachment B. N. I. composed the escort; and the Rajah, having contrived to bribe over, or seduce some of the Seapoys, and dressing himself in a suit of their clothes with a belt and musquet, quitted his tent of confinement, passing out with the other relieved Seapoys, and taking his post in the ranks. The Native officer com-

ing on duty, went into the tent, agreeably to usage, to see that his prisoner was safe, and entering the sleeping apartment, he there observed the attendants shampooing what he conceived to be the Rajah, the attendants beckoning to him at the same time not to make a noise as the Maharaj was asleep.

The following morning, however, he found that the Rajah was gone, and that what he took for the Rajah in the bed, was nothing more than a long pillow placed there by the servants. It seems that seven of the 22nd Bengal Native Infantry went off with him that night; and shortly after several more of the same corps, with some of the 6th B. N. C. also deserted, and attached themselves to his fortune. Captain B. was tried by a Court Martial, but acquitted on the grounds that his conduct, and the line of restraint on the prisoner, was prescribed and limited by Mr. J.'s written instructions to him. 'The Rajah's flight, however, put us to considerable expense and inconvenience; nor have we to this day been able to secure him. He

took his direction to the north-west of Nagpore; and the heavy rains having set in immediately after his escape, collecting about him as many of his followers and adherents as he could, he remained until the setting in of the fine weather in the beginning of 1819, amongst the hills in the vicinity of the source of the Taptee river; thence starting in February 1819, he made for Asserghur and flying from that also has never been heard of since. But of this we shall speak presently. The general opinion is, that he has turned a pilgrim in Hindostan, and he has been comforted by the Bramins, with the prediction that he must remain in that state for seven years, when he will succeed to his crown again. At Nagpore, measures were now taken, as had been long since at Poonah, to supply the places of Badjee Row and Appa Sahib; the former by one of the Satara family, and the latter by Racojee Bhoonsla of the Berar branch, both of whom were willing to accept their sudden elevation and crowns on our own terms. These states

have since assumed an order and peace of things, that had been formerly unknown to them; and the names of Badjee Row and Appa Sahib have scarcely now a place in the minds or affections of their people, who seem one and all to exult at the riddance of their own despots, and to hail with gratitude the dawn of a just government, and of certain security to their properties.

We shall now resume the operations of the army, consequent upon [the flight of Appa Sahib, and bringing matters to a final termination, in the reduction of the remaining posts along the Taptee, towards the close of 1818, and in the last blow to the campaign by the fall of Asserghur itself. Gen. Doveton's services being now no longer required in the affairs of Nagpore, he fell back with part* of his force on Ellichpore, where he recruited his army with a short rest. He had previously, however, increased Mr. Jenkins's means to-

* 2 brigades horse artillery; 1 do. foot do.; 6 companies Royal Scots; 2nd and 7th M. N. C.; 12th and 17th L. I.; 7th N. I.; 1 battalion Pioneers.

wards restoring peace to the disturbed provinces, in the flank companies M. E. R. the 3rd and 16th L. I. and a corps of cavalry, so that all commotion had been entirely allayed, and the several detachments out had returned into cantonment by the beginning of December 1818. Several of these corps, particularly the 16th L. N. I. suffered severely from the jungle fevers, during their stay in the hills.

We turn again to Khandeish. Towards October 1818, the monsoon being over, the Hon. Mr. Elphinston had made a requisition to the Bombay government for two Native corps, to relieve the troops in Khandeish; but the whole of the Native troops of that presidency being already employed, H. M. 67th under Col. Huskisson was ordered into that country, and after a most distressing and tedious march, of nearly two months, the regiment reached Malligawm early in November, scarce a man in the corps who could call himself master of a second suit of clothes. The sick of the camp, as might be expected, kept pace with these severities: the

tents furnished to the European regiments on the Bombay establishment are the same as those served out to the Native corps, and are altogether ill adapted and unfit for the health or comfort of any troops, much less of Europeans, whom we should at all events shelter from the extremes of heat and cold, and thus preserve, as long as we can, the most valuable part of our army. On Col. Huskisson's arrival in Khandeish, he of course assumed command of the troops as senior officer, and the force*, a few days after the junction of the 67th, was put in motion for Amulnair, where we arrived on the 29th of November. This fort belonged to the Rajah of Berar, and is situated on the left bank of a small river that runs into the Taptee, and about 20 miles from Talnair. The place was occupied by Arabs, who, on seeing such an immense force coming down for the reduction of their little hold, soon sent out two

* H. M. 67th Regt.; wing M. E. Regt.; 1 2nd N. I.; 2 13th N. I.; — 5th Bombay N. I.; and battering-train under Col. Crosdill.

Jemidars to treat for the surrender of the place on the payment of their arrears. Captain Briggs, previously to the arrival of the force, had offered 20,000 rupees to the Arabs to quit the place, but they replied that they were soldiers, and would not surrender unless to a superior force. Col. H. was very short with them;—he told them he would give them until sun-set to surrender unconditionally; and that if they did not do so, he should commence operations the following morning; telling them at the same time, that he would receive no farther messages from them, unless with the surrender of the place; and that, if any of them came into his camp without permission, he would confine them. The Jemidars returning, intimated to their companions the result of their visit; but the Arabs, still wishing to hang on for some kind of terms, sent out another mission towards the evening, whom Col. H. ordered to be confined, as he had warned them in the morning. Arrangements were made in the mean time for the attack of the Pettah on the morning of the

30th, whilst Col. M'Dowell was to have co-operated on the left, opposite the fort, in the same service. The Civil Commissioner was present whilst the plan of attack was made out, and had retired, no doubt anticipating in his own mind that the Arabs would be made an example of, and rue the day that they dared to treat his presence or authority with indignity. He was however, we are glad to say, entirely disappointed. The Arabs inside, suspecting by the long absence of their last deputation, that matters were not going on well, prudently sent out a third message to Major Jardine of the 5th B. N. I., offering unconditional surrender, and begging that he would communicate the same to Col. H. : this was of course done by Major J., and Col. H. consequently deferred all further arrangements for the attack, when early the following morning, matters being settled, the garrison, to the amount of about 120, turned out and grounded their arms. The fort consists of a solid mound of earth of about 100 yards square, and 50 feet in height, with 4 towers at

the angles, these with the curtains being faced with brick and stone, but in many parts in a decayed state. The gateway is to the northern side protected by a distinct work, and having three gateways; but this lower work in itself possesses no great strength; and the principal difficulty in taking the place would be the ascent up the mound, which is by a narrow passage, flanked and commanded by some smaller works, and terminating at the top by a strong gateway.—The small fort of Bahauderpore followed the example of Amulnair, the following day, by surrendering to us; and Lieut.-colonel M'Dowell, with the battering train and the detachment of M. E. R., marched early in December for Jaulnah, Col. Huskisson resuming his former ground at Malligawm. Thus terminated the entire reduction of Khandeish, from which we shall now look to the Narbudda side.

The detachments under Col. Adams, Lieut.-cols. Scott and Popham, being now, in December 1818, in readiness to move into the hills

after Appa Sahib and his followers, General Doveton likewise moved from Ellichpore to the West, to stand by in that quarter for any exigency that might turn up; and coming to the Dhool Ghaut, he drew up there, detaching Lieut.-col. Pollock with 12th L. I., 2nd N. C., and four 6-pounders, for the reduction of Gilpee Amnair, situated about 50 miles from the Dhool Ghaut, and at the conflux of the rivers Taptee and Goorga; and the detachment M. E. R. with two 12-pounders and two howitzers, arriving shortly afterwards in Gen. D.'s camp, these also were detached under Lieut.-col. Crosdill to support Lieut.-col. P.; on the arrival of which before Gilpee Amnair, and after a few shells thrown into the fort, the enemy abandoned it on that night, crossing the Taptee by a ford unknown to us, and escaping into the jungles. The fort is situated upon a bed of rocks washed by the Taptee to the west, and by the Goorga to the south, and is very strong on both these sides; but towards the east and north it possesses no strength what-

ever beyond a common wall, and which might be escalated at any part ; there is no ditch, and the gateway at the N. E. angle is simply protected by a small out-work in front of it. Lieut.-col. Crosdill, after its reduction, returned to Gen. D.'s camp, and Lieut.-col. P. reinforced by the detachment M. E. R. halted for a few days at Dhar, and thence crossing the Taptee, reached Piplaoud on the 5th February, where we took up our ground in front of the village, having our advanced piquet on the main road to Asserghur, distant about 14 miles. Towards the evening of that day, Lieut.-col. Pollock received a note from Lieut.-col. Popham on the Narbudda, stating that news had been brought him of some people dressed like Seapoys having quitted the post in the hills where Appa Sahib was, with a view of disposing of a number of jewels at Asserghur, and that they had been seen passing such a village at such a date. About two hours after this a body of horse came down the road on which our piquet was posted ; but, on seeing these, they quickly

turned about and retreated. Some of the cavalry piquet, however, followed them, and succeeded in taking two of them prisoners; and these at length acknowledged that it was the escort of Appa Sahib that passed, and that he (the Rajah) was not 40 yards in their rear when they came on our piquet; that Cheetoo, the Pindarree, was with him as his guide; and that they had been marching for the preceding nine days without a halt. The troops were immediately put in motion at 11 p. m. and broke off in different parties for the pursuit; but Cheetoo succeeded in escaping them all by a by-path, and conducted his charge in safety early the following morning into Asserghur, where he was cordially received by the Killedar Jeswunt Row Lar. And Lieut.-col. Pollock's detachment having moved its ground to Sewell, and the following day dividing into two detachments to intercept the followers, we went several routes, and took up from 50 to 60 prisoners between that and the 11th February—amongst these six Seapoys of the Bengal ser-

vice. Three of these, taken on the 9th February, were tried by a drum-head court-martial, and sentenced to be blown away from guns; and never did men meet their fate with greater fortitude and resignation, each of them moving up with a steady pace, and taking his ground opposite his allotted gun. Three more, taken on the 11th, suffered the same fate, and met it with equal composure and firmness; one of these was a man of the 6th B. N. C. whose horse, accoutrements, &c. were taken also. Gen. Malcolm was now close at hand from Mundlessa on the Narbudda with his detachment, having come down with orders transmitted from Scindeah and the Governor-general to displace the Killedar of Asserghur for the former insult offered to the British government in firing on Gen. Doveton's detachment; but Sir John had no idea at this time that Appa Sahib had been received into the fort, and therefore, anxious to effect his (Jeswunt Row's) removal in as easy and gentle a way as possible, he sent an invitation to the Killedar to visit

him in his camp, sending at the same time a passport for him to pass through Col. P.'s detachment. Jeswunt Row, however, seemed to have been apprised of the nature of the visit, and returned a polite answer to Sir J. Malcolm, adding, that he had not clothes as yet made fit to see him in, but promised in a few days to wait upon him :—this was a mere pretence of the Killedar, and Sir John was at length fully satisfied that Appa Sahib was in the fort, as also of the hostile intention of Jeswunt Row Lar—at least of his determination to defend the post. Gen. Doveton's force had now moved round from Hewkera, opposite the Dhool Ghaut (where we left him), towards Berhampore; and he in the mean time ordered up the battering-train from Jaulnah, communicating likewise with the Residents at Poonah and Nagpore for the battering-trains of these places, the whole of which, together with the 67th regiment from Khandeish, and a wing of the Royal Scots under Col. Fraser, with other troops from Nagpore, had assembled together in Gen. D.'s camp

early in March. The Saugur train, with a division of the Bengal army under General Watson, was also expected round. Sir John Malcolm in the mean time lost no opportunity or arguments to prevail upon Jeswunt Row to deliver up Appa Sahib and to permit his intended successor to assume charge of Asserghur. He was told by Sir John, that the British government had no wish whatever to take possession of the place; that their only object was to remove him (Jeswunt Row) for the insult formerly offered to the British force in the vicinity of that fortress, but now aggravated to a criminal hostility on his part by his reception of Appa Sahib, thus publicly identifying himself with the enemies of the British government. That, notwithstanding all these insults, the British government were still anxious to preserve their alliance and faith unsuspected and unbroken with Scindeah; that he (Jeswunt Row) had the only opportunity now left of saving his own fortune, and possibly his life, as also of preserving for his master the ancient

and sacred fort of Asserghur. Jeswunt Row returned to Sir John many polite acknowledgements for his advice; he still denied that Appa Sahib was in the fort, and added that he did not believe that Scindeah ever wished or intended to remove him from the command of the fort. He added, that he looked upon Asserghur as his government, which he had held since its former cession by the British in 1803; and in short, that he could not think of delivering up the fort to any other person. Sir John, finding all endeavours at an amicable arrangement to be fruitless, intimated on the 16th of March to Brig.-gen. D. that nothing now remained to be done, but the application of force to reduce the Killedar to submission.

Asserghur is situated about 14 miles directly north of the Taptee river: it stands surrounded by hills on every side, and rises from its own bed of small hills, in a rock somewhat resembling those of Unkie Tunkie and Trimbuck. The scarp, however, is not so high, nor is it carried round with such regularity; and towards the N. E. angle

it seems to have ceased altogether, or at least to have fallen off so far as to have rendered the hand of art necessary to strengthen it. At that angle two retaining walls are built for that purpose, from a projecting point at the N. E. angle to the slope on the opposite scarp: one of these walls, the upper one, is carried in a line with the upper defences; and the lower wall seems merely intended as an abutment or support to the upper one, both of these, with the difficulty of the ground beneath, rendering that part almost inaccessible, even admitting the walls to be breached. The scarp on the east and south face is the deepest, and the ground thereabout more open than to the west and south. Nearly opposite the retaining walls there is a projecting flat hill, with the remains of some old buildings on it, and seemingly an outpost, in former days, of Asserghur. It was on this hill that our batteries in 1803, under Col. Stevenson, had been erected, when the fort surrendered; and this place of course now became an eligible position for the ensuing operations. The scarp

to the south and west is not above 100 feet deep, when it terminates on a second flat on these sides, and which, inclosed by a lofty and strong wall, and carried to nearly one half of the northern side, where it meets the scarp again, forms a second and distinct work from the top. The passage from the top to this second work is by a narrow staircase, strengthened by several strong gateways; and the descent from the second work to Mallyghur is a little to the left of the upper gateway, having also a sally-port by a subterraneous passage, that issues out much lower down on the side of the hill. The work of Mallyghur is formed by a chain of works running from the S. W. corner of the third work, and carried round, in a circuit of nearly a mile and a half, to the north side of the hill, where it joins also the second work in that quarter. The Pettah lies immediately to the N. W. of Mallyghur, and is in part embraced by that work, particularly towards its gateway, which stands at the extreme recess or angle of a deep ravine, with two tongues of Mallyghur

running to the right and left of it. To the west, the approaches are extremely difficult, being through the most dreadful ravines, and over hills thickly covered with jungle, and haunted by thousands of tigers, from fear of which alone travellers seldom move about, unless in large bodies, through these fastnesses. There was scarcely a day when some of our followers and people were not carried off by them; even our troopers, in carrying expresses, were attacked, and on one occasion one of them struck off his horse and carried away. The tigers shew themselves, generally, early in the morning and towards the evening, retiring to their dens during the heat of the day.

Brig.-gen. D. had now with him a wing of H. M. Royal Scots, a wing of H. M. 30th regt., H. M. 67th regt., the M. E. R., with the 2d, 3d, and 7th M. N. C. a battalion of 7th N. I. the 12th and 17th L. I. with the flank companies of the 1st M. N. I.; and under Sir John Malcolm the 6th M. N. I. first 14th N. I. with two Bombay corps; whilst Brig.-Gen. Watson with

three Bengal corps and a cavalry corps were close at hand. On the 17th the orders for the attack on the Pettah were issued, which was to take place on the morning of the 18th at day-break: the advance to be commanded by Lieut.-col. Fraser with the wing of the R. S., flank companies of the 30th, 67th, and M. E. R., with detachments of the 12th and 17th L. I.; the reserve under Major Dalrymple, H. M. 30th regt. with a detail of that corps, the 67th, the M. E. R., and the remainder of the light corps. Early on the morning of the 18th, the signal of attack was given by Sir J. Malcolm by a few shells from the camel howitzers, Sir J. M. being situated nearly to the north of Asserghur and Gen. D. to the westward of it; and the attacking columns, advancing from their posts in the Boolty Kerar Nullah, soon reached the gateway of the Pettah, and made themselves masters of it without any opposition, the enemy having abandoned it, and taken themselves to the lower work, or Mallyghur. The head of our party pressing however upon the enemy too

impetuously towards the gateway, they were compelled to fall back in some disorder, and take shelter in the Pettah; the enemy by this time having opened the upper guns of the fort, and a heavy shower of matchlocks and rockets, upon our troops below. Lieut.-col. Fraser soon got his troops under shelter in the houses of the Pettah, occupying the main street, and barricading the nearer ends of the side streets that ran nearly at right angles with one of the faces of Mallyghur. The firing was kept up during the whole of the 18th, by which time Col. Fraser had time to establish his different posts and piquets for the defence of the Pettah. There was a small rising ground to the left of the Pettah that had been taken possession of by us, and excited in a great degree the jealousy of the enemy, who kept a constant and hot fire upon this spot, compelling the pioneers to abandon their work upon it towards mid-day on the 19th. This post was occupied by a small party of the 67th regiment under a subaltern, with a reserve of the M. E. R. under a subaltern also at the bottom; and was

our nearest post to the gateway of Mallyghur, but to the left of it. Towards sunset on that evening a smart firing was suddenly opened upon this post, at which Lieut.-colonel Fraser happened to be at the moment when the alarm was given that the enemy were advancing, and Col. F. fell back towards the main body at a considerable distance down the Pettah street. The alarm was scarcely given, when a body of Arabs appeared on the right of the little hill, and firing a volley into that post, put the troops in it into some confusion: these however, with the party at the bottom, giving an irregular volley on the Arabs, charged on the hill again, and compelled them to quit it; but some of the enemy taking to the right of the post, intercepted Lieut.-col. Fraser, with two other officers in his company, in the street, and firing, killed the former. A simultaneous attack had been made by the Arabs on our centre and right in the Pettah; and the troops being taken unawares at the time, considerable confusion ensued for a moment; but they were quickly rallied, and the

Arabs driven back to the very gateway, losing in this affair two Jemidars and 15 men, while our loss was only Col. Fraser and one private soldier, with Lieut. Adare (67th) and a few privates wounded. During the onset of the Arabs the enemy opened the whole of their guns from the hill, with rockets, gingalls, &c.; and this sortie by the Arabs was as well planned, and as handsomely executed, as any incident during the whole campaign. Through some oversight or other, we neglected barricading the off instead of the near ends of the streets, which gave the enemy an opportunity of taking possession in small parties of those houses nearest their work, when as above, finding every thing quiet, they dashed into the thick of us, and the chances are, that had there not been so large a complement of Europeans (about 350), the Pettah would have been taken. Sir John Malcolm was now reinforced on his side (N. W.) by the M. E. R. a detachment of H. M. 67th regt. the 7th N. I. and the Nagpore battering train; and batteries being constructed, Sir John opened on

the lower work of Mallyghur on the 20th, Brig.-gen. Doveton at this time moving round to the south of Asserghur, and taking up his ground to the N. E. of that place at about three miles distance. A battery of six 18-pounders was opened on the Pettah side by Sir J. M. early on the 21st; but our magazine in that quarter, through want of arrangement and a slovenly and culpable neglect, blew up from the fire of our own guns, carrying and dispersing nearly 150 of our own troops, of whom 39 were killed, about 30 afterwards died, and the remainder were wounded and burnt in the most dreadful manner. There were between 300 and 350 barrels of powder in that magazine, which was thrown to the left of the battery, but neither secured from accident nor finished as it ought to have been, when after a few rounds from our guns it blew up as above. The 15th Bengal N. I. suffered the most from this accident, having only seven men out of 112 for duty on the evening of that day; the M. E. R. likewise suffered smartly in it, an officer and several

men being badly wounded. What renders this lamentable occurrence the more culpable is, that several infantry officers, long before the battery opened, pointed out the state of the magazine, a quantity of loose powder lying about at its mouth; and independent of this, about 150 more barrels of powder thrown carelessly in the rear of the battery just as they came from the camp with the gunny bags on them, so that had a single shot of the enemy struck one of these barrels, the whole must have blown up and destroyed every one about it. Brig.-gen. Doveton ordered an inquiry to be instituted into the business, but the report was never published; it seems, however, that a precipitate and unnecessary zeal and hurry to open the battery was the principal cause of the catastrophe: this is the best and the only apology to be offered for it. This was the second accident that occurred in that way within a few months: the former, with a detachment before a small fort under Brig.-gen. Watson; and the present, in the artillery branch under Sir J. Mal-

colm. The enemy, during the confusion caused by the above explosion, opened several of their guns upon us in that battery, killing and wounding a few men likewise. That battery with others renewed their practice on the lower work, or Mallyghur, which was breached at the eastern angle of the wall, which is carried nearly in a direct line up the side of the hill, and joins the second tier of works to the left of its gateway. Some mortars and howitzers also opened upon Mallyghur and the summit of the hill; and Sir J. M. about the 27th selected a new post to the S. W. of Asserghur, on the top of a hill commanding Mallyghur, and, having placed a couple of 12-pounders and a few howitzers there, quickly caused the enemy to diminish their numbers in the lower works and ravines, and withdraw to the top. In the mean time another battery had been constructed to the S. W. of Mallyghur on the plain, for the purpose of effecting a corresponding breach with that beforementioned at the eastern angle of it; and both these breaches being reported practi-

cable, they were to be assailed on the 1st of April, but the enemy, apprehensive of the result, withdrew themselves from Mallyghur the evening preceding the intended attack, and betaking their steps to the summit of the hill, we got quiet possession of it. By this time Brig.-gen. D.'s batteries, on the projecting rising ground opposite the retaining wall to the N. E. were in readiness, and three batteries of from 20 to 26 guns, mortars, and howitzers, opened at nearly the same time upon the base of the retaining wall, the defences, upon the guns, and the top of the hill, the enemy during this time keeping up a constant fire, but with much more noise than effect ; and the retaining wall itself at length having come down, and the moment for storming close at hand, Jeswunt Row seemed to have thought better of it, and on the morning of the 8th of April, sent down a message to Sir J. M., that he was willing to treat ; and coming down a little after himself, surrounded by his hircarrahs and spear-men, who called aloud the titles and heroism of Jeswunt

Row, he visited Gen. D. with Sir J. Malcolm, and completely altering his tone, begged for milder terms from Gen. D., urging every expression of the most abject servility, even embracing the General's knees, to prevail on him to modify the terms; but to no purpose, Gen. D. telling him that he had until the morning of the 9th to think of the unconditional surrender, which if not acceded to, he should recommence hostilities. Jeswunt Row, finding that nothing was now left him, agreed to the terms; and the garrison, to the number of about 1300 men, (of whom about 400 were Arabs, Mukrannees, and Seedees,) turned out the next morning, and laid down their arms in front of the line. On visiting the top of Asserghur, we were disappointed in every respect, both with regard to the works as well as to the guns and magazines. There were scarcely four guns on the works that were really serviceable, nor had the enemy provisions to have lasted them a fortnight longer, nor powder for four days further expenditure: thus this far-boasted fortress, thought so much of,

and deemed to be impregnable, fell to us, with the loss of one officer, and about 95 men killed and wounded; for we cannot include in the fair casualties of the siege the wretched sufferers who fell in the explosion of the magazine, on the 21st of March.

We have omitted heretofore all mention of the Arabs, their particular character, &c.: let us look back a little to them. There are perhaps, no troops in the world that will make a stouter or more determined stand to their posts than the Arabs. They are entirely unacquainted with military evolution, and undisciplined; but every Arab has a pride, and heart of his own, that never forsakes him as long as he has legs to stand on. They are naturally brave, and possess the greatest coolness, and quickness of sight: hardy and fierce through habit, and bred to the use of the matchlock from their boyhood, they attain a precision and skill in the use of it, that would almost exceed belief, bringing down or wounding the smallest object at a considerable distance, and not unfrequently birds with a

single bullet. They are generally armed with a matchlock, a couple of swords, with 3 or 4 small daggers stuck in front of their belt, and a shield. On common occasions of attack and defence, they fire but one bullet; but when hard pressed at the breach, they drop in two, three, and four at a time, from their mouths, always carrying in them from 8 to 10 bullets, which are of a small size. We may calculate upon the whole number of Arabs in the service of the Peishwah and the Berar Rajah, at the utmost at 6000 men, a loose and undisciplined body, but every man of them a tough and hardy soldier. It was to the Arabs alone those Princes looked, and placed their dependance on. Their own troops fled and abandoned them, seldom or ever daring to meet our smallest detachment. Nothing can exceed the horror and alarm with which some of our Native troops view the Arabs. They will meet and fight them in the open day under their own officers; but, if attacked by night, if detached from their European officers, and even under their Native officers,

or employed in defence of a post against a sortie or other attack, they quickly become panic-struck, and fly in every direction. We have had of late many instances of this lamentable and base spirit amongst some of our Native corps. These are unpleasant reports to be announced, but we are sorry to say they are no less facts. Our Native army requires to be looked into more than any other branch of our system in India; it should be weeded of sticks and shadows of men; and we should employ and entertain, in the best service in the world to them, men who could be relied upon on serious occasions. But in the present system, throughout the whole Indian Native army, there are at least 200 men in each battalion, select corps excepted, unfit altogether for the posts they are in, and for the purposes for which the state maintains them. Our Native Army is the most faulty of the military branch in India, and will be the first to crack and fall to pieces under trial. We should turn our attention to the introduction of a hardier race of troops for our army than the

majority of our Native troops at present are. We should look to the coast of Africa, to Abyssinia, Madagascar, the Malay Islands, and even to the West Indies : corps of this description, disciplined as European corps, without any intermediate class of officers, which is a flaw in our Indian army, would shew themselves soldiers in contest as well as on the parade. Let us only look to a few incidents, and indeed, excepting Mahidporè and the attack made by Gocklah at Ashtee*, the principal occurrences in the

* Gocklah, who fell at Ashtee, had been formerly a commander of a body of horse attached to the force under the Duke of Wellington, then Sir A. Wellesley. He had distinguished himself on many occasions, and was honoured by the marked attention and confidence of the above illustrious personage ; so far even as to have driven over the field of Assye in the curricule with Sir A. W., and to have received every testimony of his approbation ; nor was the regard and admiration of Sir J. M. less to the above veteran. Sir J. on his visit to Poonah in July 1817, had an interview with Gocklah, who was then falling into the traps and designs of Badjee Row, and, surrounded by Bramins, was solely occupied in his attentions to them. Sir J. asked him, "What, Gocklah, are you now spending your life amongst Bramins, instead of following up your former noble and promising post in the army." Gocklah replied but little,

late campaign*; and we must acknowledge that the odds were, if any thing, against us, wherever we met with any thing like opposition, and wherever our enemies shewed their faces instead of their backs to us. At Nagpore, in Nov. 1817, the Arabs alone attacked us on the defence, and reduced us to the last extremity, when we were saved by Capt. F.'s charge. The Arabs attacked us at Corygawm, and would have certainly destroyed us had not the Peishwah withdrawn his troops on Gen. Smith's approach. The Arabs kept Gen. D. at bay with his whole

saying he was getting old, and tired of active life. He shortly after put himself at the head of a body of horse; and is said to have told the Peishwah, that he would drive every Fareengee over the Ghauts before a month should elapse.

* We have to thank ourselves for the schooling and disciplining of the Holkar artillery, in the discharge of a part of our Native artillery at the close of the former Mahratta war, contrary to Marquis W.'s and Lord Lake's advice, and who of course, without support, were compelled to have recourse to the Native powers in the proffer of their services, which were immediately welcomed and accepted. Hence that artillery attained an height of discipline and smartness of service equal to our own, and in every particular had their guns, ammunition, &c. as well furnished and prepared as ours.

army at Nagpore for several days, repulsing our attack at the breach, and they gained their fullest terms. The Arabs worsted us for a month at Mallygawm, and saved their credit. They terrified the Surat authorities by their fame alone. They gained their terms of money from Sir J. M. at Asserghur. They maintained to the last for their Prince their post at Amulnair, and nobly refused to be brought over there. They attacked us bravely, but unfortunately, at Talnair. They attacked Capt. Sparke's detachment on the defence, and destroyed it. They attacked a battalion of the 14th M. N. I. with two 6-pounders, and compelled them to seek shelter in a village; and they gave us a furious wind-up at Asserghur. Yet the whole of these Arabs were not 6000. Separate now the above from the whole of the achievements in the late war, and we shall only find the Mahidpore artillery well served, and a handsome charge made by Gocklah on our cavalry. At the other affairs of Nagpore, Poonah, Jubulpore, Mundelah, Chandah, and Sholapore,

which stands above all these latter, all we were alarmed about was that the enemy would not stand, and leave us something to fight against. If our only object is to preserve the Natives of India itself in due subordination to our government, the Native army is fully sufficient and efficient. But we must now look to the possibility of harder contests; — we have now got our advance upon the borders of serious and brave nations. We shall in India every day become the envy of Europe more and more; let us, therefore, with its resources, and at the present favourable crisis, apply our attention directly to that on which alone the safety of India depends — the efficiency of its armies. In the furtherance of this desirable object, we must set aside all private bias and prejudice to our service. We must speak to ourselves, and acknowledge that a much higher reputation and lustre has been given to our military exploits in India than they merited. We have done as much as was to be done in the late campaign, but little to what might

have been expected in such a contest. Let us, therefore, be on our guard not to be hurried away by mere blaze for effect, or to rest satisfied that in the event of a future and serious trial our Native army would be found the same in such a crisis as they have always carried themselves in India—constantly victorious, and constantly successful. A change of enemy may possibly occur; and in such a revolution, should they be at all on a footing with us, we shall find, possibly too late, the fallacy of the Native army; and that all our discipline, goodness, and care of them, cannot alter the common fatality and weakness of their natures. But on our army in India we shall possibly enlarge more hereafter.

Jeswunt Row Lar, even on the surrender, denied that Appa Sahib had been in the fort at all; but we had much better authority from the evidence of some of the prisoners, and it appeared that Appa Sahib had escaped from the fort about ten days before we got possession of it. The fall of Asserghur may be said to have

been the last or finishing blow to the campaign, and the whole army shortly after broke up for their several destinations and cantonments; and we since find that the Marquis of Hastings has decided upon keeping Asserghur in our own possession, which will, no doubt, have the best effects in tranquillizing the neighbouring country; and being in fact the key of the Deckan, it must at all times be a place of great importance.

We shall now conclude by a few general observations on the close of the campaign. By the wise measures of the Marquis of Hastings the Mahratta confederacy may now be considered as effectually broken, and the Pindarree system unrooted even to the destruction of their last remaining and one of their principal chiefs, Cheetoo, who had been, in the month of February, so completely chased down by Sir J. Malcolm, and driven from every habitable abode, that compelled to seek shelter in the jungles, he there fell a sacrifice to a royal tiger. There was not now a single enemy or

Pindarree left, or to be heard of, against the British authority. Badjee Row had been conveyed to Cawnpore; Holkar placed under a British Resident at his capital; Ameer Khan and Scindeah were both completely humbled; and Appa Sahib, the Rajah of Nagpore, a fugitive from his country, and abandoned by his troops and followers. The Rajpoot states, in the language of the Marquis of Hastings, "have been delivered from an oppression more systematic, more unremitting, more brutal, than perhaps ever before trampled on humanity. Security and comfort established, where nothing but terror and misery before existed; nor is this within a narrow sphere. It is a proud phrase to use, but it is a true one, that we have bestowed blessings upon millions."

The consequences that must result from these measures of his Lordship will be, a more thorough knowledge and apprehension of the sagacity, the skill, the justice, and the strength of the British government; the dispersion of those idle freebooters and troops that sucked

the vitals of their own government, and set defiance to all constituted authority. These hordes must now turn their hands to agriculture, or starve. The Native princes, released from their turbulent and licentious armies, may now rule over their people as rational sovereigns — may economize their resources, and promote real worth and industry; whilst the people, on the other hand, will derive no less valuable privileges in the security of their persons, and the quiet possession of their lands and properties. Great, therefore, as is the value of India to Great Britain, it falls short, very short, of the extensive, great, and general weight of beneficence and blessings thus diffused, through the means of England, to a population of little less than sixty millions. The people, now no longer domineered over by thousands of petty tyrants, and oppressed and plundered by their own refractory and audacious brethren, can find protection in every corner of Hindostan, and can find that protection guaranteed and carefully watched by the

British government. This certain security of property preserved to the subject of India, will be our surest road to the confidence and attachment of that people, who, although short-sighted, prejudiced, and fickle, must in the course of time discern and appreciate the maxims of our government, which in every shape extends, to the whole class of them, blessings which no æra of their own government, or their neighbours, ever enjoyed. It was contrary to the nature of things that a just and liberal government could for any time, or on any sure foundation, have remained connected with governments of directly the opposite character. The best of the Native governments in India inherit this character;—no law, human or divine, can check their despotism and extortion on their subjects. Every subject of a Native government is exposed not only to the imposition and severity of one ruler, but to every intermediate step between his humble post as a peasant and the foot of the throne, and to the throne itself. Has he a horse, the state

requires it without compensation ; is he able-bodied, he is called into service without subsistence or provision left for his family—he must himself look to plunder for his own support ; has he a family, the fairest will be selected for the prince, and the next possibly for the minister ; if he has money, he must take care of his life ; and should he have rent to pay, and not the means, he may be put to the torture : in short, in the code of the Native governments the prince is every thing and all, and the subject nothing. It is no wonder, therefore, that these princes, seated upon their sandy thrones, and observing the advances and blessings diffused by the British, and dreading them as a contagion to their states, should have trembled at the sound of such a form of laws as one of impartial justice, and tried as the last resource to combine and shake off such an unwelcome connection. In all the reduced provinces we have seen amongst the inhabitants this feeling of general pride and gratitude to heaven at

their release from the bondage and insecurity of their own governments, and at their falling under ours. The Natives now say, "We can wear our own clothes; we can now decorate our wives and children with the buried ornaments of their ancestors; we can now call our house our own; no petty tyrant of the village can now molest, no minister of lust can any longer pollute our families or our dwellings. We have long since heard of the Company; and all we fear is, that they may again withdraw from the country, and leave us to our former masters." This reasoning and comparison of things is open to the meanest capacity; and to its extended influence and gradual working upon the minds of the 'lower orders of the Natives, we may attribute in a great degree the facility and ease with which whole provinces have been run over in a day to us, and become reconciled to our government; and possibly not a little to the same causes the unwillingness and dread all Native enemies have of our armies, viewing us as a superior and

controuling order of beings, and not unfrequently half disposed to concede the victory to us on the easiest conditions. Those in England who maintain that the system of our government in India has been one continued series of aggression and ambition, have not given the subject the fair and calm reflection that it merits. That country has for centuries back been torn by convulsions and wars: the only object of the conqueror was to support his authority by the sword, by exactions on his subjects, and by the most numerous ties and dependance on himself. It never entered the contemplation of an Indian Prince to seek happiness, retirement, or wealth, in the flourishing or contented condition of his people: he rather looked to an extension of his name and achievements, and bringing under his subjection as many neighbouring states as he could. Were any better-disposed or reasonable prince to confine himself to his own territories, and resolve to keep clear from all intrigues or wars, this innocent man would be the first to attract the

general eye of the surrounding states to his wealth and to the plunder of his country. The British power has advanced in India by the only means, and in the only way, it was possible for her to preserve her footing. We could not have stooped to governments in every sense beneath us, without surrendering the best gifts of our nature and our character. We could hold no treaty with any Native power beyond the duration or utility of it to the Native government. We were not disposed or bound to follow up the policy or the unceasing tumult of war by siding with this or that government. They all courted our alliance, because we could be useful to them in war : we sought theirs for a residence amongst them for commercial purposes ; but the anticipation of commercial advantages in such a state of things, amongst a set of ambitious and marauding chieftains scourging every land they could come at with devastation and fire, was vague and idle. If we intended to remain in India, it was necessary first to protect ourselves, and but natural afterwards to

extend that protection to those who stood by us or could be useful to us. There was no faith or trust to be reposed in any Native government where the terms to their advantage were not positive, much less were they at all ambiguous. They would treat with the British to-day, and with any other power to-morrow who could approach them ; and would with equal dissimulation carry into effect the purpose of removing one to the prejudice of the other, or both at the same time, if needful to the caprice of the prince, by secret assassination, or open force. The character, therefore, of all the Native governments is so totally different in all its shapes from ours, that a man can scarce draw a rule of governing India from any analogy of governing England, or most countries in Europe. There is no stability in India, or in any thing belonging to it. You might buy at any time princes, people, and country ; and to-morrow every country in India would be knocked down to the highest bidder, that is the strongest arm, without reference or regard to existing treaties, interest, or obliga-

tion. Every thing in it is as variable as the season: the people, accustomed to changes, meet them in their severest dresses with indifference; their own period of existence, either in strength of body, or faculty of mind, seldom attains the age of matured manhood in other countries. Void of pride, of national jealousy, or honour, they carry with most willingness the load as it comes lightest upon them, without a thought as to its durability, or the qualities or virtues of those who impose it. In every step we made in India, we had to oppose unceasing combinations against us: we wished to act by fixed and immutable principles of justice, faith, and mutual benefits: but no such theory of government ever existed in India: all was strength of arm, length of purse, caprice, and corruption. It is therefore to be rejoiced at, that these unfit and petty tyrants are so many of them moved away from obstructing our administration, and our free intercourse with the mass of the people. This has been a work of time, and surely a providen-

tial deliverance for them. They can now reflect upon higher qualities that their nature is capable of; console themselves, that their lives, though short, may be happy, their families and properties secured, and their dependance upon a firm and solid footing, instead of one exposed to every gust of wind. Many people argue that our extent of territory in India has been but just proportioned to our extent of ambition and perfidy with the neighbouring powers; and in reflecting upon the condition of the Natives, picture to their minds a people made wretched and oppressed by us: instead of viewing the British government in India, as one that can boast of its simplicity of construction, its wonderful and rapid progress, its deliverance of a great part of the civilized world from tyranny and oppression, its justice and its moderation to all its subjects, more than any other nation in the annals of history can do in such another cause, and more than half the governments of Europe can boast of to their own subjects; and the same hand of Providence over it, with

the wisdom of the British government in the protection of and due attention to the people's properties and customs, may perpetuate the possession of India to England; and in time accomplish for that people, the utmost attainable height in government, laws, and religion, that the nature of things in India is capable of.

It has been one of the wisest steps of the British government, that they would never allow any interference, or compulsory propagation of the Christian religion, amongst the Natives of India:—that measure alone, if adopted, would have been fraught with nothing short of total ruin to our interests. It would have leagued the whole population of India against us at one and the same time. We have done better; we have not only protected them in the exercise of their religion and rites, but even encouraged all the superstitions and follies of their several faiths, by entering at once into their wishes on that head, and even maintaining under our own superintendance and cost their most ancient temples and ceremonies. The conse-

quence is, we have taken the very surest way to bring them about, by leaving them their absurdities, and prohibiting the intermeddling of enthusiasts among them. The Natives are now beginning to smile involuntarily at many of their own rites and ideas; the temples and pagodas are, of the people's own accord, become neglected and unfrequented; and the Natives confine their devotion more to their own homes and families than at any former period. We wisely never gave them on this head any real cause of alarm. The progress of Christianity in any country will be but proportioned to the moral energy of the people; and where a deficiency of that strength of mind exists, it can only come about or be effected by education in the first instance, its moral consequence in the second, and next by the aid of Providence and the common contingency of events. But the zeal of the Missionaries will not be restrained by natural impossibilities. They endeavour to pour into the minds of the Natives, still unversed in our language, the doctrines of our religion.

They present to them Translations in their own language of the Acts of the Apostles; they address them in the fields, and they give them to understand at once, that they are all going astray, and are sure to perish. The villager who now possibly for the first time enjoys his little field under the benign influence of our government, and whose family is fed and happy, wonders at this new-comer and his address; he does not even comprehend what he alludes to, whether some worldly calamity or other, and his ignorant soul is thus rendered unhappy and miserable. But these gentlemen, fired with pious zeal, which surpasses in its nature all other, seem to think that the dispersion of the Gospel in the Chinese, Sanscrit, Hindoostanee, or Malay, amongst the people is sufficient for the proposed object; and as they deal out these to the Residents and Magistrates of the different places, they consequently set down their converts and their work in proportion to the number dispersed. We have ourselves observed at more Residencies to the eastward than one, where scarce a vessel

arrived without bringing a box or package of the above books in the Chinese language to the Resident, who was requested to disperse them, and did so as far as was in his power. He sent them to all quarters, by bundles of hundreds at a time. The Chinese looked at them, and said they had finer stories of their own; for there was no person amongst them to describe the intention or purport of these books. They did not know why they were sent, whether for entertainment, or moral improvement; and seeing so many copies, they latterly threw them aside altogether, and the above Resident could disperse no more. Nevertheless, the fervid zeal of the Malacca missionary heaped them on him ship after ship; and they at length acquired such a mass in his office, that he was compelled to remove them to an out-office, and several thousand copies of that description were handed over to the Dutch authorities, in whose hands we are sure they will never bear much fruit. This was the missionary of whom we read in an English paper

a few years ago, as having written home to the Missionary Bible Society for three hundred millions of Bibles, or copies of the Acts. In the above manner he could easily get rid of even that number, by delivering them as ballast, or turning them out of doors without an index or a monitor to explain them. We might compare the habitual excesses of the Portuguese descendants with those of the Mahomedans who originally visited Hindostan. Each party was powerful of itself; each struggled to extend its faith by sword and force; each failed in its object. Nature, as it were, vindicated herself; she has preserved to the mass of her children in India innocence and simplicity of life and manners, unadulterated with discordant particles. Of those proud innovators and invaders, we find the descendants and the followers in a great measure obliterated from the earth; and in those who remain scarce one quality that is creditable to mankind. The Hindoo, in morals, stands pre-eminently above all the others in India. In his life he is in-

offensive, simple in his diet, without ambition, and without pride ; attached to his family, obedient to the government, prostrate to the Creator of all, and neither anxious to convert or be converted. Now change the picture, and convert the Hindoe, without the spirit of Christianity (for it is so at present), to our nominal Christian : we shall find him become loose, drunken, and ungovernable. We shall let loose a set of vagabonds over the face of the country, and we may have to charge this to the precocity of the experiment. Let us be watchful and cautious against religious innovation in India : we can only gratify the Missionaries by permitting them to try their success :—we foresee its impracticability for centuries. Let them have their wishes ; but let not the British government be prevailed upon, or the nation be so far deluded, as to dream of mixing our Church establishment amongst the branches of the Indian government. Let them reflect that, in a moral point of view, the Natives must for years to come be the losers by the adoption of

any, even were it of our religion. If we can but improve the minds and morals of the Natives, their prejudices will gradually shift off of themselves: this, however, must be a work of time, and, unless by the interposition of Providence, cannot come about for centuries in that country but with loss and deterioration to the little moral character at present amongst them. We must not arrogate to ourselves the sole superintendence and concern for the people of India; in the eye of Providence, as of nature, they have, no doubt, a due share and weight; His will, and not ours, will accomplish the perfection of the creation. We are as yet merely the lever of India;—let us not press too heavily or too rashly upon it: we might in a day find the whole mechanism of our art fall to atoms about us*.

* An American Missionary gentleman, a little time before I left Bombay, called on the Governor, Sir E. N., with two more of his reverend brethren, for the purpose of getting permission to reside at Bombay with a view to his calling. Sir E. having heard his request, told him he had the most positive orders from the Court of Directors not to permit any European or American to remain in India without their permission, and that he had always been regardful and obedient

Let us for a moment turn our attention to the Indian army, which we shall class under the following heads, and nearly under the following numbers :

1st, His Majesty's regiments of cavalry and infantry	20,000
2nd, The Company's European troops, artillery, and infantry	7,500
3rd, The regular Native army : cavalry	12,600
infantry	118,800
Native artillery	3,000
5 Battalions of pioneers	4,500
Total of regular army, 166,400	—
4th, The regular corps of our Allies, officered by Europeans	7,000
5th, The irregular corps of our Allies, chiefly horse, under a few European officers	15,000
6th, The Sebundeas, or irregular soldiers, employed by ourselves and our Allies on occasions of minor importance, and on hill-forts	4,000
Total, irregulars	26,000 —
Grand total, 192,400 :	
say, with the veteran battalions, 200,000.	

to their orders ; and that he (the Missionary) could not remain. The Missionary still urged his point, but to no purpose, as Sir E. was yet inflexible. At length the Missionary swelled up, and addressed the Governor in nearly the following words : " If, Sir E., you, as a Governor on earth, prevent me from discharging and entering upon my duties to the Governor of Heaven, I shall charge you, and I do

Of the 1st, His Majesty's. These are generally from 18,000 to 22,000 in India, and from their strength, officers complete, and skill, hold the first place, in efficiency, of the whole. They are, in short, the very corner-stone of the military structure in that quarter. Next to his Majesty's troops, if not with them, we may rank the whole of the Company's European artillery, horse and foot, these being the only corps that are kept complete in officers in the same manner as the King's. The Company's European infantry corps are more or less broken up, and in want of European officers, in the same manner as the Native corps; and being subjected to be drafted into the artillery prior to the peace, it thus rendered the attention and pride that officers naturally took in disciplining

hereby summon you to stand for the same before the tribunal of ——." Sir E. on this was panic-struck, as we may fancy; and under this heavy imprecation and threat, he said, "Well, you may stay here until I refer it to the Marquis of Hastings; he is a step in authority above me. I shall wash my hands of it altogether." The Missionary's case was referred to the Marquis of Hastings, and he obtained his desire of residence in India.

their men, useless to the corps and painful to themselves. The Company, however, can now get as many and select men as they please, and the services of their European corps during the whole of the late war entitle them to a full share of their consideration. The Native corps are principally faulty in the want of sufficient officers in the first instance; of able-bodied and fit subjects for an army in the second; and in the want of Native officers of some education, family, or rank, in the third. Of the first: we look upon the European officers as the very souls and hinges of the Native army, whose presence and example alone can infuse confidence in and a proper stimulus to the troops under them, and without whom (even contrary to the high authorities of Brig.-gen. Sir J. M. and Sir T. M., but who have of themselves, we believe, since recanted a little their opinions on this score,) we shall pronounce the Native army not worth holding. Remove the European officers from the Native corps, and you dismantle at once the whole machinery—you strike off

the pendulum from the clock, and the work ceases. To judge of the warlike or hardy character of a people, we must not only look to the organized and well-disciplined lines of an army, we must visit them in their villages, and observe their domestic pursuits, their habits, and their very amusements; and when we find them in all these inferior even to women of more hardy regions, we must stamp that people as very unlikely to form an efficiency of strength or energy equal to any occasion of emergency or need. And a fair criterion to judge of the military character of that people would be, to look to themselves and their brethren, nearly sixty millions of whom we now have brought under subjection to us, and amidst the whole of whom no one prince ever yet found steady allegiance in them as subjects, bravery in them as armies, or protection for themselves against foreign enemies or invaders. Amongst a class of this kind the most we can expect, and farther than which we should be cautious never to rely, is to preserve in subordination to the go-

vernment their brethren, over whom our discipline and officers will always ensure a commanding ascendancy, however numerous or however ill-disposed the mass of the population of Hindostan might be to us. Dwelling on this subject, we have little to fear from any internal revolution or event within India itself. Whatever disturbances may occur in India internally by combinations of the Native princes, of the higher or the lower classes, against our authority, a little time, and the application of our resources, will infallibly burst asunder their feeble machinations. The sphere is too wide and great for the narrowness of their capacity to comprehend: they may fancy awhile that because they wish it, or plan it to be, it may be accomplished; but when the moment of action or bringing it to the test arrives, they become at once confounded, and know not what to do, all their vauntings sink into servility and fear, and they will break up one after the other, only with this accession to their minds, that their murmurings and insurrections are useless and futile as long

as the want of firm hearts and hands pervades their general mass.

Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescent.

Left to ourselves, we may sustain and preserve this expanse of dominion, amidst the clashings and interruptions that must naturally arise among such varieties of governments, of interests, and people, and amidst any defections that may arise amongst ourselves. But this facility of government must be only contemplated under the present state of things; and might in a single twelvemonth present the very reverse of so pleasing a picture. Our dominions in India have now increased in extent and relations to a size that will at all times require a great degree of wisdom and firmness to manage them single-handed, and to prevent their tottering under their own weight; but the danger to our possessions would be the appearance from any quarter of a power or arm like our own. Such a standard of 70,000 men on the Indus would be more bitter to us than half the

population in Hindostan up against us, and would in its effects at once vibrate, like a stroke on an extended sheet of metal, to the very walls of our three governments. Adverting to our vast strides of conquest and grandeur in India, it cannot be expected that the lowered and degraded sovereigns, or their subjects, will for years to come either forgive or forget their injuries and our animosities.—

*Necdum causæ irarum, sævique dolores
Exciderant animo.*

These will be always ripe for action, and ready to obey the first signal of war against us; and although any change of masters must to the Natives of India prove injurious and hurtful (for they never had, nor ever can under any other government possess, the same advantages as they enjoy under the British), still the mass of that people are short-sighted, timid even to despair, and easily won over; and their intellectual, with their corporeal faculties, seem in these to be precisely of the same character. The Native of India seldom calculates beyond his

present enjoyment. Premature in the indulgence of every disorderly passion, his days soon run to an end, and by the time that his judgment and body ought to be matured, he becomes void of energy, childish, and imbecile. The duration of a government is of the same consideration to him as the passing of a season, or the growth of a tree; void of all ambition and of pride, and dead to every sense of principle or of honour, (except the insolence of his superior cast can be so called,) the highest Hindoo, or other Indian, will stoop to the practices and cunning of the lowest; and so far as any moral restraint operates upon him, will at all times be an object for vigilance and precaution to the authorities set over him. Such a character cares little who rules him, whether English or other. If his village is attacked, he will either flee away, or bury himself with his treasures. If his neighbour's house is on fire, provided a broad street intervenes, he will sit with as much composure as if nothing wasⁿ happening; and will even view a murder committed before his door

with the same apathy and indifference. From such a people, therefore, we could expect little support or prop, were we seriously attacked. The same character belongs to every Seapoy, or Native soldier, in our service. They serve us to make money, and the mass of them would be no longer steady to us than the bloodless operations of war continue*. Even now, when we have had to encounter so little for years

* We found in the late Goorkha war instances of this kind, where the Bengal Seapoys, suspecting they had got hold of a Tartar, threw down their arms, and deserted by dozens. General S. W. however took up some of them; but his tenderness for the Civil Laws of Bengal prevented him from making a suitable example of them. Such lenity is always ill-judged; and the first instance of defection or serious alarm amongst the Bengal Native troops followed not long after this, in 1814, when they could scarcely be prevailed upon to embark for Java; and at Java in another instance they carried their combination, as will be observed, to a dangerous height;—the latter was quelled by a prompt example in the execution of three of them: but those equally guilty, and condemned, in Bengal were pardoned by Lord Moira. An example was required at the time in Bengal; and although the voice of mercy is always welcome, we apprehend that the late defection to the Berar Rajah by Bengal Seapoys may be deduced from those mistaken applications of pardon.

back, we are compelled to humour and to court them to our service. We recruit 100, and then, the order of march being given, possibly 50 will desert. They will not pass certain boundaries, mountains and rivers. In short, there is an insuperable bar between the strength and faculty of the European mind and that of the Asiatic, that can never be surmounted or reconciled; and all that we can do will be, to temper as well as we can, this frail material in India, by blending with it every infusible quality of our own, and thus try to invigorate the composition and render it less perishable. In the mean time we alone must buoy up the bark in India; we must protect and shelter the inhabitants, and guard at the same time against foreign invasion, which in any shape, for years to come, might paralyze our whole system in India.* The

* GENERAL ORDERS.

Bombay Castle, 14th January, 1818.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to direct the following Proclamation to be published.

PROCLAMATION.

Whereas many of the Seapoys belonging to the Military

Bengal army, in men of high cast, size, and strength, stands far above either of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras, and consequently under a proper selection, would be found the most efficient against a severe enemy; but even of these, generally there are 100 men in each battalion very unfit for the use of arms, and the whole of whom should be gra-

Establishment of the Presidency of Bombay, who, it is believed, are well affected to the service of the Honourable the East India Company, have lately deserted, having been misled by Emissaries of the Paishwa, or with a view of preventing the farther exercise of those acts of cruelty and oppression, which have been inflicted on their families and friends in consequence of their being employed in the service of the Honourable Company: the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, being persuaded that such desertions are alone to be attributed to those causes, since the Bombay Seapoys have ever been distinguished by their fidelity and attachment to the British Government, hereby offers free pardon to all deserters who may surrender themselves to the Officers commanding at Bancoote, Malwan, or Severndroog, or at the head quarters of the corps to which they belong, at any time between the date of this proclamation and the first of August next.

The civil and military authorities at every station are hereby directed to extend protection to the families of such Seapoys as may seek refuge within the British territories.

dually set aside for better Scapoys. At Madras and Bombay, we may double that number to each battalion, who should in the same manner be removed from the army, or sent to stations or duties of inferior moment. The rigours and severities of our discipline, and the dearness of provisions on the Madras and Bombay sides, prevent men of the same good qualities as those of Hindostan from entering our service; and it consequently becomes a measure of necessity to receive into these armies every man who wants service, above a certain size, without reference to his fitness or his strength. Hence the Madras and Bombay Native corps are generally composed of men who are as fit for boxers as they are for soldiers; many of them not equalling, in muscular strength, an European boy of 12 years old, and scarcely able to stand the shock of their musquet. The whole of the Native cavalry on these establishments are subject to the same observation; many of whose accoutrements, sword, and dress, would nearly equal the weight of the man himself. Now in

such hands, setting the hearts aside, such an engine as a British musquet or sword is absurd on the face of it.—The Native officers, again, taken from the ranks, rise to the highest of their class, progressive only, we may say, in promotion, and in amassing money; for at their highest summit, they are as ignorant and as incapable of doing the duty of an officer, as the commonest Seapoy in the ranks. The Native officer has little to look up to, beyond increase of pay: he can never attain a rank equal to one of our Cadets. He is kept in ignorance. We are apprehensive of imparting any share of our own nature or learning to others, for fear of their taking advantage of it, and applying it to our own destruction.*

* This remark particularly attaches to Madras, to which a feverish character, peculiar to itself, belongs, and has embroiled that presidency for the last century, from the days of Whitehill, Rumbold, Pigot, and Lord Macartney, to those more eventful ones of Sir G. B. Every whisper, every breeze, over the government bridge at Madras seems to be impregnated with ideas and rumours of faction and mutinies. If half a dozen rounds of ammunition are missing, the Seapoys are about to mutiny—the old story, a serious

From the mass of the Madras army, 55,000, there are not, probably, above 50 in the whole, writers excepted, who can read or write a

combination against us. If a respectful remonstrance is made, it is construed into a criminal design : down with it by force and by arms. The Native officers at Vellore respectfully remonstrated against the introduction of the new caps, and the turncrew, which too nearly, in their apprehensions, resembled a cross : they were turned away unattended to, were brought to trial, and publicly punished. The Seapoys in the Travancore mutiny, urged in their defence that they thought they were only fulfilling a desideratum of the Madras government, to get rid altogether of the European officers, and be commanded by their own, who, having tasted a little of the sweets of command, in the absence of their officers, were no less anxious to recover it, and of course industrious in exciting their troops to revolt. The Madras 7th Cavalry at Hewkera, in January 1819, having had a promise held out to them for the preceding four years that they should be relieved, and having been in the field for the last ten years, when ordered to march again on a new service, remonstrated with General D., and urged the fulfilment of the promise made to them. The Native officers and men said, " Our wives and families are looking out for us ; they charge us with having abandoned and forsaken them ; the wives of many of us are now of that age that must render a protracted separation from them dangerous and painful to us. We have had more service than any other Cavalry corps in the army ; and we shall be glad to take the field again, after a short visit to our friends." This was instantly construed into sedition : the report reached Madras ; - the order was sent to

word of English. How much better would it be if we could instil into them a desire of imitating our ways of thinking and acting; to dissipate their gross prejudices, to teach them an higher order of ideas, and thus not externally and through fear as they now are, but in reflection and in the enjoyment of an improved education, attach them firmly to us. There are many Natives at the different Presidencies, who are well instructed and versed in the English language, and all these justly set themselves in their own estimation above the crowd

remount the 25th Dragoons on the eve of embarking for Europe. An old Subahdar, who acted as spokesman, was ordered for three months to the top of Gawilghur. The corps marched without farther murmur, and were obliged to submit to the necessity. Now it ought to have been considered, that General D.'s force, from the year 1814 to 1819, had more marching, and underwent greater fatigues and privations, than any other force perhaps ever did in India. Gen. D.'s force had been out four monsoons in succession, nor did the troops ever grumble, or evince the least dissatisfaction; and in that of 1818, when ordered to march, they moved three days without their Bazars, the Bazar men saying, their hearts were nearly broken, that they had not a leg to stand upon, and refused, until driven out by the commissariat, to accompany the army.

of their countrymen, and pride themselves upon their knowledge of our language and our history. They admire us the more from this acquaintance with us; they look down upon their brethren with contempt, and they are as proud of the honour of corresponding with an English officer or gentleman in English, as they would be at a present.

In the irregular horse and troops of our Allies, such as the Mysore, the Hyderabad, Poonah, and Nagpore, we find many Native officers of family and respectability in those services that would not enter our service under the present constitution of it, whereby they are precluded rising except from the ranks, but who, we doubt not, would most readily enter it if they saw encouragement held out to themselves and their equals to do so. Some of these Native officers are men of the highest respectability in the country—men who would with the acquisition of our language become an ornament and a value to our army, and many of whom have lately shewn a zeal and gallantry in our service

that would stand comparison with our Native cavalry. If we could impart a certain instruction in our language to the Native officers of our army, we might calculate upon many advantages from it. It would set them in a superior order or class above the ranks, would bring them nearer to their own officers, would attach them to our government from a knowledge and not dread of its value, and, more than all, make them better officers, and competent to more important duties and trusts. English schools might be established at the different Presidencies, the instructors to be selected from those qualified amongst the several casts of Natives; the instruction to be confined to the English language and writing alone, with a peremptory and absolute exclusion of all religious discipline or discussion. The children of respectable Mahomedans and others, whether soldiers or not, might be invited to receive a common education at these institutions, and be thence posted, in the manner of Cadets, to corps as Jemidars and Subah-

dars. The Native ranks should be confined to rise as high as Havildars, and each Havildar after so many years' service, be allowed to retire on a pension. Such a plan would, in our opinion, be better calculated to secure permanency and efficiency to the Native army than the present one, where we find Subahdars, and Subahdars Majors, differing only in title from the lowest Seapoy. Nor do we think it would be attended with any particular difficulty to effect such a plan in the Native army, as the children of those in the army alone should be selected in the first instance, and the parents of the children would perceive that the object of the institution was not a reduction, but a self-evident improvement in the army.

There are many exceptions, of course, to the preceding remark respecting the ignorance of the Native officers, and their incapability of doing their duty; but it will be found on examination to be as true as it is general through our Native army. It will not be understood here, that these Native officers are not more expert in parade

duties and guard's relief than their Seapoys; but separate or detach nine from ten of them to any post, or on any duty, where conduct, method, or the simplest exercise of the mind is demanded, and they will infallibly bungle it. In short, in their present training all reflection seems to be quite foreign to their minds; they appear to act more on instinct than reason or thought; and when one thing has been done or turned over, there they drop it, nor do they ever recal it again to their memory or their assistance. The branch of the Native officers is the most faulty in the Native army, for it has given room to pride, an insolent ambition, and, above all, to the exercise of a dangerous influence amongst the troops, to which their attainments by the longest experience can never entitle them; and the latter apprehension becomes the more dangerous, in proportion to the scope given by the absence of too many European officers from their corps. We may find an example of this lately at Java, where plots were actually in contemplation by the Native officers of the B. V. battalion, to usurp the

Java government. There were only two young European officers present at the moment, when the machination was to commence in their murder, but which, through their decisive and prompt arrest of the ringleaders, was happily quelled. At Travancore in 1812, in like manner, the Native officers were the chief instigators in the plot, who, finding so few officers present with them, combined with some refractory chieftains, but were informed against *, and dis-

* Sir Samuel Auchmuty, in confirming the sentence of the Native court on those implicated in the Travancore mutiny, hit upon an expedient that will, we think, effectually sicken and defeat all future close connexion between the Seapoy and Native officer. The order of his Excellency was couched somewhat in the language of inspiration. He went to bed with his mind fully impressed as to the guilt of the whole, Native officers and all ; but in the morning, as if in the effulgence of a vision or of a dream, he publicly declared his conviction that the Native officers were all innocent men, and ordered their swords to be returned to them, directing the sentence of death at the time to be carried into execution on the non-commissioned and Seapoys found guilty. The separate classes of both will most probably in future look with suspicion on any proposal of combination amongst themselves, from the above example, where those who seduced were pardoned, and the unfortunate men who followed their advice, forfeited, for the temerity of both, their certainly more innocent blood.

comfited through the means of a Native woman. Nothing can more tend to diffuse a proper confidence in the government and themselves, and to frustrate all attempts of a dangerous influence amongst the Seapoys and their own Native officers, than the presence of a sufficient number of European officers with each battalion. We have of late years to complain of the great and strange want of officers in every part of the Native army, where a much greater exertion than has been encountered might have been looked for. Independent of the small number of European officers to a regiment of two battalions (1 colonel, 2 lieut.-cols., 2 majors, 8 captains, 22 lieutenants, 10 ensigns) there must be taken from this, the whole of the staff of various officers employed in civil and other situations, absentees in Europe, and on sick account; and we find in 1818, the officers of the Madras Native army throughout not averaging above five actually doing duty with each battalion of the army. At the battle of Mahidpore there was a deficiency, from only seven battalions

(wing M. E. R., 3rd, 6th, 1. 14th, 2. 14th, 16th, and Rifle corps), of 75 officers absent from the line in battle; and the Commander-in-chief Sir T. Hislop's general rota for subaltern duty was at one time reduced to four Company's officers; while no less than four officers of corps attached to the pioneers were in camp at the time, with nothing to do but what serjeants would be better fitted for, to superintend working-parties; and one of these officers was actually withdrawn from his corps after the battle of Mahidpore to act with the pioneers. It must be understood that officers attached to the pioneers receive an extra allowance of about 135 rupees monthly; but such an occupation for officers, excepting a Commissary officer and an adjutant to each battalion, is altogether unseemly, and would be much better transferred to respectable and steady non-commissioned officers, or those in the under classes of the ordnance department. Whilst every other corps in the army laboured under the greatest want of European officers, the corps of pioneers, because there was something to

gain by it, had many claimants; and the channel in which that branch of patronage ran, always succeeded in keeping the pioneers complete with officers, to the detriment and prejudice of the army at large. The fact is, in the Company's service we do not pay that attention to the real efficiency of the army that should be done. Every officer in the Company's army only joins his corps as a matter of necessity, and sticks to it no longer than he can help, until he succeeds, somehow or other, to get out of it into some little by-employ or other.

To adduce an instance of the want and the absence of officers from their corps, I shall give you the 1st reg. of Madras infantry, to which I can speak from my own authority, having been in company with that corps during the late services in the Mahratta campaign, and for nearly three years. From a part of this corps alone, there was a field-officer, a Judge-advocate-general, and who had not joined his corps, or any other corps, for at least the last 16 years. Another field-officer of the same had been a Barrack-master and Pay-

master for the last 14 years. An old captain of the same was nursing his family on the coast during the whole service. Another captain of the same was permitted to reside, from the delicate state of his health, at Madras. Another captain of the same was an Aid-de-camp to the Governor, and had not joined his corps for the last 14 years. Another captain, Brigade-major in the field. An old lieutenant had been appointed in the commencement of the campaign to a Staff post, and withdrawn from his duties. A second lieutenant was in like manner detached from his corps, to act as Pay-master. A third had been in a Civil situation for the last eleven years, and still continues in it. A fourth had been in the Surveyor-general's department for the last ten years, and never joined his corps. A fifth an Adjutant to the pioneers for the last four years. One major, about two captains, three lieutenants, sick; two lieutenants on furlough; not a single ensign in the corps. So that with nearly 400 men, there stood alone three lieutenants to their whole charge, each

of them with two companies to look after, and the whole of the staff duties of the corps to be discharged and sustained by them in like manner. This speaks volumes as to the system in the Company's army: it may answer in a dead calm, but there is no need of remark as to its total inefficiency should there be any thing to be done. The fact is, that from the general mockery of fighting in India for the last 16 years, officers on the commencement of any campaign or service, instead of wishing to join their corps, and share the fatigues and dangers with them, by which alone experience can be bought, instantly set to work to get some by-employ or other on the staff, and thus shake themselves out of their corps for the time altogether. From this, we observed very nearly as many officers about the person of Sir T. H. during the battle of Mahidpore, as there were officers in the line of infantry opposed to the enemy; and it is not here necessary to question, which was the post of danger. For instance, in the corps above mentioned, on the very eve of its taking the field, it would scarcely

be credited, that the three most necessary and efficient men, viz. the surgeon, adjutant, and quartermaster, were taken away from their corps, and two of them to enter into paltry appointments. The corps consequently was nearly dismantled, going into action with one major, and five lieutenants, with nearly 400 men, and two of the latter officers were killed. Let us therefore be convinced, that whenever the safety of India is materially at stake, the Company must not be only looked to for its protection. We cannot at all times have a Wellesley, or a Hastings, in that quarter; and any man who will venture to rest the defence of India on the numerical strength of our armies there, will be sadly disappointed. England, at such a crisis, will have to send a reinforcement, indeed an indispensable prop to the whole military machinery of India, of at least 40 or 50,000 men*.

* It was not a little remarkable that at the siege of Asserghur, when there were nearly 15,000, with three Brigadier-generals, the conduct of the siege, not by selection, but as if a matter of course, should have been conferred upon a young Lieutenant of engineers; whose whole expe-

Thus the officers of the army are diverted from their essential duties with their corps, and the interests of the government consequently exposed to injury and to prejudice. The whole of the staff of the army, and all those who hold permanent employ detached from their corps, should be set aside in a general list, and struck off the efficient strength of the regiments to which they belong; but be permitted to rise in them, until they should attain a rank that would preclude their holding any longer their staff posts, when they might return to their corps in their relative ranks. During their absence, of course the several vacancies should be filled up; nor should the line of the army be subjected to any interruption by absen-

rience in war was embraced in his visit and observation of the attack by storm on Cornelis at Java. It may be asked, where were all the Colonels, Lieut.-colonels, and other officers of the Engineers? That branch of the service is despoiled and torn away from the real exercise of their profession, in the same way as the other Company's corps; and in short so passive is the nature of war deemed by us in India, that we may be sleeping too soundly and too long, until, aroused from our lethargy, we may perceive too late the errors and fallacy of this system.

tees on staff or other duties. Of nearly 4000 European officers in the Company's army, there may be generally present in India, from 2400 to 2700; of these certainly not less than between 700 and 800 are permanently or occasionally detached from the actual line of their profession. Thus we should reduce the number of the European officers with the main engine, our army, to less than 2000—an army amounting to upwards of 160,000 men; or one officer to 80 men; and then allowing a Commanding officer and Adjutant to each Battalion, and consequently two of each to a Regiment, and there being of these in Bengal, Cavalry and Infantry 39, Madras 34, Bombay 14, or 87 by 4, (that is, 348 officers excused from charge of companies) will render the charge on each remaining officer upwards of 100 men. Now, in His M.'s army in India, officers go out but with one object, that is, of joining their corps, and staying by them. The consequence is, with the yearly replenishment of officers, and many of these, officers of distinction and rank in Europe, any of

H. M. corps kept in that complete and compact discipline, would be found before an enemy of men, instead of slaves, of the weight and value of at least any six Native battalions. The parts of the one are linked together, heart and hand joined ; they are as if in a desert, and nothing but annihilation can defeat them : those of the other are loose, of compound and contradictory ingredients ; the troops looking to their officers, inspired and stimulated by them alone, the officers, at bottom, not confiding much in their men ; and the diffidence is natural, such a body, unless in close co-operation with a powerful European contingent, would be found as brittle as glass, were but a serious body to strike against them. It is but justice to the Company's officers, that the exclusive benefits of the service in staff appointments, &c. should be confined to them in a great measure, as they in fact enter that service for life, and once choosing it, can seldom alter their condition ; yet the exclusion of H. M. officers should not be absolute, and particularly from appointments of an active

and purely military nature. Officers of talent and zeal in that service, and who may have been in India for years, should be eligible to all posts as above, excepting the general staff. But to those appointments of brigade-staff, interpreters, division-staff, and all appointments in the line, if fitted or entitled to them by service, or application to the Native languages, the door should not be shut against them. By encouragement in this way, you will soon possess in the several King's corps officers who can interpret themselves for their commanders; the officers of these corps will look upon the Natives by degrees as more nearly allied to their own ~~natures~~ than brutes; and commanding officers of such corps, in passing through the country, can judge for themselves—may deal and treat with the Natives or enemies in their own words; and in quitting India after possibly a service of 20 years in it, know somewhat more of it and its language than they do at present, carrying with them little more about India, than if they had resided the whole

time in the wilds of Siberia. Had Lieut.-col. Fancourt, who commanded at Vellore in 1806, understood the Native language, he might have profited by the information of a Seapoy who discovered the plot to him; but the Colonel and his family being totally ignorant of the language, he was obliged to have recourse to a Subahdar implicated himself in the conspiracy, and who interpreted the Seapoy's report into a piece of merriment, adding of himself that the Seapoy had been mad for years. The succeeding evening brought about the well-known calamities of the 21st of July, 1806. And at Hyderabad about the same time Col. M. also of His M's. service, had, through his ignorance of the habits and language of the Seapoys, nearly plunged the whole of that division into an insurrection. To these we add the lamentable affair at Talnair, where had Sir T. Hislop understood the real state of the case, or been able to hear the Killedar's defence, he never would have sanctioned the scene of that day; but, surrounded by men who had other

objects in view than the support of his Excellency's reputation, and who, rendered giddy by a flush of success, and eager to enter upon their promised advancement without obstacle and without delay, blackened to his Excellency in the darkest colours the conduct of the garrison, and which in the sequel has no less blackened ourselves. But, however the good things of the army in India, and which are now reduced to the lowest scale, may be apportioned to the King's or Company's army, it becomes a matter of greater importance, that the efficiency of the line of the army should not be so materially interrupted or broken upon as at present, where generally officers of talent and pretensions are taken from their corps in which they might be useful, and placed in some quiet situation or other. The consequence of this selection is, that we unhinge the several corps in a great measure, and throughout the army if we find one or two smart officers with a battalion, it is the highest we can look to. To impose, therefore, upon the few officers present with a

battalion not only all its common duties, but those also in the field, where the duties and exertions of European officers with their Native troops are multiplied ten-fold, and to expect that every officer of a few present is a man of energy, or resource within himself,—to think that they can individually not only command their own presence of mind and nerve, but stimulate and infuse a portion of these qualities into the Seapoys,—is placing a burthen upon Nature herself, which she is unable to carry, and which in such a climate as India should in these essentials be as light as possible*. In the difficulty of procuring for our Native armies fit subjects for military life, and considering likewise the necessity of maintaining the whole

* We must constantly bear in mind the remark of the late Lord Melville, to prevent us throwing the whole system of the Indian government into either one scale or the other, and which can only be maintained in that quarter on sure grounds by a diversity of governments as well as of armies. "The monopoly of the Company is of as great importance in a political view to the interests of the State, as its commercial advantages are to those of the Company."

Indian system, whether of government or armies, in the most multiform, distinct, and varied classes, we should turn our attention to the introduction of another class of troops, to be composed of Seedeas, or Abyssinians, Arabs, Mukrannees, natives of Madagascar, of the Malay and French Islands, and even those remote in the West Indies*.

* Had not the attention of our Government in England been entirely forgetful of our footing in the Eastern Islands at the conclusion of the late treaty with Holland, we might have looked towards that quarter for a wholesome nursery for our armies in India. By proper encouragement and attention, the various tribes of Malays, Javanese, Madurese, and the inhabitants of Borneo and the Moluccas, might be rendered in a short time equal in discipline to our Indian Native troops; and with firmer hearts, and more hardy and robust frames, would have added a most wholesome contingent to our Indian army. During the operations of Sir S. A. in Java, and particularly in the assault on Mister Cornelis, the resolute and desperate bravery of the Madurese and Javanese was most conspicuous: they stood the approach of our storming-parties of Europeans to the very bayonet, and only surrendered their posts with their lives: the very canals were glutted with the bodies of the former, whilst even the French and Dutch troops sought safety in flight. And we could adduce several other instances of those tough and savage tribes defending their "bintings," or

During peace the Company's army might be officered as they should think fit ; but the whole of those men unfit to bear arms should be removed at once : and, as above mentioned, we calculate on the Bengal side 100 for each battalion, and on Madras and Bombay 200— a body of men without strength, fire, or energy of character, and unworthy of the arms they carry. Rejecting these men from our ranks, we should fill up their place, but in a different class and a new branch, with a corresponding number of Black troops, disciplined and officered solely by His Majesty's officers. The change by such a branch to the Indian army would be little short of 20,000 men, and in the system of King's corps, complete with officers, would give a wholesome contingent to the Indian army ; and as the Company do not

rude forts, and their prowess, or boats, even against boarding-parties from men of war, with the most invincible courage ; frequently repulsing and defeating them. A battalion of such men, and under officers in whom they could confide, would from physical superiority alone be equal to any three Native battalions in the Southern armies of India.

generally think it expedient to keep their own corps complete in officers (at all events as they have not as yet entered into any resolution to make up for those vacancies of European officers by absentees on staff-duty, &c.) let the Seapoy battalions, as they stand at present, be weeded of that class unfitted for arms, instead of having 900 or 1000 men in a battalion, with possibly not more than 600 or 700 fit for service, and commanded and disciplined by 7 or 8 European officers; and the battalions being reduced to a lower number of select men, let the difference in numbers be transferred to the new system, where, with the increased number of officers by His Majesty's army, and *rejecting the plan of Native commissioned officers altogether*, we should in time prepare the way for a larger extension of this plan. Thus, in Madras there are 50 Native battalions, each of late 900 strong, or 45,000 men. Of each battalion there are 200 unfit for arms, or 10,000 men. The proportion of European officers present in the Madras Native army is to those of the King's

corps as 1 to 5 or 6. Now it may be taken for granted that the Company's are amply recompensed in the duties of the staff, and other public situations filled by officers, without charging it to the military account, or subtracting on that score from the efficiency of the army; so that if we only transfer the difference between the establishment of European officers and those actually present with the Native corps, to the proposed system, we shall not have incurred an additional rupee's expense beyond the original design; and in addition to the advantage of giving a balance in some ratio to our lately augmented and now unwieldy Native army, we shall plant a new system to counteract by degrees the errors of the old one in the Native commissioned class; and what is still of more importance, we shall add, by proper encouragement and selection of brave and hardy men, a complement nearly equal to the number of His Majesty's troops in India. The Company's Native corps then may be kept up, according to the expediency of the moment, in

regard to officers; but these corps should again be weeded and picked out for select battalions, in the manner of the Rifle and Light corps, and the disciplining of which should not be left to chance, but a due complement of officers constantly kept with them. The system of recruiting others than the Natives of India for our army, should be commenced upon by attaching those that may enter to European corps for a time, that they may observe the system, and regard the authority of the European officers alone, gradually and imperceptibly, and without reference to the Seapoy battalion. Every forbearance should be used to those recruits in the first instance, for they are more irritable, revengeful, and proud than the Natives of India, whom, generally speaking, we can distort or model into any shape or figure but that of a real man.

The 4th class of the troops of the Indian army are the regular corps of our Allies, such as the Hyderabad, or Russel brigade, those of Poonah, Nagpore, and other states. These

corps are disciplined and officered by European officers from His Majesty's and the Company's service; and have in most of them attained a height of discipline equal to the Company's Native corps. The men are generally Hindoostanees, with Mahrattas; these will enter those corps where they will not our's, as the services of the former are of a provincial nature, and they are seldom employed beyond their particular boundary.

The 5th class are the irregular horse of our Allies, as above, officered, but not in such numbers, as the regular infantry of our Allies, by European officers, possibly 1 to 200, generally from the Company's service. Many of these corps have proved themselves useful in the late desultory warfare in the Deckan, particularly those divisions of them employed under Capt. S^d., D., R., and Sⁿ.; however, generally speaking, they would be found more useful in escorting supplies, &c. than for the purposes of a steady or disciplined army.

The 6th class are the Seebundees, or men

accustomed to the use of the matchlock, and who, for want of better, are employed in aiding the collectors' servants, guarding passes and hill-forts, where behind a rock or wall they may be useful in the defence of their posts. These corps seldom have European officers; and if any, but one to superintend their pay, discipline, and musters*.

* The services of the Russel brigade have been of late very distinguished; and the siege and reduction of the fort of Nowah (by Major Pitman, Bengal army), in the country of the Naicks, N. E. of Hyderabad, by that brigade, with two heavy guns, a detail of artillery, and a party of irregular horse, in March last, for smartness of execution and brilliancy of achievement, stands perhaps unparalleled by any similar affair during the whole of the late war. The above troops sustained for many days a very heavy loss before it; they were, however, indefatigable, and pushed their works to the very counterscarp, which they blew in, and assaulting the enemy to nearly 500 men at the breach and in the fort, they carried the place by sheer dint of the bayonet. Yet we have never seen any public acknowledgment of that service—not that it was deemed unworthy of due praise, but perhaps because the corps by which it was achieved did not belong to the regular army. Such a service, however, performed under the direction and at the example of British officers, certainly merited some public testimony, and infinitely more so than the reduction of Mundelah and

To reduce these 200,000 men to effective numbers against an enemy of any character, we shall expunge the last two classes of 19,000 men altogether, as only fit to escort grain or supplies from our magazines or depôts. Of our European army, King's and Company's, 27,500, we must deduct 10 from every 100, on first

Chandah, where, we verily believe, there was more paper consumed in the compliments on those occasions than was expended in the cartridges discharged—two or three men being killed and half a dozen wounded at the former place, and at the latter, *such the difficulty* of the breach, that the horse-artillery actually galloped over it, the enemy flying and throwing themselves off the walls in every direction. We should be glad to see the copious stream of public encomium in India somewhat curtailed, and confined to hardy and essential services. A public acknowledgment of the government should be a rare and distinguished mark of public approbation; whereas of late, from the mass of names contained and re-echoed in the general orders, it is as difficult to discover as to remember the particular merit of any individual. From this practice every subordinate officer in charge of a detachment assumes a right of issuing his own panegyric, if at all employed; and somewhat in the manner of a ballad, we perceive in these orders due measure and numbers (not a rank left out) strictly preserved; so that the difficulty would be, not to find where merit existed, as it was to be found every where, but to discriminate the active from the idle in the general heap.

taking the field; as unfit for service, time expired, sick, &c. Thus, suppose 14 European Regiments ordered to the field, the most we could turn out would be 12,600; and from these or any portion of them on field service, we may deduct 18 from each 100 for the first six months, and after that, for the same space, as long as under canvass, 7, as unfit for service, or deceased. The Royal Scots, who had been in advance chiefly in barracks, but on service in tents since 1809, lost from that period to the beginning of 1819, upwards of 800 men, the chief mortality whilst under canvass; and the Company's European Regiment, from May 1817 to December 1818, being for the greater part of the corps also under canvass in advance, lost about 340 men from 800, and not more than 20 of these killed in action. But so heavy a mortality amongst our European army in India might be greatly alleviated, and remedied, by greater attention to the sick of that class, as to carriage, diet, and clothing.—The Medical branch of our army requires also, and admits of,

considerable improvement. We understand, the Court of Directors have proposed limiting the seats at the Medical Board to a certain term. This would, no doubt, be attended with the best effects, as in such an arrangement we should find gentlemen of energy and life, called at once from active service in the field or with the armies, and exerting themselves at the board; whereas on the present system, a gentleman gaining his seat by seniority alone, and keeping it as long as he pleases, has no public object sufficiently strong to stimulate his zeal and application in improving the service. From this drowsiness or dulness in that department, several of the forces experienced the greatest want of medicines, &c. during the late campaign. Even at Mahidpore in the field hospital, there was scarcely a bit of dressing plaster for the wounded officers; none for the men; nor was there a single set of amputating instruments besides those belonging to individual surgeons; some of these without them: and we have the best authority for saying that, of those

amputated, from the bluntness of the knives and the want of dressing plaster alone, two out of three died in the hospital. The medicines that ought to have attended the Commander in chief in August 1817, did not reach the army until its return from Hindostan, in Feb. following; and we perceived the European detachment, under the Honourable Lieut.-col. M., from Hyderabad towards Hindah in October, 1817, for eleven days, without a grain of medicine of any description that could be administered; the consequence was, the men fell sacrifices to complaints, that might have been remedied, no less than 17 of them having died on the march. These extraordinary deficiencies surely merit some correction, or at least inquiry into them.*

* It is remarkable enough, that we should pay more attention to our Native troops, than to our Europeans; every man of whom, independent of the claim he has upon our humanity in the sacrifice of his life to us, stands government in nearly 100*l.* by the time he is landed in India. We find that all the Light corps in Madras are not only furnished with carriage at the public expense, but if their

The clothing and feeding the European sick in hospitals should be transferred altogether to

baggage is lost, they are recompensed by the Government for it; and that they in like manner receive from the government warm great coats gratuitously once every three years. Now the Europeans, whether King's or Company's, have not one of these indulgences held out to them. They must hire their own carriage, and stand to the consequence if it is lost; they must purchase their own great coats, and at an advance to the Company of 5 per cent. The pay of an European soldier is 13 rupees; and of a Seapoy in the field 9 monthly. It is true, the European in the field is furnished with provisions by the government gratis, such as meat and rice, but he has to pay for his arrack, his cookboy, bread, vegetables, washing, barber, and carriage; and at the end of a month, if he has three rupees coming to him, it is the very most. The Seapoy is furnished with rice at a certain standard price, and his wants, generally speaking, are as two to five, to those of a European. It cannot be said that the indulgence above extended to the Light corps, is granted them because they are the only marching corps in the army; the Royal Scots have for the last nine years been marching mile for mile with them; so have lately the M. E. R. and the European Light Battalion in the southern Mahratta country. Many of these men, harassed almost to death, and driven to despair, have quitted the ranks, and shot themselves. We perceive the Madras Government offering a bounty to *old* men of H. M. corps of 170 rupees, to enter the Company's service; now ten sums of that amount, or 200*l.* annually, would in England purchase warm clothing and blanketing, that would certainly preserve to us the lives of 100 Europeans, far beyond the present term of their general run of years.

the Commissariat department, and the deductions now made for the surgeons be carried from the pay of the men to the side of government; which will be fully equal to the charges necessarily incurred. The Medical line might still retain their allowances for medicines, &c.; but, as a general remark to all public branches, there should be no room left for any possible collusion between men's interests and their duties; particularly in cases so nearly affecting the highest calls of humanity and public expediency. We should soon perceive the good effects of an arrangement of this kind, in the paucity of our European sick, and the decrease from three to four in the hundred annually in the mortality, telling so heavily in the present system against the European troops in the field in India. Every Field Hospital, north of the Kistnah, or at all in exposed or hilly situations, should be furnished with a good blanket, flannel or serge jacket and trowsers, for each sick man, with a warm night-cap. These simple and cheap comforts to the men will prove

better in and against sickness, bowel complaints, &c. than all the medicines that can be thrown into them. No matter what the season is, hot or cold, wet or feverish; the European soldier is sent off with his corps or detachment provided by the government with tentage alone; no carriage for his baggage or family; no warm clothing in the shape of bedding, &c. allowed (not even straw), he rests upon the ground, wet or dry, and can but at best protect himself from damp, or the myriads of insects that torment him, by throwing up a small mound around his birth, and adding some straw or grass. If he is unwell, he is sent to the hospital, and stripped of his warm jacket, and furnished with the hospital dress, composed of folds of blue cotton cloth; the trowsers, night-cap, and bedding the same. He undergoes possibly a course of mercury, or some such process of medicine. He lies extended on the cold ground, no bed-place or plank being allowed, and he thus continues under his hospital regimen, until he is cured; but how seldom is


that the case! and of the many who enter a Field Hospital, how few ever return! We have seen a field of battle, and we have seen some of our own Field Hospitals, and the contrast of distress was deplorable on the side of the latter. In the former it is chance of war, and what we must look to in our profession; but in the latter, the wretched rows of Europeans stretched out on the cold and naked ground, under fevers, &c. and these moving off by two and three a day to their graves, solely through want of comfortable clothing and nourishing diet, is what humanity cannot reflect on without shuddering. We fancy as much depends upon the warm and secure condition in which a patient's body is kept from damp, cold, &c. for the due efficacy of medicine, as upon the quality of the medicine itself; and we know by our own experience and observation, that putting an unfortunate man under a course of mercury on a cold floor, without bedding or covering, is but hurrying on the fate of the wretched sufferer.

Closing the subject of the Army in India, we must likewise make allowance for a considerable deduction, if called to the field, from each Native corps of cavalry and infantry, allowing for those on recruiting service, sick, desertions, and a thousand duties that fall in a war to Native troops, which would reduce the effective line of each battalion from 900 to 600 or 700 ; so that from our Native army, cavalry and infantry, 131,400, we could seldom move to the field 80,000 ; and this would be the *utmost possible stretch*, leaving, of course, a certain quota of troops for the protection and peace of the interior. That number of Native troops will be of a relative value to us in proportion as they shall be coupled with European troops : thus, 50,000 Natives, with 12,000 Europeans, would, we are confident, be equal to any European army that could reach India of 50,000 men ; but 20,000 Natives of themselves, such as they are at present, would have but a poor chance of success against half that number of an European enemy. Of such vital importance

is our European stock and ingredient to the army of India: to the numbers, solidity, and compact order of which we must ever look with steady regard, whether in contests internally or externally.

Yours, &c.


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
ROUGH SKETCH of the GROUND PLAN of ASSEERGHUR its OUTWORKS, PETTAH &c.

REFERENCES.

- 1, 2, 3, 4. Mortar-Batteries playing principally on the upper works.
- 5, 6. 24, 16, & 12 pounders.
7. Breaching the lower retaining wall.
8. Knocking off the defences.
9. 18 & 12 pounders breaching Malappur & knocking off the upper works.
10. Two 12 pounders & one Howitzer dealing above & below & rooting the Enemy out from the ravines on Malappur.
11. A Breaching Battery for the South side of Malappur.
- 12, 13, 14. Position of the troops occupying the Pettah on the 19th of March when the Garrison sallied out to Lt Col's Prisoners.



Sketch by P. Williams, 18th March, 1850.



APPENDIX

General Orders by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General.

Head-Quarters, Camp Imleeah, 9th Dec. 1817.

HIS Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, adverting to the peculiar and desultory nature of the warfare, in which so many separate divisions and detachments are at present engaged, against the Pindarrees, is pleased to order and declare, that all lawful prize which may be captured from the enemy, shall be considered as the property of that division only by which, or by detachments from which, it shall have been seized.

General and other officers in command of divisions or distinct corps, are accordingly authorized to divide lawful prize, captured by the troops under their orders, according to the rules and usages of His Majesty's service.

The Governor-General is pleased to determine, that all captured horses deemed fit for army purposes, or for the stud, shall be set apart and reserved for the service of government; and commanding officers of divisions are directed to authorize immediate payment to the captors, at the regulation prices, for all such horses duly approved by a committee of competent officers.

(Signed)

J. YOUNG,

*Secretary to the Governor-Gen.,
Military Department.*

General Orders by His Excellency the Most
Noble the Governor-General.

Head Quarters, Camp Koolurje, on
the Terrai, 8th April, 1818.

His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, anticipating the sanction of the Crown and of the Honourable Company, is pleased to order and direct, that all lawful prize, captured since the 20th of October 1817, from the Powers now or lately at war with the British Government, shall be distributed at the earliest possible period among the several armies, divisions, and corps of His Majesty's service, or of

the three Presidencies, engaged in the combined operations of the campaign in Hindoostan and the Deekan, under the general command of the Most Noble the Commander-in-Chief in India.

His Excellency accordingly authorizes the Most Noble the Commander-in-Chief to cause Prize Agents to be named, and the distribution to be made conformably to the usages of the British service in similar cases. In the common prize-fund will be included all sums awarded, or to be awarded, as valuation of guns and stores taken or destroyed by any division or portion of the general force employed during the war. The Most Noble the Commander-in-Chief will be pleased to direct, that all proceeds of prize already realized be paid forthwith into the hands of the officers in charge of the pay departments with the several armies or divisions, who will grant quadruplicate receipts for the amount, one copy of which will be retained by the person depositing the money, and by the officer under whose authority the deposit shall be made; and two will be sent to the Military Secretary, to the Commander-in-Chief, of which one will be deposited in His Lordship's office, and the other transmitted to the office of the Secretary to Government in the military department.

All prize property not yet sold, or that may be captured hereafter, will be delivered over to the Commissariat department with the capturing division, and will be there disposed of to the best advantage for the benefit of the troops, or appropriated, at a fair valuation to be acquiesced in by the Commanding Officer, for the use of Government, similar receipts being granted for the amount.

If any proceeds of prize or prize-money shall have already been divided by any corps or divisions of the armies in the field, the Governor-General directs, that an exact account of the same, and of the manner of its distribution, may be rendered by the Commanding Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, or Prize Agents, in order that the quota already shared by each individual may be deducted from the dividend which shall ultimately be assigned to him out of the general fund.

Doubts having arisen how far the provisions of the General Order of the 9th December last are to be considered as applicable under the more regular character which the campaign has assumed since that period, the Governor-General takes this opportunity of declaring that General Order to be in full force in regard to booty

captured from the Pindarrees only, but no other description of prize. All property lawfully captured from the troops of any Power at war with the British Government, although Pindarree forces may have been mixed with such troops in action, is to be considered as falling within the provisions of the General Order now promulgated.

(Signed) J. YOUNG,
*Secretary to the Gov. Gen.
Military Department.*

A true Copy.

(Signed) GEO. CADELL,
A. A. General.

Camp at Rajapoor, May 5th, 1818.

The Committee being assembled for the purpose of consulting regarding property lately discovered in the town of Nassuck to a very considerable amount, determine on the following resolutions.

The Committee, contemplating the nature in which the jewels, &c. &c. have fallen into the possession of Captain Briggs, do not hesitate in declaring it to be their opinion, that it resulted entirely from the information given in the President's letter, dated the 21st ultimo, and the rapid and successful operations of the

troops under the command of Lieut.-colonel M'Dowell.

The surrender of (19) forts, together with the several towns, to the Sebundies of the Civil authority, can only be attributed to the presence of the regular troops employed in conquering the country; in support of which the following is a strong instance:—

During the offensive operations against Trim-buck, Captain Briggs detached a party of Sebundies with a Killedar to take possession of the fort of Wajeera. The Killedar continued to fire upon Captain Briggs's party until Trim-buck had fallen, when Wajeera, with several other forts, immediately solicited the protection of the British Government.

Considerations of the Prize Committee, in support of their claims to the jewels, &c. &c. in question; should any doubt arise as to its not being the just and lawful prize property of the troops employed in subduing the authority of Badjee Row, and his adherents in arms, against the British government.

1st. The total inability of the present increased number of Sebundies, under Captain Briggs, to have forced even the weakest of the

22 forts that have surrendered* in consequence of the operations of the detachment.

2nd. The force or reputation of our arms, and our vicinity to Nassuck, enabled Captain Briggs's peons to proceed in advance of the detachment, and establish the Civil authority in the town.

3rd. The improbability that even an open town like Nassuck would have yielded to a much stronger detachment of irregulars, than that sent on by Captain Briggs, when it is a known fact, that part of the garrison of Trim-buck only quitted the town the day that Col. M'Dowell's detachment encamped there.

4th. That positive resistance has not hitherto been considered necessary to entitle the detachment to public property, is exemplified in the instances of Unkie Tunkie, Indeego, and Doorub†.

5th. That Nassuck was capable of resistance, that is, it contained troops, and treasures of killedars and adherents of Badjee Row.

* Unkie-Tunkie, Rajdier, Indeego, Doorub, Trim-buck, Hurruz, Wajeera, Rowleygew, Sownye, Eywutta, Achola, Marumdah, Rowla, Jowla, Charcumah, Caldher, Hutger, Ramchaize, Curwarra, Bascurgur, Jingurrah, Irenjulwarry.

† Nassuck and many other towns are now occupied by the Seebundies of the Civil authority.

6th. That the object of this force, is to subdue and take possession of this part of the country, and by attaining which, the detachment is fully entitled to the Sircar property, that by established custom falls to the conquerors.

Terms of the Surrender of the Fort of Singhur.

Camp near Singhur, March 2, 1818.

Ram Chunder Choudry consents to surrender the Fort of Singhur to Brigadier-General Pritzer on the following conditions:—

1st. As soon as an officer on the part of the General shall reach the gateway, it shall be made over to him.

2d. The garrison shall march out with their arms and their private property. The Arabs and Gosaions shall proceed to Ellichpore, and shall not take service, nor enter into any intrigues on their road. Hostages shall be given for the observance of this article,—Acheans on the part of the Arabs and two Hahunts on the part of the Gosaions. Passports in the name of the British Government shall be furnished, and Hircarrahs sent to accompany the Arabs and Gosaions to Ellichpore; on the return of the

Hircarrahs, the hostages shall be released,—but should the Arabs and Gosaions not proceed to Ellichpore, or should they enter into any service, or any intrigues on the way, the hostages shall suffer death. The Mahrattas of the garrison shall give two hostages to be kept a month for their not entering into any service, but returning quietly to their homes. All persons shall be liable to search in removing their private property.

3d. The Chowdry and his Carcoans and other servants shall not be obstructed in removing their private property.

4th. All property belonging to Badjee Row, or his chiefs, or their dependants, or to bankers, or Ryots, shall be made over untouched to any person commissioned by the General to receive it; if it should appear that any part of it is removed by the garrison, or by the Chowdry himself or his people, the Chowdry shall be bound to make it good, and to answer for the breach of the capitulation.

(Signed)

THEOP^s. PRITZLER,

Camp near Singhur, March 2, 1818.

Brigadier-General.

A true Copy.

(Signed)

THEOP^s. PRITZLER.

Camp near Poonah, May 19, 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to inclose copies of various letters that have passed between General Doveton, Captain Briggs, Colonel M'Dowell, and the Prize Agents in Khandeish, and myself, regarding some treasure found at Nassuck. The property alluded to was lodged in a fort in Gungtorry, belonging to the Agent of Roop Ram Choudry. When Lingen surrendered, the Agent ordered his other forts to be made over to us, and warned the persons entrusted with the treasure to remove it; they did so, and concealed it in a private house in Nassuck; but the place of its concealment becoming known to the Agent, he conceived himself at liberty to disclose it to me; I immediately wrote a minute description of the place where the treasure was hidden to Captain Briggs, who managed with much sagacity and address to secure the whole; the value is said by the Choudry's Agent to be 76 lacs of rupees, but, independent of the chance of exaggeration, the property (being chiefly jewels) is not of a description likely to sell for its full value.

It is necessary to mention that the occupation of Nassuck by Captain Briggs's Sebundies was

reported to me in a letter dated 10th of April last: the detachment was then only at, or near Rajdier, and did not reach Nassuck till the 20th or 21st of that month.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. ELPHINSTON.

To John Adam, Esq. &c. &c.

A true Copy,

(Signed)

H. TOVEY.

Statement taken on the 3d May, 1818, regarding the circumstances which led to the occupation of the Town of Nassuck, and the discovery afterwards in that place of jewels and treasure belonging to Badjee Row, said to be of the value of seventy-six lacs of rupees.

WHEN the detachment I command moved towards the Gungtorry province, beginning of last April, Captain Briggs, who was directed to act under the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone, sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territory conquered from the Peishwah, applied to me for 300 auxiliary horse, to send forward with some Sebundies to summon and take possession of Nassuck.

The surrender of Unkie Tunkie, on the 5th of this month, and the approach of the detachment, as well as the appearance of the horse and Sebundies, induced the inhabitants of that town to take protection. After the fall of Rajdier the evacuation in consequence of Indrie, Dhoorup, and some other hill-forts of less note, the detachment marched towards Trim buck, and on the 19th encamped within a mile of Nassuck, where it remained for two days; during this time the Prize Committee gained positive information that property to a very large amount belonging to Badjee Row was concealed in the town.

Major Andrews, the President, applied to me to be permitted to search for it, I sent this letter to Captain Briggs, who wrote in reply that he could not allow a search without permission of the sole Commissioner; this was on the 21st of April.

Meantime I marched the detachment to the siege of Trim buck; after the fall of that fortress, on the 29th, I returned to the neighbourhood of Nassuck: at this time an answer to Major Andrews's application for making the search was anxiously looked for.

On the 1st of May Captain Briggs requested

to speak with me. He told me he had just received a letter of great consequence from the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone, on the subject of concealed treasure belonging to Badjee Row in the town of Nassuck; he then read that part of the letter which mentioned the street and house where it was hidden, as well as the name of the man who had charge of it. After some conversation regarding the best place to secure it, it was agreed that I should take a party of pioneers, and a detachment of Seapoys, and go early next morning with Captain Briggs into Nassuck. Shortly after, I took Captain Briggs aside, and told him the Seapoys and pioneers would be ready at Gunfire: he then said he would first ascertain, by going in by himself, if the man was in the town, and afterwards would write to me to bring in the pioneers and Seapoys.

He accordingly went in next morning, and in the course of the day I received a note from Captain Briggs saying that he could not gain any information regarding the man, but added, it will be as well to send in the pioneers and Seapoys: I ordered them off, and as it was late, I recommended that guards should be placed over the house during the night, and that I should be with him early next morning.

I accordingly went in, and found that the jewels, &c. had been dug up during the night, and secured by the regular troops of the detachment.

I then called on Captain Briggs, who related the circumstances and particulars, and told me at the same time, that silver articles to the amount of 12,000 rupees had also been discovered with the Nassuck jewels, and that those articles had been brought into Nassuck from a hill-fort, a dependency of Trimbuck. He then requested I would send a money tumbril to lodge the treasure, which I did, and afterwards detached a company under an European officer to escort it to camp.

(Signed) ANDREW M'DOWELL,

Lieut.-Col. Commanding det. Hyd. Subs. force.

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